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Abstract
Multilateral treaties’ success depends in large part on decisions made during
their drafting and negotiations. Lack of support from key states, weak or
non-binding commitments, and sweeping reservations often doom treaties to
ineffectiveness or worse. Challenges to treaty effectiveness have inspired significant
bodies of research in international law and relations. Yet existing research in these
fields has given little systematic attention to negotiations or to the political origins
of treaties generally.
This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of treaty-making through
both theory development and empirical analysis. I first develop a positive
decision-theoretical model of the factors that states consider in drafting, negotiating,
approving, and ratifying multilateral treaties. The model considers states’ right
to opt-out of a treaty and that right’s several implications: that treaty-making
entails a three-stage decisional process unique in democratic lawmaking, and that
treaty externalities and the quantity and character of future members both affect
states’ decisional logic during negotiations. These phenomena have not been
fully appreciated in either the legal or international relations literatures, much less
formally theorized.
I then apply these insights to analyze real-world drafting efforts. Using a novel
technique, I code the drafting states’ recorded positions based on three treaties’
negotiating histories, and I use them to estimate states’ ideal points on multiple
x
issues. My findings demonstrate that this method can predict states’ ratifications
and reservations with reasonable accuracy.
The analysis provides new insights into how international law is created and
implemented, and under what circumstances it meaningfully affects later state
behaviors. Specifically, the issues that divide states differ across treaties, and I
find evidence that states’ preferences for particular treaty provisions coincide with
those we would expect of utility-maximizing states. That the state positions predict
subsequent behavior implies that treaty negotiations yield a rich trove of relatively
authentic revealed state preferences. This finding suggests that, in addition to
fueling theory and data-generation, these methods and the insights they provide




In a late-night meeting in Paris on December 12, 2015, 196 countries adopted by
consensus a major multilateral agreement, the Paris Agreement on climate change,
the latest agreement under the umbrella of the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). The late-night victory – producing a standing ovation
among some 50,000 attendees and cheers and tears among the delegates – came
after two weeks of intense negotiations full of diplomatic obstacles and several
deadlocks.1 Getting 196 countries to agree to cut emissions was no small feat:
prior UNFCCC conferences since Kyoto had revealed major schisms between the
developing and developed world and had been less successful, such as the 2009
Copenhagen Accord, which failed to produce a binding agreement.2 This time
was different. The Danish host in Copenhagen had made a number of mistakes:
the conference had focused on “important countries,” perturbing small states, and
the drafting process was overly rushed.3 By contrast, the experienced members of
the French diplomatic corps used a number of innovative techniques to move the
discussion forward. They consulted all delegates in confidential meetings (called
1 Fiona Harvey, Paris Climate Change Agreement: The World’s Greatest Diplomatic Success,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 14, 2015.
2 Kevin Rudd, Paris Can’t Be Another Copenhagen, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2015, available at https:
//www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/opinion/kevin-rudd-paris-cant-be-another-copenhagen.html.
3 Why Did Copenhagen Fail to Deliver a Climate Deal?, BBC NEWS, Aug. 22, 2009.
1
confessionals); they held “informal informals” whereby small groups of delegates
negotiated over small portions of the treaty text (the parts of the treaty still in
“square brackets”); and they used the Zulu tradition of “indabas,” whereby elders
(in this case, up to 80 states) convened to discuss disputes. They also strategically
employed Barack Obama, Francois Hollande, and Angela Merkel to talk with
reluctant world leaders, including Xi Jinping, Narendra Modi, and Vladimir Putin,
in private.
But arguably the most important break-through came three days before
the final vote, when the “coalition of high ambition” was announced. This
coalition cut through the entrenched developing-country/developed-country
divides, presenting a coalition of countries that wanted a more ambitious treaty.
As the EU climate commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete put it, “[t]hese negotiations
are not about them and us. They are about all of us, developed and developing
countries, finding common ground and solutions together.”4 Thus, while some
of the countries within the group initially found themselves at opposite sides of
the negotiating table, they realized they had similar goals and ambitions. This
breakthrough was crucial in reaching the final agreement. With all of the world
leaders involved, some 600,000 people marching around the world, and, given
a “last chance” to take decisive global action to address climate change,5 they
overcame old divides, formed a new coalition, and concluded the treaty.
Many attempts at multilateral treaties end very differently. Most drafting
conferences are relatively low-profile affairs, and if there are deeply entrenched
divides, negotiation efforts simply break down. To mention just one example,
4 Karl Mathiesen & Fiona Harvey, Climate Coalition Breaks Cover in Paris to Push for Binding and
Ambitious Deal, GUARDIAN, Dec. 8, 2015.
5 Fiona Harvey, Paris Climate Change Agreement: The World’s Greatest Diplomatic Success,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 14, 2015 (quoting Miguel Arias Canete, Europe’s climate chief).
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negotiations over ILO Convention 169 broke down in 1989 over whether to include
the term “peoples,” instead of “people” or “population,” and whether doing so
entailed peoples’ right to self-determination, which blocked the Convention for a
full two years (Engle 2011).6 Short of the kind of circumstances that surrounded the
Paris Agreement, it is often hard to break such deadlock.
International lawyers and scholars know well the challenges of persuading key
states to engage with multilateral treaties, including the significant concessions that
are often required. In some cases, treaties’ strong provisions deter states from
joining, preventing the agreement from receiving enough support to take effect
or otherwise function properly (a failure of depth over breadth in the so-called
“broader-deeper tradeoff”) (Gilligan 2004). For instance, the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement of 2011 received only one ratifier (Japan) before protests in Europe
effectively doomed the treaty after the European Parliament declined to consent
(Floridi 2015; Weatherall 2011).7 The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention
of the International Labour Organization likewise failed to attract states with
substantial native populations, such as the United States, New Zealand, Australia,
and Canada (Engle 2011).8
In other cases, many states have ratified ambitious treaties so riddled with
6 Engle (2011) writes that “Indigenous participants’ insistence on the term ’peoples’ blocked the
convention’s adoption at one point, leading to two years of negotiation and an eventual compromise,
after which the term ’peoples’ was finally included, but alongside a provision that disclaimed the
attachment of any international rights to the term. Specifically, ’[t]he use of the term peoples in this
Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which might
attach under international law.”’
7 Another example is the Migrant Workers’ Convention, which mainly ensured support from
sending-countries, not receiving-countries, and is widely considered a failed treaty (see, e.g., Lyon
2009) (observing that for the United States and other “migrant-receiving” countries, the Convention
is a “political non-starter”).
8 With some 22 parties and low prospects for future ratifiers, further progress on indigenous
people’s rights is now being made through non-binding “soft law,” such as the UN General
Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res. 61/295, 13 Sept. 2007).
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reservations that they lack real bite. Saudi Arabia’s reservation to the Women’s
Rights Convention states that “in case of contradiction between any term of the
Convention and the norms of Islamic law,” it is not bound (see, e.g., Clark 1991;
Riddle 2002). Another well-known example is the Genocide Convention, whose
reservations are so significant that it led the International Court of Justice to revisit
the doctrine of reservations entirely.9 And some treaties are widely ratified but
only after substantial dilution during negotiations (a failure of breadth over depth).
For example, the legally binding character of the 2016 Paris climate agreement was
dramatically scaled down; part of the goal was to allow the U.S. president to ratify
without advice and consent from the Senate (Bodansky 2016) (which, in June 2017,
became a moot point).10
These consensus-building problems have plagued international conventions for
over a century. Especially in recent decades, they have inspired a discourse among
legal academics and practitioners over how to address negotiation failures. For
example, some international legal scholars have argued that certain provisions of
widely ratified treaties represent customary international law and therefore bind
even non-parties.11 Others have made normative arguments that certain states have
moral obligations or utilitarian reasons for joining certain popular treaties (see, e.g.,
Delmont 2001; Koh 2002). For treaties riddled with reservations, international legal
scholars have asked what to do with those reservations that undermine the object
and purpose of the treaty (Goodman 2002) and what to make of states’ objections to
9 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15 (May 28) [hereinafter “ICJ Advisory Opinion on
Reservations”].
10 In June 2017 the Trump administration announced its intention to withdraw from the agreement
anyway. Paris Climate Deal: Trump Pulls US Out of 2015 Accord, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2017, available at
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40127326.
11 There is disagreement on the question of whether and to what extent multilateral treaties might
provide evidence of the existence of international custom (See Roberts 2001).
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them (anonymous note 1951; Ginsburg 2018; Redgwell 2017). For treaties with weak
provisions, other scholars have advocated strengthening them through creative
interpretation and litigation.12 Indeed, a substantial fraction of the international
legal literature is devoted to exactly these kinds of problems.
In international relations, a strand of research has treated the content of
international agreements as the dependent variable, asking what phenomena
predict certain treaty features, and conjecturing that treaties reflect rational state
interests. For example, Koremenos et al. (2001) argue that treaties are largely
the product of states’ pursuing self-interested international goals. Koremenos
(2005, 2013, 2016) empirically supports this conjecture, showing that agreements
often contain mechanisms tailored to the particular cooperation problems facing
the parties. These studies do not attempt to observe directly how states pursue
their objectives through treaty design; rather, they infer that states adopt treaty
provisions that will help them address the issues that impede cooperation on the
issues addressed.
Thus, all these literatures focus on events after the treaty’s negotiation and
adoption. Scholars have paid little systematic attention to what happens before:
specifically, how global welfare might be improved at the drafting and negotiation
stages. To be sure, the unique dynamic of multilateral treaty-making has not been
lost on international legal scholars; a large body of research has analyzed particular
negotiations. Both historians (e.g., Davidson 1992) and legal scholars studying
the history of international institutions (e.g., Hathaway and Shapiro 2017) have
12 There are many examples. For instance, the Spanish Supreme Court recently found that the
decisions by human rights treaty bodies are legally binding on Spain, even though human rights
treaties make clear that they are not. As another example, the Committee Against Torture effectively
has interpreted away the difference between torture and cruel, unusual and degrading treatment.
(See Committee Against Torture, General Comment 2, Implementation of article 2 by States Parties,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2/CRP. 1/Rev.4 (2007)).
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contributed to this literature. But no research has attempted to build a universal
theory of treaty-making applicable to both past and future negotiations.
Through theory development and an empirical study of several real-world
drafting efforts, this dissertation attempts to do so. I show that statements made
during multilateral treaty negotiations predict states’ subsequent international legal
behavior, even years later. Moreover, I develop a method that, by drawing on these
insights, might be used to improve future treaty-making. As with all theory, the
model necessarily simplifies the world. But in doing so, it produces a framework
that generalizes between treaties, across issue areas, and over time. I hope that
this framework will be useful to international relations scholars, international legal
scholars, and international lawyers who study, create, and interpret many types of
multilateral treaties.
In Chapters 2 and 3, I first show how treaties can be modeled spatially, and I
then develop a formal decision-theoretical model that explains what factors states
consider in drafting, negotiating, approving, and ratifying multilateral treaties.
The goal of this theory is to better understand states’ decisional logic in their
interactions with other states through the different stages of the treaty-making
process. International law scholars are aware that treaty-making is a fundamentally
different exercise than other forms of lawmaking (Aust 2013; Benedetti et al.
2013), but the consequences of the differences have not been fully appreciated in
either the legal or international relations literatures. In contrast with most other
institutions, treaties allow their participants to opt in or out of the legal regime.
Treaties generally permit all potential parties to participate in the negotiations,
but no state is bound to the resulting treaty’s terms unless it voluntarily accepts
them through ratification. This fact distinguishes treaty-making from nearly
every other democratic lawmaking process, in which all actors are bound to the
6
collectively adopted law. I show that this rule causes treaty-making to unfold in
three decisional stages: (1) a negotiation stage, (2) an adoption stage, and (3) a
ratification/reservation stage. In deciding their respective negotiation strategies,
states must anticipate the actions in later stages – both their own and that of other
states – that is, they must look down the decision tree. Most notably, whether or not
states intend to ratify in the third stage affects their advocacy behavior in the first
stage. This, of course, creates a sort of circular dilemma, as states cannot know with
certainty whether they will ratify until they have observed the outcome of the first
two stages.
This model is not just a theoretical exercise: it can predict state ratifications and
reservations when applied to actual treaties. To apply my model to real-world
treaty-making, Chapter 4 explains how to use treaties’ legislative history, called
the travaux préparatoires (or just travaux), by converting it into quantitative data.
To analyze the negotiating data, I use ideal-point estimation to determine the
positions of states relative to each other, to the status quo, and to the treaty.
I use an item-response theory, a form of Bayesian statistical preference-scaling,
which draws on states’ recorded positions to estimate states’ ideal points in one
or more dimensions. Applying these methods to treaty-making requires some
methodological innovations; they were developed for domestic legislatures and
must be modified to account for the unique properties of treaty-making.
In Chapter 5, I apply the method to three treaties: the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, and the Convention on the Status of Refugees. CERD
is a global convention designed to formally condemn all forms of racism and to
promote national legal mechanisms that reduce and eventually eliminate racism
around the world. It was opened for signature in 1965 and entered into force in
7
1969. The Rome Statute established the world’s first permanent international court
with jurisdiction over an array of international crimes. It was finalized in 1998 and
entered into force in 2002. The Refugee Convention was adopted in response to
the refugee crisis created by World War II and the Holocaust. It requires its parties
to provide limited protections to people arriving at the border who would suffer
government-sponsored or enabled persecution if returned to their home countries.
It was drafted from 1950–51 and entered into force in 1954.
For those treaties, it turns out that the positions that states took during
the negotiations predict ratification. For CERD, it also predicts reservations,
declarations, and understandings (RUDs). For the Rome Statute, the negotiating
positions predict future implementation efforts. To perform this analysis, I
introduce several methodological and research-design innovations. First, I
introduce the concept of dual ideal points and show how the concept complicates
states’ decision-making when contemplating creating and joining an institution
with substantial externalities. The concept does not apply to most democratic
lawmaking. But it might be usefully applied to other institutions that involve both a
voluntary opt-in rule and externalities, as with many constitutional conventions.
The second methodological innovation is the process of converting qualitative
records of negotiations into “votes” for the purpose of ideal-point estimation.13
Finally, I show how, in applying spatial public choice theory to empirical position
data, a researcher can construct policy points – the status quo and the treaty – as if
they were political actors by estimating the position that each would take on each
issue.
Taken together, the theoretical model and its empirical application provide
13 See also James Morrow, “The International Legislature,” National Science Foundation Grant
Application (2004).
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important insights for international law and relations scholars, which I explain
in Chapter 6. Although we seem to have entered a period of general growing
hostility towards international cooperation, global problems persist, and new
treaties are emerging in response. Trade barriers, climate change, and the growing
refugee crisis are among the global problems that best lend themselves to formal,
multilateral cooperation (Cope and Crabtree 2019). I hope that this dissertation
will contribute to these debates, first of all, by providing an analytical framework
for analyzing these problems and, second, by providing empirical insights into
real-world drafting efforts. Among these insights is that states’ negotiating positions
are generally not “cheap talk” (Farrell and Rabin 1996) and that what states say
during the negotiations predicts their subsequent behavior in meaningful ways.
Many scholars and practitioners have long believed as much, but I develop the first
tool for demonstrating it empirically and applying its implications going forward.
More specifically, states’ negotiating positions predict subsequent ratification, as
well as the entering of reservations, declarations, and understandings, and, to a
lesser extent, domestic legal implementation. The fact that these behaviors were
foreseeable at the time of drafting offers important new insights for long-standing
international legal debates on ratification and reservations.
In addition to improving our theoretical understanding of treaty-making, the
method might even be applied to ongoing treaty drafting. I expect that the method
will eventually be able to process negotiating records more comprehensively
and more quickly than any individual negotiator could, thereby aiding future
negotiations and interpretation. Negotiators on the ground have neither the
benefit of hindsight nor a bird’s-eye view of the negotiation. In the flurry of
fast-moving talks involving more than 100 states, delegates rarely have the ability
to see how all the issues fit together or how seemingly unconnected states might
9
form useful alliances. The empirical technique that I develop can help states and
intergovernmental organizations do so by showing the relationships between key
elements on each set of important issues. The ability to analyze the evolving





Realists in world politics think of the international system as a state of chaos
(Morgenthau 1985; Waltz 1979). In this telling, states struggle with each other
in a anarchic world, where, in the words of Thucydides, “the strong do what
they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Hornblower 1996).1 But in
modern world politics, this zero-sum state of conflict describes only a fraction of
international interactions. Like domestic political actors, states can often benefit
from jointly agreeing to constrain themselves from “do[ing] what they can.” In fact,
states throughout history have routinely bargained and reached mutually beneficial
agreements, even in the face of impending war (Fearon 1995).2 A large fraction
of these agreements are multilateral conventions: treaties open to many states, and
often, all states. These agreements are often drafted and negotiated in legislative-like
settings, with representatives from states and NGOs working to draw up initial
provisions in committees, followed by sometimes months of debate and revisions
in a plenary conference. Indeed, partly for this reason, scholars often analogize
multilateral treaties to domestic legislation (Mahoney 2006).
1 A better translation of the original Greek is probably “The powerful exact what they can, and
the weak have to comply” (Hornblower 1996).
2 Finding ways to promote adherence with those agreements is a different story, and one beyond
the scope of this manuscript. Indeed, the mechanisms by which they motivate states to change their
behavior are more nuanced and complex than in most domestic systems (Guzman 2008; Scott and
Stephan 2006).
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As international lawyers and scholars are well aware, however, treaty-making
differs in key ways from domestic lawmaking (Benedetti et al. 2013). Benedetti
et al. note that treaty-making is thought of as a “product of its own kind,” neither
“legislative” in “the way that laws are made” nor “like the make of resolutions in
governing bodies, such as the United Nations General Assembly.” Scholars have
noted that treaty-making bodies are not continuously constituted; they assemble for
limited periods to complete the discrete task of drafting a treaty. One consequence
of this difference is that when negotiations deadlock, it is often more difficult to
simply resume discussion later, after positions may have hardened, often because of
feedback from polarized domestic stakeholders (Benedetti et al. 2013). For example,
for the Rome Conference, when the Conference seemed to be moving on without
U.S. support, the U.S. delegation asked for an additional 2–3 days; the Chairman
denied that request to maintain momentum and with the idea that, after a recess,
the conference and the alliances would not be the same (Benedetti et al. 2013).
In contrast with domestic legislatures, the ad hoc nature of treaty-making
bodies also makes it difficult for delegates to trade support (i.e., “log-roll”) across
different treaties (Morrow and Cope 2018). Treaties are also different from domestic
legislation in that they represent a series of votes or expressions of consensus
on related proposals, rather than an up-or-down vote on an entire bill. As the
International Court of Justice observed in its advisory opinion on reservations,
even multilateral treaties approved by consensus are “nevertheless adopted through
a series of majority votes” (ICJ Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951). Sometimes,
drafting conferences vote on a package of proposals, as with the Rome Statute and
the Law of the Sea, but this is unusual. Indeed, the parliamentary rules of both the
UN General Assembly and most preparatory committees actively discourage this.
(Benedetti et al. 2013). Other observers have emphasized the consensual nature of
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treaty-making relative to domestic legislation. For instance, many important issues
in treaty-drafting are not formally voted on because states operate by consensus
(Bederman 1993).
Although scholars have noted the several unique properties of treaty-making,
those properties have never been fleshed out into a general theory of treaty-making.
I do so here. To provide some basic building blocks, I first introduce a basic
public-choice spatial model of lawmaking, which is widely used in economics and
political science, and occasionally, law.3 Chapter 3 introduces my own contribution,
which adapts the spatial model to account for the unique features of treaty-making.
To do so, I model the factors that shape states’ dynamic decisional logic through
each stage of treaty-making. The core insights from this theory are: (1) we can
model states’ making treaties in three stages, with each stage involving factors that
influence states’ strategic calculations; (2) in determining their actions at the first two
stages, states must look to later stages in the decision tree and anticipate the payoffs
from different scenarios; and (3) in contrast to other kinds of democratic lawmaking,
treaty-making has a unique third stage – the decision to ratify or not – which impacts
states’ strategic calculations in ways that are unique to treaty-making.
Different classes of international problems call for different types of treaties to
address them (Koremenos 2016; Koremenos et al. 2001). The type of problem that a
treaty is intended to solve affects the nature of the negotiations, including states’
strategic negotiating logic. Some treaties address problems of collaboration, like
trade agreements, which reflect parties’ commitment not to impose trade barriers.
Collaboration problems (sometimes called market failures ) occur when two or more
states are positioned to take actions that affect each other, and each state has a
dominant strategy, that is, an action that – for any given action of the other state(s)
3 Readers familiar with spatial models may wish to skip ahead to Chapter 3.
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– produces the best possible outcome for the first state, but which is nonetheless
is sub-optimal among all possible outcomes for both states. Put differently, the
“dilemma arises when the Pareto-optimal outcome that the actors mutually desire
is not an equilibrium outcome” (Snidal 1985; Stein 1982). The classic prisoners’
dilemma typifies this situation (Setear 1996).
Other treaties solve problems of coordination, like the Chicago Convention on
Aviation,4 which ensures that pilots are able to communicate effectively in the same
language, among other things. In contrast to collaboration problems, coordination
problems exist when each state’s preferred outcome depends on what other states
will do, creating multiple equilibria. That is, neither state has a dominant strategy.
Although each state may have a first-choice of action for it and its partners, each
state would rather take other states’ favored actions (almost whatever they are)
than pursue its first-choice action alone. Where all states share the same first
choice of standard, there exist no distributional issues, and cooperation is rather
trivial. But where they differ on the preferred standard, distributional problems
may frustrate reaching consensus. Thus, coordination problems may or may not
contain distributional issues (see Hardin 2015; Heymann 1973; Schelling 1980).
Once a coordination problem is solved through international consensus, it generally
becomes self-enforcing. That is, rational states will continue to adhere to the norms
it provides, even absent any external consequences for violating them. This occurs
for the same reason that people from Great Britain (usually) drive on the right side
of the road when they visit most of the rest of the world. They would do so even
if it were not legally enforced. They might prefer that everyone drive on the left
side, but they cannot accomplish that unilaterally, and they much prefer the oddity
4 Convention on International Civil Aviation (also known as the Chicago Convention), signed
Dec. 7, 1944 (Stein 1982)
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of right-side driving to a head-on collision.
Still other treaties do not promote interstate cooperation in the traditional sense.
Instead they create rules for how states must regulate themselves internally. This
configuration describes most human rights treaties, which set norms for how states
treat their own nationals.
The spatial model I develop can explain negotiations over any of these treaty
types. The model is a useful way to analyze the issues that a given treaty addresses
by depicting graphically those issues and the states’ positions on them. A given
treaty comprises numerous important issues, and the treaty can address each of
those issues in any number of ways. A spatial model depicts these relationships
in physical space, either one-dimensional (a line) or multi-dimensional (a plane or
3+-dimensional space). The policy alternatives for each issue can then be ordered
along a continuum in each dimension in some logical order. For instance, the
dominant issue in many trade treaties is to what extent to reduce trade barriers
(including tariffs and non-tariff barriers). Consider Panel A in Figure 2.1 below,
which depicts the range of options on key issues for a hypothetical trade treaty. The
smallest reductions in trade barriers would lie on the left end of the continuum;
the largest would lie at the right end. But states also differ on other issues, such
as the mechanism for filing complaints and retaliating against offending states.
Decentralized mechanisms that rely on voluntary state cooperation for compliance
would lie toward the bottom of the continuum, while centralized mechanisms that
strongly coerce compliance would lie near the top. States may align differently on
these two sets of issues. The ‘treaty points’ tA and tB depict hypothetical treaties
comprising different variations of these two policies.
Likewise, Panel B depicts how a global environmental treaty might address

























Trade Treaty (2 dimensions)
tA: A treaty with high tariff levels and most non-tariff
barriers permitted; enforcement mechanism typically
imposes significant penalties for violations
tB : A treaty with tariffs nearly eliminated and
most non-tariff barriers prohibited; remedy for
non-compliance is a system of voluntary, collective































Environmental Treaty (3 dimensions)
tC : A treaty with moderate emissions-reduction
goals, relatively high burden on high emitters,
and fairly effective mechanism for enforcing
non-compliance
tD : A treaty with ambitious emissions-reduction
goals, the burden of reduction roughly equally
distributed between high and low emitters, and an
effective mechanism for enforcing non-compliance
Figure 2.1: Continua of Issues for Two Hypothetical Treaties
restrictions are distributed among states that emit high and low levels of pollution
(y), and the nature of the enforcement mechanism (z). Treaties tC and tD show how
the policy choices might manifest in two different treaties. For both panels, the
points s denote the status quo. Whenever states are considering drafting a treaty,
there are a set of existing international rules (or lack thereof) already in place.
For some agreements, that means essentially few or no such rules; for others, the
existing international framework is already quite robust. Regardless, this set of
status-quo rules can also be located in this space.
For each issue and each state with an interest in that issue, there exists an ideal
point: a provision that that state would prefer over all others because it would
maximize its expected utility from the treaty. That is, the state believes that it would
benefit more from having that provision in the treaty than from any other provision.
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My model denotes ideal points as xi, for a state i.
To illustrate further, Figure 2.2 below is a two-dimensional graph depicting a
proposed trilateral treaty with two discrete issues. There are three actors, A, B, and
C. Because there are two issues, each actor has an ideal point in dimension x and one
in dimension y, which together can be plotted as a single point in two-dimensional
space. The utility that any state derives from the treaty is maximized when the
ideal point and the treaty point coincide, because that scenario reflects the state’s
ideal outcome. The state’s utility therefore declines at some rate as the treaty moves
away, i.e., as the distance between the treaty point and ideal point increases. As
with most negotiations, states rarely get their most preferred term on every issue.
So each state needs to decide how much deviation from its ideal point it is willing to
tolerate before it no longer supports the treaty. This point occurs where the distance
between the ideal point and the treaty point exceeds that between the ideal point
and the status quo. There, and beyond that point, the actor prefers the status quo.
More formally, each actors’ utility (ui) is a function of the treaty policy (t), the
status quo (s), and i’s ideal point (xi). ui(t) decreases quadratically with the distance





 (t  xi)2 if the policy takes effect (1)
 (s  xi)2 if the policy does not take effect (2)
(2.1)
with (t xi)2 denoting the distance between i’s ideal treaty policy and the proposed
treaty policy, and (s  xi)2 denoting the distance between i’s ideal treaty policy and
the status quo. During drafting and negotiations over the treaty, the actor advocates
for terms that move the treaty policy as close as possible to its ideal point. Then,
when the treaty is put to an up-or-down vote to conclude it, i will vote to support
the treaty if and only it lies closer to its ideal point than to the status quo, that is, if
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 (t  xi)2    (s  xi)2.5
In deciding whether any given formulation of the treaty policy would be
utility-enhancing, an actor weighs each of the salient issues collectively. Therefore,
for each actor, there exists a set of provisions that will increase its utility and another
set that will decrease it. The border between these two sets constitutes an actor’s
reservation curve, which forms a circle whose center is the ideal point, and whose
edge is the status quo, s. Its radius therefore has a length of ||s  x||.6 By definition,
the status quo lies on this reservation curve.7
For proposed polices lying on that curve, the actor neither benefits nor is
harmed relative to the status quo, because the distance from the ideal point to the
treaty equals the distance from the ideal point to the status quo, that is, the radius.
The reservation curves are depicted in Figure 2.2 as dashed lines. An actor will
benefit more from the treaty than the status quo only if that treaty point lies within
the actor’s gray-shaded area between the ideal point and the reservation curve.
The several actors engaged in writing and negotiating the treaty have different
ideal points and different reservation curves. In Figure 2.2, the set of treaty points
that A will benefit from is large; it prefers a treaty far from the status quo, so there
is a broad range of rules it prefers, including ones that make much more drastic
changes than it would prefer. In contrast, the set of treaty points that C will benefit





6 It is a perfect circle, i.e., it is symmetric in each dimension (and not a non-circular ellipse),
because I assume that utility declines at the same rate in every dimension.
7 That the reservation curve is an ellipse rather than a rectangle implies that the actors consider
discrete issues as a whole package, rather than one at a time. With a rectangular reservation curve,
an actor’s reservation point in any one dimension is not conditional on its reservation points in any
other dimension. In other words, there is no tradeoff between dimensions. That means that an issue
in any given dimension can have decisive reservation points, across which point an actor will reject a
policy regardless of concessions on any other issue. But with a circular (or other elliptical) reservation
curve, an actor’s reservation point in any one dimension is conditional on its reservation point in the
other dimensions, which is a function of the shape and radius of the reservation curve. That means
that the location of the ‘deal-breaker’ policy in a given dimension varies depending on the policy’s








only A & B support
universal support only A & C support
no support
Figure 2.2: Hypothetical policy showing three actors’ ideal points and reservation curves,
with labels showing support were the treaty policy to lie in that space
from is more limited. C prefers not to deviate much from the status quo; it will not
benefit from any policy that departs from it significantly.
Where two actors’ reservation curves overlap, a treaty would make both better
off relative to the status quo. Where there are three or more actors, several of these
spaces may overlap with each other. In that space, each of those actors would be
better off if the treaty policy were adopted: it is pareto-improving (that is, it makes at
least one state better off and leaves none worse off). In negotiations of this type, the
dominant issue is therefore distributional: where within that set the policy will be
located, that is, how the benefits of the treaty policy will be distributed.
In Figure 2.2, in part because of C’s narrow preferences, the only set of terms
that all three actors will support is the dark gray sliver labeled “universal support.”
To receive support from all three actors, the treaty would need to lie within that
space. But placing the treaty there does not necessarily maximize the three actors’
collective utility. A and B may prefer to adopt the treaty without C’s support,
under terms closer to their own ideal points (at some point in the gray-shaded area).
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Whether they do so will depend on whether C’s participation is needed for the
policy’s success, i.e., the relative utility that A and B would derive from the policy
with and without C’s participation. A and B may be willing to trade more favorable
policies for C’s involvement, if that involvement yields sufficient utility in itself.
In essence, democratic lawmaking – including treaty drafting and negotiations
– involves arriving at a policy that makes a sufficient number of actors better off, but
which may leave some worse off. Choosing a given treaty policy therefore involves
trade-offs – between different actors, and between a treaty with more parties and
one that regulates more state conduct. This is referred to as the “broader-deeper
tradeoff” (Gilligan 2004), because it involves tension between more participants and
more extensive international rules. Many treaties improve total welfare relative to
the status quo but do not maximize welfare. A challenge for those studying and
coordinating negotiations, then, is to design a treaty drafting and negotiating system
that is most likely to lead to a utility-increasing treaty, and as close as possible to a




How States Make International Law: A Positive Theory of
Treaty-making
This Chapter develops a formal, positive theory of states’ decision-making in
each of the three stages of treaty-making. Section 1 explains the unique decisional
logic of treaty-making, laying out the utility function associated with the three
scenarios facing every negotiating state. Section 2 then presents the dynamic
decision-making that guides states through the three stages: negotiation, approval,
ratification.
1 THE UNIQUE DECISIONAL LOGIC OF TREATY-MAKING
Spatial models can describe how collective policy choices are made in
many different systems: legislatures, courts, and constitutional conventions, for
instance. In fact, scholars in law (Eskridge Jr 1991; Gilbert 2017), political
science (Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006; Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Cameron and
Kornhauser 2012; Cox 2000; Wahlbeck et al. 1998), international relations (Fearon
1998; Krasner 1991; Morrow 1986), and economics (Levy 2007) have extensively
theorized about the law- and decision-making processes of these other public
institutions, with many drawing on a spatial model similar to Figure 2.2 in the
previous chapter.
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A. Voluntary Opt-In and the Third Option
None of these models are suitable for multilateral treaties, however, because
none account for the unique rules governing how treaties bind their subjects.
Consider that a legislator and her constituents are bound by legislation enacted by
the body, regardless of whether the legislator supports it. Likewise, in many systems
that recognize stare decisis, judges considering a case are bound to follow similar past
decisions from the same court, even if they dissented from it.1 In contrast, the norm
of state sovereignty (Barkin and Cronin 1994; Nagan and Hammer 2004) as reflected
in the international law of treaties gives state treaty-framers the power to opt in or
out of the regime they have created. No state is bound to a treaty’s terms unless and
until it voluntarily accepts them through ratification or accession.2
As a result, in addition to the two scenarios that face other lawmakers (creating
the regime and being bound by it, or not creating the regime), states negotiating
a treaty have a third option: they can decide not to join a regime that has been
created. This means that for a treaty-making state, there are three possible scenarios:
(1) a treaty is adopted, and the state opts-in through ratification or accession, (2) a
treaty is not adopted, and (3) a treaty is adopted, but a state decides to opt-out.3 As
I elaborate below, this means that, in developing their treaty negotiating strategies,
states must consider a far more complex set of factors than actors making other types
of law do. The central challenge in developing a model of multilateral treaty-making
1 Precedent is not unchangeable, of course, and dissents can convince judges to change the rule
in the future (see Douglas 1949).
2 In international-law literature, bilateral treaties are often likened to contracts, and international
conventions are often compared with legislation (Mahoney 2006). Yet from a negotiations
perspective, the voluntary opt-in rule suggests that conventions resemble multilateral contracts as
much or more than they do legislation.
3 If the existence of a treaty does not materially alter the status quo for non-parties, there is no
material difference between scenarios (2) and (3). Yet, as I show below, some treaties alter the status
quo by their very existence. That is, the treaty’s entry into force changes all states’ foreign-relations
environments, even for states that do not join the treaty.
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is to account for the implications of these three scenarios, while keeping the model
parsimonious enough to apply to a variety of real-world treaties.





 (t  xi)2 if the policy takes effect (1)
 (s  xi)2 if the policy does not take effect (2)
(3.1)
where t denotes the policy point, xi denotes i’s ideal point, and s denotes the status
quo policy point. Because of treaty-making’s voluntary opt-in rule, the function







vi   (t  xi)2 if t enters into force and i ratifies t (1)





vi   (t  x0i)2
#
  (1  e)(s  xi)2 if t enters into force, i does not ratify (3)
(3.2)
where e 2 [0, 1] denotes the fraction of a treaty’s benefits that are external, irat.
denotes a ratifying state, xi denotes i’s ideal point assuming ratification, x0i denotes
i’s ideal point assuming non-ratification, and vi denotes the marginal value of i’s
ratification to the treaty.
Note that only the utility for scenario 2, the treaty’s not entering into force,
is the same as in the spatial model for traditional policy-making. The voluntary
opt-in rule and the resulting third option complicate a state’s utility for the treaty
in the other two cases: where (1) the treaty enters into force and the state ratifies;
and (3) it enters into force but the state does not ratify. This third option, which
captures the voluntary opt-in rule, creates two new important phenomena: (i) the




vi). Each is unique to treaty-making, and each affects states’
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decisional logic in negotiating, approving, and joining the legal regime. I elaborate
on the roles of externalities and membership-based utility below.
B. The Treaty’s Potential Externalities and Alternative Ideal Points
The fact that some treaties produce significant externalities complicates a
state’s treaty-making utility analysis. Those external effects can be either
positive/beneficial, or negative/harmful (see, e.g., Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962).
By definition, where a treaty creates externalities, non-parties to the treaty are either
benefitted or harmed by the treaty, despite their not being parties to it. Of course,
treaties are not the only political or legal interactions that produce externalities.
But because of the voluntary opt-in rule, treaty externalities affect policy formation
differently than do externalities in other systems. In most of those other systems, all
those involved in negotiating and voting on a proposed law will be forcibly bound
by it, meaning they are not in fact “external” to the institution. Not so with treaties.
The nature of a treaty’s externalities affects how the treaty distributes utility
between the group of states that have ratified the treaty and those that have not,
which in turn affects states’ ratification decisions, and therefore, their negotiation
strategies. We can think of treaties whose benefits are primarily or entirely positive
externalities as producing public goods (i.e., both nonrival and nonexcludable).
Consider a hypothetical treaty designed to provide 100% of its benefits to
non-parties and parties alike.4 A state considering whether to ratify would know
that it will receive all the benefits even if it does not join. In that scenario, the
marginal benefit of ratifying would be little or nothing. Such a treaty would thus
4 If we define the benefits of ratification broadly to include less tangible benefits like international
and domestic signaling, few if any agreements produce public goods exclusively. For instance,
international signaling and reputation for cooperation or liberal norms are important motivators for
many states in considering whether to ratify a treaty, particularly for human rights and international
humanitarian law. Because this aspect of the treaty benefit accrues only to members, no treaty that
carries reputational benefits produces exclusively public goods.
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invite enormous free-riding, allowing states to enjoy the benefits of the regime
without suffering any of the constraints or other costs. A global environmental
treaty is perhaps one of the closest examples of a pure public-good treaty; it affects
the entire world, producing expected climate benefits for every state (though not
necessarily to the same extent) regardless of membership. Likewise, treaties aimed
at solving coordination problems – such as standardized international procedures
(e.g., aviation), metering, or measurement – can also generate significant benefits for
non-members. Non-members are usually free to use and benefit from the agreed-on
standard if they wish.5
Other treaties produce negative externalities. These include some (not all) that
produce so-called private or club goods (i.e., benefits from which non-parties can be
excluded). The difference between private and club goods lies in their rivalrous
nature: club goods are not diminished by others’ use; private goods are. For
instance, mutual defense agreements arguably produce private goods, because only
those that join the coalition receive defense benefits, and because military resources
are finite, a coalition that comes to the aid of one member may be unable or less able
to aid other members in other conflicts. Likewise, the consequences of not ratifying
a human rights treaty may become more severe as more parties join, and IGOs and
NGOs can increasingly focus their-naming and-shaming efforts on non-parties. This
phenomenon is further illustrated in the discussion surrounding Figure 3.1 below.
These negative-externality treaties make at least some non-parties worse off
compared with a world with no treaty at all. This phenomenon can occur
through several different mechanisms. One such mechanism is where the treaty
members pool their efforts to improve their collective welfare in a way that
5 A state that prefers a different standard may also be harmed by the treaty, since it encourages
other states to use a different standard, raising the costs of using its preferred standard.
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reduces opportunities for non-members to do the same. For instance, consider a
mutual-defense coalition; those that do not join the coalition maintain the same
absolute military strength they had before the coalition formed. But relative to the
members of the new coalition, they may find themselves weaker, and thus more
vulnerable to attack than if the other states had not made the agreement.6 Likewise,
a trade treaty makes its members more attractive trading partners to each other,
which may draw trading opportunities away from non-parties. In both cases, the
treaty’s mere creation makes the non-party worse off than if the treaty did not exist
(Gruber 2000).
The combination of the production of externalities and the voluntary opt-in rule
complicates states’ treaty-making logic. In the absence of externalities, any state
could opt-out of a concluded treaty and experience a foreign-relations environment
much like that before the treaty arose, i.e., the status quo. But if a treaty produces
substantial externalities, its entry into force changes the international legal and
political state of affairs for a state, regardless of whether that state ratifies.
This observation gives rise to a striking and novel theoretical insight: a state
negotiating a treaty can have two simultaneous, alternative ideal points: one assuming
it ratifies the treaty; and another assuming it does not. That is, it would prefer
one set of treaty terms if it is going to ratify, and another set of treaty terms if it is
not going to ratify. It follows that states might push for a particular type of treaty
based on whether they intend to ratify, without revealing these intentions during
the negations. To illustrate, if a treaty has strong positive externalities (as with a
global environmental agreement), a state might push for a strong treaty that it does
not intend to ratify; it knows that a strong treaty will make it better off than a weak
or no treaty, regardless of whether it ratifies. Because the state hopes to free-ride
6 See Figure 3.1 below.
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on the treaty’s benefits, it wants those benefits to be as plentiful as possible, and it
would not care about its costs to members. Conversely, when a treaty has negative
externalities (as the mutual-defense agreement), a state may do the opposite and
push for a weak treaty, one which it has no intent of ratifying. I define the two
ideal points produced by externalities as x (assuming ratification) and x0 (assuming
non-ratification).7
The nature of the externalities – whether they are positive or negative, and
their magnitude – matters a great deal to negotiating states’ strategic calculations.
It affects the relative positions of the x and x0 in the following ways. For
club/private-good treaties with negative externalities, x is typically greater (i.e., higher
level of regulation) than x0, and the difference increases as the level of positive
externalities increases. Likely examples include mutual defense and trade. For
public-good treaties with positive externalities, x0 is typically greater (i.e., higher level of
regulation) than x, and the difference increases as the level of positive externalities
increases. This is true because a stronger x0i maximizes the benefits of free-riding.
Likely examples include environmental, refugee, coordination, and disarmament
treaties.
Consider the graphs in Figure 3.1 below, which depict a world with four states:
Aspain, Breaca, Craocia, and Doswor. (Only Doswar’s ideal point is plotted.)
Aspain is a powerful bully, and Breaca, Craocia, and Doswor are considering a
mutual defense agreement to deter and protect themselves from Aspain’s potential
aggression. Doswor is the weakest state, and if it joins a defense agreement, it wants
very strong protections (expressed as its ideal point, xD) from Aspain. But other
states are less committed to a strong regime, and they have proposed t. Because
7 As explored in the next section, this distinction is relevant only when a treaty produces strong
externalities. If there are few or no externalities, x and x0 coincide, and we can think of a state’s













A treaty with moderately high funding and defense levels;













A treaty with high funding and low defense














A treaty with low funding and defense levels;
D’s order of preferences is not ratify, status quo,
ratify
Figure 3.1: Three Hypothetical Proposed Mutual-Defense Agreements (utility from
most-D’s preferred scenario in red)
Doswor is not convinced that t would provide sufficiently strong commitments,
Doswor is on the fence about whether to join the coalition as proposed, or whether
to support the status quo, s. One possibility is that Doswor joins, in which case
it wants a well-funded coalition with commitments to robust mutual defense, xD.
Another possibility is that Doswor does not join, but the agreement goes forward
with only Breaca and Craocia. In that case, Doswor will become the weakest unit
by far, and a relatively attractive target for Aspain. In that case, Doswor would
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prefer a very weak agreement, x0D (or no agreement at all, the status quo, s) to a
strong agreement. Doswor’s decision about the form of treaty for which it should
advocate therefore depends on whether it anticipates ratifying it. The type of treaty
Doswor prefers depends on whether it joins, and whether it joins determines what
treaty it prefers.
Given those assumptions, suppose that the putative coalition produces a draft
agreement with fairly low levels of funding and commitment, as in Panel A of Figure
3.1. The utility function would produce the following analysis for Doswor: The most
preferred outcome is that t enters into force and i ratifies t (ui =  (t xD)2), depicted
by segment 1; the second-most preferred outcome is that t does not enter into force
(ui =  (s   xD)2), depicted by segment 2; and the least-preferred outcome is that t
enters into force, but i does not ratify t; (ui =  (t  x0D)2), depicted by segment 3.
Now assume instead that the states have proposed a different treaty, one
depicted in Panel B of Figure 3.1. The treaty features large funding levels but very
low commitment levels. This changes the relative utility of the three options for
Doswor. Now, because 2 is the shortest segment, followed by 3 and 1, Doswor’s
order of scenario preferences is 2, then 3, then 1. Assuming the proposed treaty
does not change significantly over the course of the negotiations, it would most
prefer that no treaty is concluded, as the proposed treaty would be very expensive
and offer little expectation of effective defense. Its second choice is that the treaty is
concluded but it does not join. Although that would make it susceptible to Aspain,
it may be able to use the funds it saved to bolster its own military and deter Aspain’s
aggression somewhat. Its least-favored scenario is joining the treaty. Given its
expense but lack of commitments from other states, it may not be much safer than
without the coalition, and the financial commitments might deprive it of the ability
to defend itself.
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Finally, assume yet another version of the treaty is proposed, as in the Panel C
of Figure 3.1. The treaty involves less financial and defense commitment compared
with the other proposed treaties. Now Doswor’s most-preferred scenario is for the
treaty to be concluded but not to ratify it, segment 3. Again, as with the second
proposal, it may save a small amount of funds from not joining, and it appears to
have little clout anyway. Segment 2 (no treaty) is second, followed by segment 1
(ratification).
This last scenario highlights why it is critical to consider the two ideal points
in models of treaty-making. If we had used a conventional model which compared
only the ideal point xD’s relative distance to s and to t, we would have concluded
that Doswor prefers the status quo above all, so pursuing a strategy resulting in
no treaty at all was its best option. But that would have overlooked the regime’s
considerable externalities, making Doswar best off when there is a treaty, but it is
not part of it.
As another example, consider a regional trade treaty involving a number of
South American states. Assume that currently, there are no international legal
constraints preventing the negotiating states from imposing trade tariffs on the other
states. Brazil is participating in the negotiations. As an initial matter, Brazil must
weigh any proposed treaty’s terms to determine whether the net effect on it would
be beneficial or harmful. But because of externalities, the decision is not as simple
as opting for a treaty or not. A regional trade pact would be expected to increase
trade flows between its members, probably to the detriment of non-members.
That is, it would produce negative externalities. If an agreement with aggressive
trade-liberalization terms arises without Brazil’s participation, it might have fewer
favorable trade opportunities than it does currently. If so, it might be in Brazil’s
interest to advocate for a treaty that produces little or no trade-barrier reductions
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with the intent of never ratifying it.
To formalize, let e 2 [0, 1] denote the fraction of a treaty’s benefits that are
external. So, for example, e = 1 indicates a pure public-good treaty. (In theory it
could also denote a pure public-bad treaty.) At the other extreme, e = 0 indicates
a pure private/club-goods treaty, for which none of the treaty’s effects are felt
by outsiders. (The notion of a treaty with e = 0 is mainly theoretical; it is
unlikely that any actual treaty has zero externalities.) In the component of the
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  (1  e)(s  x)2, the e variable serves two purposes.
First, because e = 1 for pure public-good treaties (for which the treaty’s benefits
accrue to non-parties as they do to parties), where a treaty produces a public good,
the x ideal point (the option to ratify an existing treaty) has what we can think of as
a comparative disadvantage, all things being equal, relative to x0. That is, the state
receives the public goods regardless; why accept the restrictions and other costs
that go along with them if it is unnecessary? The discount from ideological distance
where t enters into force but i does not ratify (scenario 3) is denoted (t   x0i)2. But
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both components – that term falls out, and the state prefers the greater of  (t  xi)2
and 0. Where t and xi coincide (that is, the proposed treaty is the state’s ideal treaty),
 (t xi)2 = 0, and i is therefore indifferent.8 Therefore, since i is indifferent between
ratification and non-ratification even for its ideal treaty, i will always weakly strictly
prefer non-ratification to ratification of a pure public-good treaty.9
Second, consider the extreme opposite case, where t produces no public goods
or other externalities (e = 0). In that case, a non-ratifying i is indifferent between
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The utility of not ratifying is therefore a function of (1  e)(s  x)2 = (s  x)2, alone,







vi   (t  xi)2 if t enters into force and i ratifies t (1)
 (s  xi)2 if t does not enter into force (2)
 (s  xi)2 if t enters into force, i does not ratify (3)
(3.4)
Note that this value,  (s xi)2 equals the payoff from scenario 2, the status quo.
In other words, where there are no externalities and e = 0, not ratifying a treaty that
enters into force is equivalent to the treaty’s not entering into force at all.
8 Note that the states’ preferences for the nature of the externally provided public good can vary
between states (as it does for the private/club goods). One dimension on which a treaty policy could
vary is the nature of the public good, which could therefore have distributional effects among states.
9 This is somewhat of a strong assumption, because i’s own ratification will, in itself, make the
term in scenario 1 greater than that in scenario 3, all else equal.
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C. Membership-based Utility
The basic utility function in Equation 3.1 for ordinary lawmaking does
not account for the fact that, all things being equal, the benefits to each
treaty-negotiating state can depend on the number and character of the other
ratifying states. Most political studies of voting simply assume a fixed number
of parties. Likewise, most bargaining models in economics and political science
assume that the parties are bargaining over a fixed-size “cake,” “pie,” “donut”
(Raworth 2017), or some other delicious round baked good. This makes sense for
those systems because there, while different policies affect the size of the pie and how
it is divided, the number of supporters does not. So long as there exists sufficient
support to adopt the policy (usually a majority, or sometimes, a super-majority), the
number of bargaining actors voting for the policy has little direct effect on the total
utility it provides.
Treaties are different in this respect. For many treaties, the size of the “pie”
is endogenous, not just to the terms of the agreement, but to the number and
character of the parties. Specifically, many treaties tend to yield more utility for
each state-party as the number of parties joining it increases. Not all treaties do,
though; for human rights treaties, for example, the utility that each state derives
from additional members is likely fixed. But for many others, the utility that a state
derives from joining a treaty is not just a function of the treaty terms’ proximity to
the state’s ideal point; it also depends on who else is participating. In this sense,
they are similar to some multi-party private contracts, such as patent pools.10
10 A patent pool is an agreement between several patent holders to cross-license those patents
for a particular use or technology. See Michael Lightfoot, Patent Pools: What Are They, What Are
Their Uses and Their Benefits?, INTELLECTUAL PATS, May 3, 2015, at http://intellectualpats.com/
patent-pools-what-are-they-what-are-their-uses-and-their-benefits/. I thank Dotan Oliar for this
example.
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Consider, for example, a treaty to lower trade tariffs for imports from members
states. Bilateral tariff reductions benefit trade partners, so, all else equal, a
state joining a multilateral tariff-reduction agreement with five other states (the
equivalent of five bilateral agreements), derives more total utility than if it joined
an agreement under the same terms with just one other state. The same is also
generally true, for example, of agreements to follow certain rules of war and to
provide collective security.
As the utility function in Equation 3.1 above for ratification is structured, even
under the ideal scenario – where the treaty policy point, t, and a state’s ideal point,
xi, coincide – 0 utility is derived. In any other ratification scenario, utility is negative.
That seemingly odd result follows from the implicit assumption that the treaty
would have no other parties. A treaty with one party is, of course, not a treaty
at all! Because the state is comparing the utility from each of these with each other
– not with zero – this does not affect the analysis.
I capture the membership-driven value of treaties by defining a state-specific
value giving the marginal value for the treaty from the state’s ratification. I define
vi as the marginal value for the treaty from i’s ratification. The aggregate level of





i=1 vi 2 [ 1,1], where irat.
denotes a ratifying state, and there exist M possible ratifying states.11
The term appears in the payoff formula for ratifiers,
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irat.
vi   (t   xi)2, by
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⇤
, by contributing to the utility that states receive, to the extent
the treaty’s benefits are public. The value effectively acts to expand the treaty
point, t, from a single point to a circle that varies with the sum of all state-parties’
11 This term is inspired by a similar concept discussed in James Morrow’s 2004 National Science
Foundation grant application, “The International Legislature,” and elaborated in Morrow and Cope
(2018).
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the Utility-Changing Effect of e
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values, thus bringing the treaty’s edge closer to all other ideal points and uniformly
increasing the treaty’s potential utility for all states. Thus, where
P
irat.
vi > 0, the






vi = 0, the ideal
point is a traditional point with a radius of 0. See Figure 3.2 above.
The value a state adds to a given treaty depends on a variety of state- and
treaty-specific factors. States vary in the value they bring to the treaty regime. In
a trade treaty, states with large economies would have the largest value. In a mutual
defense treaty, military spending might largely determine a state’s value. And in
an environmental treaty, the level of current pollution (assuming cuts are roughly
constant as a percentage of pollution) would determine its value.
A state’s ratification decision may therefore turn on the number of other ratifiers
it expects. The importance of additional parties to the ratification calculation also
depends on what fraction of the treaty’s benefits generally reach non-ratifiers, i.e.,
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are positive externalities. In many cases, non-ratifiers will receive some, but not all,
of the benefits of additional parties.12
Because other states may be making a similar calculation simultaneously, a state
rarely knows for sure how many others will ratify. It must estimate this by observing
and comparing other states’ relative utilities of ratifying and not ratifying, just as
it does for its own ratification decision. This phenomenon explains why most all
treaties require a threshold number of ratifiers (modeled here as a sufficiently large
P
irat.
vi) before the treaty enters into force. Some treaties (like the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)) require the participation of not just a minimum
number, but certain key states, before they enter into force.
This calculation partially explains why some states might ratify even a mostly
public-good treaty. Many public-good treaties are collaboration-like prisoners’
dilemmas; in any one round, defecting (not agreeing to cooperate) is always the
dominant strategy. Consider a major global polluter like the United States, India,
or China. If the net utility to that state of continuing a high level of emissions (the
benefits of efficiency savings and/or jobs minus the costs of pollution) exceeds the
12 To illustrate, suppose you are considering joining a book-sharing group with a given set of
rules: each month, each member must donate a book and may borrow a book. The group would not
provide much benefit if there were only 10 other members, as you would be stuck with whichever
10 books those 10 members happened to lend. But if there were 10,000 members, you would have
a veritable library of new books to choose from and would probably have at least a few dozen to
your liking. Even though the rules (“give a book, take a book” each month) remained the same, the
additional members themselves would make you more likely to join the group. Now assume the
group is considering whether to make its book collection open to the public, that is, to non-members















. In that case,
the group’s growing from 10 to 10,000 would not affect your decision to join; as a member of the
public, you would receive the same access either way. Instead, your decision would be determined
by the club’s rules or traits (that is, the difference between t and t0),for instance, the book-borrowing
location or favorite genre of the median member. Presumably, they would coincide (making you
indifferent) only if the costs of membership were 0 (where here, they are > 0, since members must
lend a book each month). But if borrowing books were available only to members, (that is, e =
0), then the difference between the benefits received would depend on being a member, that is,










, and the growth would certainly affect your
membership decision.
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utility to that state of lowering its own emissions (the benefits of higher air quality
minus the costs of reduced productivity and/or technological development), the
state should not rationally commit to an emissions-reduction international regime.
After all, most of the regime’s benefit will accrue to it regardless, but it will incur
costs only if it joins. But assuming (1) the benefits of the regime’s existence exceed the
state’s costs of its lowering its own pollution, and (2) it believes that its participation
will lead other major players to join that would not have otherwise, it should
rationally commit to the regime. Formally, the state might expect that, for one or
more other key states, its own participation would decisively increase the treaty’s










so, it would form the tipping point for those other states’ own ratification, sending
the entry-into-force tally over the minimum threshold (see Schelling 1971, 1978).13
This rationale is closely linked to the logic of the multi-stage prisoners’ dilemma,
a game were cooperation produces the public good of reduced jail time. Where there
are two or more players, cooperation by staying silent benefits all other players;
the game is designed so that one cannot snitch on one player but not another.
Defect/defect is the strictly dominant strategy, and mutual defection is the Nash
equilibrium. But as many others have shown, rational cooperation can occur in the
iterated prisoners’ dilemma, if players believe that the opponents’ strategy (such
as ‘tit-for-tat’ or the ‘grim trigger’) will produce more utility for him over many
iterations if he cooperates (Axelrod 1984; Friedman 1971). The thinking is that
cooperation would pay less for any given round, but would keep the game going,
13 This logic relates to Schelling’s concept of a “critical mass” of actors, in which sufficient
participants in an activity make it more valuable for others, produces external benefits, and thus,
makes it self-sustaining (Schelling 1978). A tipping point can also trigger flight from an activity. For
example, if there exists even a small level of white intolerance for black neighborhoods, a certain
small number of black entrants to a neighborhood would constitute a tipping point that would
eventually lead to complete racial segregation (Schelling 1971).
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producing many rounds of moderate payoffs that, together, exceed the windfall
payoff from a one-time defection.
Returning to the hypothetical South American trade treaty, in estimating the
potential treaty’s expected utility, Brazil will be interested in gauging which other
states are likely to ratify the treaty. For instance, if the treaty gets participation from
several other major trade partners – especially those that import iron ore from Brazil
like Argentina – the benefits of the tariff reductions to Brazil would be greater than
if those states were not members, even if the treaty terms were the same.
2 THE THREE STAGES OF TREATY-MAKING
With these utility calculations in mind, the theoretical model treats
treaty-making as a three-stage process. Those stages are: (1) drafting and
negotiation advocacy; (2) deciding whether to support the treaty’s adoption; and (3)
deciding whether to ratify or accede14 to the treaty and make reservations. I explain
how – as with many other multi-stage decisional processes – states’ decisions in
earlier stages are informed by the states’ expectations about the relative utility of
their expected options in later stages. This means that the decision-making logic in
each stage cannot be completely isolated from other stages; rather, states must use
backwards induction.
Nonetheless, because the real-life stages proceed chronologically and because
the stages are codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it is useful to
disaggregate the decision-making process this way. The rest of this chapter therefore
explains the different decisional logic of a utility-maximizing state in each of the
14 Accession to a treaty is an alternative method for consenting to being bound; it occurs in lieu
of ratification, typically after the period for signature and ratification has ended and the treaty has
already entered into force. See VCLT Art. 15. In this manuscript, I use the term ratification to include
both ratification and accession.
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three stages.
A. Stage 1: Drafting and Negotiation Advocacy
States negotiate the substance of international law in multilateral negotiations
under the auspices of the United Nations or other intergovernmental organizations.
These negotiations begin when a core set of states agrees on the need for a treaty
to advance international cooperation on a particular issue. A common approach
is for working committees of IGOs or NGOs to first draw up draft portions of the
treaty, though sometimes a single state proposes a first draft.15 Once a draft has
been produced, the overseeing IGO typically holds a final conference to revise the
draft treaty based on comments from representatives of the participating states and
NGOs. Sometimes the conference approves the various articles through a series of
roll-call votes, but states’ more detailed views on the provisions come from their
verbal statements, which are sometimes written but mostly expressed orally. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is relatively silent on the procedures for
this drafting stage, merely noting that every state “possesses capacity to conclude
treaties”16 and providing rules on who is authorized to negotiate treaties on behalf
of a state.17 It therefore falls on each treaty conference to develop its own specific set
of procedures.
Despite the lack of international standards, this negotiation stage is critical to
the final treaty’s character and relative success. Moreover, states’ decision-making
in this stage affects – and is affected by – their expectations for subsequent stages.
While a state has unilateral power to ratify a treaty if it is concluded (and enters
15 For example, Sweden proposed a full first draft of the Convention Against Torture; the United
States developed a full draft of the Race Convention.
16 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 6 (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
17 Id., Arts. 7 & 8.
39
into force), each individual state has relatively little influence over the content of the
treaty and whether it enters into force at all (Simmons 2009). Although the official
decision to ratify comes well after drafting and negotiations are concluded, a state
involved in negotiations must consider the likelihoods that it will enter into force
– and if it does, that the state will ratify it – in deciding what substantive legal
provisions it most prefers and for which it will advocate. This is true because, as
discussed above, a state may prefer one version of a treaty if it joins the regime, but
another version if the treaty enters into force but the state stays outside the regime.
This dynamic greatly complicates the decision-making logic of treaty
negotiations, creating a circular dilemma: whether a state ratifies or not depends
on the treaty’s terms, and who else ratifies it. But the terms a state prefers
can sometimes depend on whether the state will ratify it. At each round of the
negotiations, a state must therefore make a series of informed estimates based on
the status quo, the state of the draft treaty, and what it believes to be other states’
positions and intentions for ratification.
Having determined its relative utility for the three scenarios – status quo; treaty
with ratification; or treaty without ratification – based on the considerations above,
a state engages in diplomatic advocacy, using persuasion or coercion to attempt to
convince other states to adopt treaty provisions that are most favorable to it. To do
so, the state first attempts to predict whether it might be able to persuade enough
states to move the treaty point sufficiently that it would change the state’s optimal
scenario from the one it currently prefers, to one of the other two that would be
preferable. If so, it advocates for nudging the treaty in the direction that optimizes
that alternative scenario. For example, a state may prefer to ratify a weak treaty (x)
over the status quo (s), which in turn it prefers to not ratifying a strong treaty (x0).
If the currently proposed treaty is fairly strong, its best scenario is to not ratify. But
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if it senses that it might be able to persuade a coalition of other sympathetic states
to significantly weaken certain provisions, it would get more benefit from ratifying
that weak treaty than from not ratifying the existing strong treaty. It might therefore
try to weaken the treaty, that is, to move the treaty away from one of its ideal points,
x
0, and toward its x.18 If not, the state advocates for nudging the treaty toward its
appropriate ideal point under the preferred scenario.
In the trade-treaty example, in entering the negotiations, Brazil would first
need to estimate the relative utility of the three scenarios. Suppose that Brazil’s
domestic petroleum industry accounts for a large fraction of its exports, but it
also imports a significant amount of petroleum. The government has determined
that the petroleum industry is vital to the national economy, and the benefits of
protecting it from competition outweigh any hike in consumer oil prices. Brazil
therefore wants to be permitted to levy high tariffs on petroleum, to protect its
domestic industry. Brazil’s second-biggest industry is the production of iron ore,
and it exports a significant volume of ore to other South American states. Brazil
therefore would prefer the agreement significantly limit tariffs on iron ore, so as to
drive business for its domestic ore producers. Suppose the currently proposed treaty
lowers permissible tariffs on iron ore, but it also limits petroleum tariffs, preventing
Brazil from continuing its high tariffs. Brazil would benefit from the lowering of
iron ore barriers, but it would be harmed by the reductions in petroleum barriers.
Suppose Brazil determines that joining the treaty as proposed would not serve
its interests because of the reduced petroleum tariffs or because it expects an
insufficient number of other states to join. In that case, if the treaty were to be
adopted and take effect, Brazil would want the treaty to do as little as possible
18 If the current or alternative most preferred outcome is the status quo, the state is unlikely to
truthfully reveal its preferences; rather, it will likely make arguments to weaken the treaty marginally
(Morrow and Cope 2018).
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to promote efficient trade among the parties, minimizing the extent to which it
disadvantages Brazil vis-a-vis its trade partners. In that case, however, maintaining
the status quo of no agreement would still preferable.19 In that case, Brazil should
advocate for a weak treaty, that is, one that resembles the status quo by doing
little to reduce trade barriers. In other words, it should attempt to move the treaty
point close to its ideal point assuming non-ratification (x0). If, on the other hand,
Brazil determines that the treaty’s benefits are likely to outweigh its costs, it should
advocate for a treaty that leaves petroleum tariffs in place, and which lowers the
permissible tariffs on iron ore. In other words, it should attempt to move the treaty
point close to its ideal point assuming ratification (x).20
A state considers the relevant factors and formulates its negotiation tactics
repeatedly, in every round of the negotiations, until the states have concluded
negotiations over the treaty’s substantive provisions. At that point, the states move
on to the stage 2 process of deciding whether to support the treaty’s adoption.
B. Stage 2: Deciding Whether to Support the Treaty’s Adoption
Per the decision tree in Figure 3.3, at the stage 2 approval decision, the state
compares the utility of two options, the greater of: (1) scenarios 1 and 3 (both
under which a treaty is concluded); and (2) scenario 2 (under which a treaty is not
concluded). If the utility from (1) is greater, it supports approving the treaty and its
entry into force. If the utility from (2) is greater, it opposes approving the treaty and
its entry into force. Of course, any state i has little power in itself over this outcome;
its power is only marginal, as all the other states collectively have effective control
19 This order of preferences (though not the positions of ideal and policy points) would resemble
that in Panel B of 3.1.
20 This order of preferences (though not the positions of ideal and policy points) would resemble





























































Figure 3.3: Decision Tree Depicting State i’s Post-Negotiation Decisional Logic in
Stages 2 and 3
over this outcome. For this reason, all other states together then move to enter the
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treaty into force or not. Though i’s effect is marginal, it is not zero.21
After negotiations have completed, the drafting conference determines whether
to accept or reject the final draft. This is often accomplished through consensus,
because at that point, the negotiating states have already signaled their support for
the treaty, and the chair would be reluctant to move the treaty to a final vote without
a consensus from the convention. Sometimes, however, if the level of support for
the draft agreement is unclear or one or more states want state positions on the
record, the conference may hold a formal roll-call vote. This occurred, for example,
at the 1998 ICC Rome Conference. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, “the adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes
place by the vote of two-thirds of the States present and voting, unless by the same
majority they shall decide to apply a different rule.”22 In this case, states vote either
to support the treaty with an eye toward its taking effect at some later date, or they
reject it in favor of maintaining the status quo, at least for the time-being. If that
vote fails (or, more likely, a vote is never called because states have signaled a lack
of support), the state and all other states must accept the status quo. Although
21 The equations below give the probability of the treaty’s entry into force (EIF) given i’s
opposition Pr{EIF |Nay} and support Pr{EIF |Y ea}, respectively. Note that they draw on a


























where p denotes the probability that some other state, j, will support the treaty, with M negotiating
states. (The function makes the unrealistic but typically insignificant simplifying assumption that
all other states have the same probability of support.) Likewise, the probability of entry into force
conditional on i supporting the treaty is















22 VCLT, supra note 16, at art. 9.2.
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treaties rarely fail in this phase, there are some examples of its happening, such as
the 1967 International Convention on Religious Tolerance and the 2009 Copenhagen
Agreement on Climate Change (Rajamani 2010, 825–26). My model treats a state’s
advocating for not holding a vote because it opposes the treaty in its current form
as equivalent to formally voting against the treaty.
This stage mirrors the approval vote in other democratic legal and political
systems, in which a final vote is held to approve (or reject) the bill, judicial opinion,
or other collective policy choice. Unless they abstain, the actors vote either to
support the new policy or to reject it and retain the status quo. The difference for
treaties lies in the voluntary opt-in rule and the three scenarios it provides, meaning
some states may vote to approve the treaty even if they have no intention of being
bound by it. Therefore, in the final vote, a state chooses between two options: (a) the
status quo (s), and (b) the greater utility produced by ratifying (x), a future treaty
that will enter into force, or not ratifying it (x0). If (a) is greater, the state votes nay;
if (b) is greater, it votes yea.
In the trade agreement hypothetical, Brazil would oppose the treaty’s adoption
and taking effect if and only if the status quo is the most preferred outcome. If either
of the other two scenarios are preferred – including the scenario in which it does not
ratify the new treaty – it should support the treaty’s adoption and entry into force.
C. Stage 3: Deciding Whether to Ratify and/or Reserve
If the treaty is approved, it is opened for signature and national ratification,
usually requiring the support of national legislatures (Cope 2016). This stage is
unlike virtually any other public-law process. If and only if the treaty is approved,
each state must decide whether to ratify, thereby accepting its terms and the benefits
and restrictions that they involve, or to not ratify, thereby rejecting them, and staying
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unencumbered by the new regime’s rules. It further has the option to ratify with
modifications by entering reservations, declarations, and understandings.
The Ratification Calculation. At the final stage, ratification, i compares the expected
payoffs from scenarios 1 and 3. i ratifies if the utility from scenario 1 is greater, and
does not ratify if utility from scenario 3 is greater. Once a state reaches this stage, it
has already done most of the hard work to determine its expected utility from the
treaty under different scenarios. It has gauged the treaty’s externalities, speculated
on the utility provided from other potential members, and used this information to
advocate for a utility-maximizing instrument during negotiations. It has supported
or opposed the treaty’s approval based on the considerations above. So once the
treaty has been approved and opened for signing and ratification, it is left only with
a choice of whether or not to ratify it.
Of course, no state has complete information about its utility, even at this
stage. It cannot be certain about which states will ratify, although because treaties
generally have minimum-ratifier thresholds for entry into force, it can be certain
there will be a critical mass of states before the treaty enters into force and the state
is bound. It also cannot be sure what if any external shocks – economic, political,
or otherwise – may alter its benefit from the treaty. But, as with actors facing most
lawmaking choices, states must use whatever information they have to make an
informed estimate.
At this stage, the state is choosing between a world with a regime of which
it is a part, and a world with a regime of which it is not a part: a world with
no such regime is no longer possible. That said, for a treaty with relatively
few externalities – including the three treaties analyzed in Chapter 5 – the








Figure 3.4: Hypothetical, 4-State Club-Good Treaty Negotiation Resulting in 2 Ratifiers
state-of-the-world, i.e., the status quo. That is, if the treaty does not primarily
produce externalities, the status quo adequately approximates the alternative to
ratification, so it effectively chooses between s (not ratify) and x (ratify) based on
an estimate of which is closer to its ideal point, that is, which policy is more similar
to its ideal scenario.
Consider Figure 3.4 below, which depicts a hypothetical, four-state club-good
treaty with few or no externalities. The policy points of the treaty, t, and status quo,
s, are also depicted. The ideal points for states 1–4 are distributed throughout the
two-dimensional space. Each state compares its utility from ratifying (indicated by
the line from its ideal point to the treaty) with its utility from not ratifying (indicated
by the line from its ideal point to the status quo) and makes a decision to ratify or
not. If the distance to the treaty is shorter, it ratifies; if the distance to the status quo
is shorter, it does not ratify. The dashed line, called the “cut line,” represents the set
of points that is equidistant between the treaty and the status quo. The two states
that ratify are colored blue; the two that do not are colored red.23
23 Note that the cut line is not “fitted” to the states’ ideal points; rather, it exists independently of
them and can be estimated before any state takes a position.
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In the alternative case of a treaty that exerts significant externalities on the rest
of the world, the previous state of the world is no longer the status quo. Upon
entry into force, it is replaced by the post-treaty world, regardless of any given
state’s ratification decision. In that case, a state in this stage faces a different set
of calculations than choosing between retaining the status quo and adopting a new,
mandatorily binding regime. The decision instead depends on whether the actual
treaty is more like the treaty the state considers ideal, assuming it is a party, or more
like the treaty the state considers ideal, assuming it is not a party. Therefore, if the
treaty vote succeeds and a treaty with significant externalities has enough support
to enter into force, the status quo is taken off the table for all states. The state must
then choose between x (ratify) or x0 (not ratify), based on whichever is closer to t.
Consider how this logic would apply to the three mutual-defense-agreement
scenarios depicted in Figure 3.1 above. In the top panel, D would lobby to move t
as close as possible to xD, would vote in favor of adopting the final treaty, and, if it
is adopted, would ratify it. In the bottom left scenario, D would lobby to move t as
close as possible to xD, but, assuming the treaty did not change significantly, would
vote against approving the final treaty. If it were approved, it would not ratify it. In
the bottom right scenario, D would lobby to move t as close as possible to x0D and
would vote to approve the final treaty. But if it were concluded, it would not ratify
it.
Returning one last time to the trade treaty example, suppose that the negotiating
states have approved a treaty text and there is sufficient support for it to enter
into force. In this case, even if Brazil preferred the status quo, it is no longer
possible. It must therefore choose between x and x0. Figure 3.5 below illustrates
this choice. Brazil’s x involves large reductions to iron ore tariffs but few reductions


















Note: Brazil will ratify a treaty if and only if it lies above the dashed cut line, which is equidistant
between x and x0. (The status quo, s, coincides with x0, but it is no longer a possible scenario, because
the treaty will take effect, changing the international legal environment for all states.)
Figure 3.5: Brazil’s Scenarios in Hypothetical Proposed Regional Trade Agreement, Where
Treaty Has Been Approved and Will Enter Into Force
ratify depends on whether the treaty’s terms place it closer to x or x0. The dashed
cut line represents the series of terms for which Brazil would be indifferent, so it will
ratify if the treaty lies above the line and not ratify if it lies below it.
The Reservation Calculation. The law of treaties allows states to opt-out of, or reserve,
specific provisions of a treaty, so long as: (1) the treaty itself does not prohibit it, and
(2) the reservation does not undermine the treaty’s object and purpose.24 A state can
use this option to effectively modify the treaty’s terms for itself. Legal scholars have
examined how allowing reservations affects things like ratification rates, subsequent
state behavior and compliance, and the integrity of international law.
This feature of the treaty system is difficult to capture formally, but as I show
for the CERD below, it can be relevant to explaining reservation behavior. For the
purpose of my approach, if there exists a discrete provision or other element of the
24 VCLT, supra, note 16 art. 19 (“A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless . . . The reservation is prohibited by the treaty . .
. the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.).
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treaty whose removal would meaningfully improve the treaty’s utility for that state
(and the two conditions above are met), the state should enter a reservation for that
provision. It should then gauge the relative utility of the treaty as if the treaty had
that position. In effect, doing so alters the treaty by moving t closer to x, but only
for that state.
***
This model has explained how states weigh several factors in position-taking,
voting to approve the final draft, and ratification. With these expectations in mind,
I develop a method to apply the model’s assumptions to real treaty negotiations
– past, present, and future – by converting negotiation records into data. I then




Empirical Research Design and Methods
This Chapter explains how to apply the theoretical model developed in Chapter
3 to real-world treaty negotiations. Using the negotiating records of three treaties,
I develop a method to obtain the theory’s key parameters from treaty negotiating
records. That is, for each of these treaties, I can estimate t (the proposed treaty), s (the
status quo without the treaty), as well as each states’ ideal point based on its stated
positions during the negotiations x (the ideal point assuming ratification), and, for
some treaties, x0 (the ideal point assuming non-ratification). While I cannot explore
all the concepts or implications from my theoretical model with these three treaties
alone, the analysis partially validates some aspects of the theory and provides
important insights about treatymaking.
1 TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES AS A SOURCE OF STATE IDEOLOGY
Some may be skeptical about the value of travaux generally as a source of state
international-law preferences. Indeed, a long-running related debate exists among
lawyers, law scholars, and political scientists over why states ratify treaties (see, e.g.,
Simmons and Danner 2010; Vreeland 2008). Within this debate, some theorists have
dismissed many types of multilateral treaties and international-organization actions
as “cheap talk,” or as otherwise unimportant to foreign policy and state behavior
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(Morgenthau 1985; Waltz 1979). Indeed, Voeten (2000) finds that states’ UN General
Assembly (UNGA) votes on given issues are not closely connected to particular state
interests, but rather divide into traditional, East-West Cold War alliances, groupings
which are only occasionally logically related to the substantive international issues
under consideration. Just as “some see UNGA votes as merely symbolic,” (Voeten
2000) then, some may believe that treaty negotiating statements may be signaling
an alliance or state identity more than a substantive policy preference.1
To the contrary, there is strong theoretical and empirical support for the notion
that states’ treaty negotiating positions are substantively meaningful and generally
authentic. First, unlike UNGA resolutions, multilateral treaties are legally binding
on states that join them and may even have consequences for non-parties. By
proposing or otherwise taking a position on a treaty term, a state is much more
likely to affect the content of potentially binding international law than it is with
a single vote in the General Assembly (whose resolutions are not even binding on
member states). Second, compared to the UNGA, treaty negotiations are relatively
low-profile fora on average; they rarely have large audiences and are not broadcast
on the Internet or otherwise audio-visually recorded. In a high-profile public
1 International lawyers have expressed other concerns about the travaux related to their
usefulness as interpretive aids because they are often contradictory and inconclusive (Bederman
1993; Sadat and Jolly 2014). In its 1927 Lotus decision, the Permanent Court of International Justice
stated expressed skepticism about using the travaux for treaty-interpretation and held that on “no
occasion” they should be resorted to when the treaty itself is clear, a principle that the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties later adopted. The Court noted that it is always possible to
cherry pick statements and that it is often hard to find evidence of what states actually intended (S.S.
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (observing that “only the British delegate
. . . stated the reasons for his opposition to the Turkish amendment; the reasons for the French
and Italian reservations and for the omission from the draft prepared by the Drafting Committee
of any definition of the scope of the criminal jurisdiction in respect of foreigners, are unknown
and might have been unconnected with the arguments now advanced by France”)). Scholars have
voiced similar objections, though both international and domestic courts routinely use the travaux
in treaty-interpretation. Even if some of these concerns are valid, they do not directly bear on using
the travaux as evidence of state positions. After all, the fact that drafters disagree with each other
and that the records produce no clear consensus is a strength for measuring state preferences, not a
weakness.
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forum with political alliances particularly salient like the U.S. Congress or the UN
General Assembly, states may believe that the symbolic importance of maintaining
voting blocs trumps any marginal policy impact. Though treaty negotiations are
increasingly public affairs, they are relatively low-profile fora on average compared
with General Assembly votes. As such, the audience costs of taking a position in
a treaty negotiation are likely to be lower, leaving states relatively free to pursue
policies that state representatives nonetheless believe serve their interests, but which
might carry domestic or international political costs. Conversely, the benefits in this
forum of inauthentic grandstanding or value-signaling are small.
There are therefore good a priori reasons to think that negotiating positions
typically represent relatively authentic state interests. But as with voting in the
UN General Assembly, these beliefs can be tested empirically. If treaties are merely
conduits for power-driven signaling, the positions I retrieve from the data will
mostly track established alliances or other superficial traits rather than reflecting
the provision-specific utility that the state expected to derive from the treaty. The
empirical analysis that follows provides evidence to the contrary: the positions that
states take in negotiations tend to align with what we would expect to represent
their genuine state interests.
2 QUANTIFYING AND ANALYZING THE TRAVAUX
A first step in processing the travaux is to code them. Because those negotiations
rarely conduct formal, recorded roll calls, the positions of states must be interpreted
from the statements they make over the course of negotiations. These records
contain many substantive proposals to amend existing provisions and to add new
ones entirely, as well as state responses to these proposals. An example is the
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dialogue below, taken from the CERD travaux; it summarizes part of the debate
over a U.S.-sponsored proposal concerning anti-Semitism.2
Mrs. TREE (United States of America) proposed that the words “racial
segregation and apartheid” in article III of the draft convention
should be replaced by “racial segregation, apartheid and anti-Semitism”.
Anti-Semitism was an evil which should be mentioned side by side with
apartheid and which was far from having disappeared after the Second
World War.
As an example of how states can respond to this type of proposal, consider the
statements by Lebanon and the Soviet Union.
Mr. Hakim (Lebanon) said that, like all the Arab States, Lebanon
considered that unspeakable crimes had been committed against the Jews
and that those crimes had had deplorable consequences both for the Jews
and for the Arabs of Palestine. He strongly condemned anti-Semitism and
recalled in that regard that the Arabs also belonged to the Semitic
race, just like the Jews. The Arabs, for their part, had never
practised discrimination against the Jews, who had always lived in
peace in Arab countries. In his view, anti-Semitism was not solely a
manifestation of racial discrimination and did not therefore belong in
the draft convention under consideration, and in particular in article
III. In that article, the Sub-Commission had laid stress on apartheid,
because that was the most repellant form of racial hatred existing at
the present time.
Mr. Morozov (USSR) said that the insertion proposed by the United
States delegation would radically alter the balance of article III.
Racial segregation and apartheid were forms of discrimination. They
were methods of promoting a racist policy, which had been used in
several countries, were still being used and could be directed
against any race. That was why the Sub-Commission had particularly
condemned racial segregation and apartheid. However, anti-Semitism
was a manifestation of discrimination against one particular race.
Consequently, apartheid and anti-Semitism could not be placed on the
same footing. The former was a general form of racial discrimination,
which might be applied at any period and against any race. The latter
2 E.CN4/ SR789, at 10–12.
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was merely one manifestation of racial discrimination in a particular
case. However, if the Commission intended to revise article III,
his delegation would submit a sub-amendment to the United States
amendment, so that reference would also be made to the other individual
manifestations of racial discrimination which still existed. Subject
to any changes, the sub-amendment would consist of the addition of the
word “Nazism” after the word “apartheid” and of the words “and other
expressions of hatred based on doctrines of racial superiority” after
the word “anti-Semitism.””
Each record contains hundreds of such proposals like the U.S. representative’s and
thousands of responses like those of the Lebanese and Soviet delegates.
Experts familiar with both international law and with the treaty’s substantive
issues must interpret and code the proposals and their responses. To facilitate
coding, I developed a codebook containing detailed coding instructions and dozens
of variables, some of which are appropriate for all treaties, and some of which
are treaty-specific (see appendix). Among other things, the questions capture the
identities of issue sponsors, supporters, and critics, as well as the strength of
preference on a five-point scale.3 Trained coding assistants and I read each meeting
report and identified all proposals relating to the substantive content of the treaty at
issue. I also compared each proposal to the final version of the treaty. In doing so,
I took account of which states or other organizations made which sort of proposals,
capturing and coding numerous attributes of each. For each proposal, the sponsor
and all actors that take a position on the proposal are recorded, coded on a 5-point
Likert scale from 1 (unqualified support) to 5 (unqualified opposition). A code of 3
denotes a mixed or ambivalent position. Coding a treaty typically takes each trained
coder approximately 100–300 hours in total.
3 The questions also capture the exact nature of the proposal assigning to one or more of
dozens of categories. (The coding scheme was designed to capture a broad set of information
about the negotiations, which might be used in a variety of future research projects; only some
of that information is used in the analysis in this dissertation.) Parts of this typology are partly
inspired by the treaty-problem categories in the Continent of International Law (COIL) coding
system (Koremenos 2016).
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After the travaux is coded, the next step is to process the resulting data. To
do so, I use a form of ideal-point estimation. Similar methods have been used for
the U.S. Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1985), the U.S. Supreme Court (Bailey 2017;
Fischman 2011; Martin and Quinn 2002), and the UN General Assembly (Voeten
2000). In essence, these methods use the ‘yea’ and ‘nay’ votes of lawmakers or
judges to estimate a latent dimension that groups likeminded actors together and
places their ideal points on the latent dimension.
The merits of different forms of ideal-point estimation are subject to an ongoing
debate among political methodologists. I will not attempt to meaningfully cover
that debate here, but suffice it to say, each of the several methods of ideal-point
estimation has its own assumptions about the data, the form of actor utility,
and the goals of the estimation (Armstrong et al. 2014; Carroll et al. 2009; Laver
2014). The leading technique is likely still NOMINATE, which was developed by
Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal 1985 for the U.S. Congress and adopted in
hundreds of published papers. They include Poole and Rosenthal (1997), Voeten
(2000) (UN General Assembly), and Lupu (2013a) (W-NOMINATE), for states based
on previous treaty ratification behavior. Another spatial estimation technique
is Optimal Classification (OC) (Poole 2000). Optimal Classification prioritizes
categorizing political actors into like-minded groups, uses a non-parametric form
for voters’ utility functions, and produces ordinal rather than interval ideal point
estimates (McCarty 2011).
In the analysis that follows, I opt for an Item Response Theory (IRT) model.
IRT exploits advances in Bayesian methods and is now used to model ideal points
of domestic actors more broadly (Clinton et al. 2004). Specifically, I use the
IDEAL quadratic parametric model developed by Clinton et al., and elaborated
in Armstrong et al. (2014). The principal motivation for choosing IDEAL is my
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assumption that decrease in state utility accelerates as a treaty policy moves away
from a state’s ideal point, and that utility becomes negative with sufficient distance,
making the IRT’s quadratic (rather than Gaussian) utility function appropriate for
my purposes. The main alternative is a Gaussian form used by models such as
NOMINATE, in which the the actor’s utility asymptotically approaches 0, such
that it is largely indifferent between extreme positions. IDEAL has also been
shown to estimate with greater certainty the positions of moderate actors relative
to extreme ones (Carroll et al. 2009). Moderate actors tend to be more influential, so
determining their positions with greater precision is valuable.
IRT was initially developed for psychometric testing but was later adopted
for estimating parameters of legislator roll-call votes (see Ladha 1991). The
psychometric test model (from which the model I use was derived) estimates
two latent parameters – (1) item discrimination and (2) item difficulty – based
on test subjects’ responses. Some variation of this model is now widely used
in political science, in addition to psychometrics and epidemiology. Like others
studying political actors, I model the positions of actors (instead of test subjects’
responses) on political issues (instead of test questions) (Martin and Quinn 2002).
The corresponding three latent parameters are therefore (1) issue ideological
divisiveness ↵j , and (2) issue unpopularity,  j , of issue j, given the matrix of states’
expressed positions about the treaty terms, Y, comprising n⇥ q positions, yij . It also
estimates state ideal point, xi, for each state i. In this model, for issue j in k 2 [1, s]
dimensions, state i derives utility Uijy from the acceptance, y, where the proposed
treaty’s policy point on that issue lies at tjky, and it derives utility Uijn from rejecting,
n, the proposed policy on issue j and remaining at the status quo policy point at tjkn
(cf. Armstrong et al. 2014).
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With this IRT model, I can estimate states’ ideal points, as well as the position of
the treaty (t) and the status quo without the treaty (s). To calculate state ideal points
x, I treat the positions of each state on each issue captured in the negotiating record
as a vote, with a supportive position equivalent to a yea and a critical one equivalent
to a nay. These “votes” can then be expressed as an n⇥ q matrix.The matrixes below
show the form of the data. The left panel shows the generic form of the data; the
right panel shows a set of hypothetical states and coded positions.
Table 4.1: n⇥ q matrix of state positions, yij
j1 j2 j3 ... jq
i1 y11 y12 y13 . . . y1q
i2 y21 y22 y23 . . . y2q






in yn1 yn2 yn3 . . . ynq
j1 j2 j3 ... jq
Iran 3 3 2 . . . 3
China 1 3 3 . . . 2






Argentina 3 3 3 . . . 1
Because the conventional IRT model on which I draw is designed for binary
rather than ordinal data, the 5-point Likert scale is reduced to a 3-point scale:
1 (supportive), 2 (critical), or 3 (ambivalent), with ambivalence treated as no
position.4 With this matrix of state positions, I can estimate each state’s ideal point in
n-dimensions. For the purpose of ensuring relatively precise estimates, I excluded
those negotiating states that took fewer positions than one standard deviation below
the mean number of positions.5 The IRT model excludes issues for which there was
4 In addition, there are fairly few “partial” positions, ie., 2 or 5, so the choice of binary instead of
ordinal IRT likely makes little difference. Nonetheless, in future work, I may use an ordinal model
as a robustness check.
5 For the CERD that number was 9; for the Rome Statute, it was 5; for the Refugee Convention, it
was 3. Therefore, I did not estimate ideal points for states that took fewer than 9, 5, and 3 positions,
respectively.
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unanimous consent, which are uninformative.
In a methodological innovation, I also use the IRT model to obtain an empirical
estimate of the treaty point and the status quo. Applying the ideal-point estimation
methods to a treaty’s negotiating records requires incorporating this unique opt-in
features of treaties by estimating policy points for the treaty and the status quo. To
capture t, I conceive a hypothetical actor, the ‘treaty,’ which supports every proposal
that the body as a whole supports, and which appears in the concluded treaty – and
add this hypothetical actor to my data. Of course, the logic of negotiations implies
that the treaty will nearly always occupy some middle position among the states.
The estimation of t represents an innovation because the notion of an “ideal point”
for the final institutional product (in this case, the treaty) is theoretically meaningless
for most other legal institutions. In other systems, roll calls are disconnected:
legislators cast votes, and judges decide court cases in isolation from each other.
In legislative roll calls, for instance, all members of the legislature can be mapped
in n dimensions, and in a polarized legislature, party members will cluster together
around an unobservable point that represents their median policy preference. There
may exist sets of related issues on which the body decides, like taxes, defense
spending, and social welfare programs, but the legislative session or court sitting as
a whole usually has no substantively coherent theme or product whose proximity
to the actors has political significance. In contrast, treaty negotiations entail a final
product that links all of the different votes together into one, tangible institutional
package: the treaty.
In the same fashion, the position of the status quo can also be derived from the
data. It roughly approximates the status of international law without a new treaty. I
therefore construct a hypothetical actor who always responds yea or nay to proposals
based on which outcome lies closest to the status quo, and I add it to my data.
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For instance, the status quo actor would prefer the smallest possible (or no) legal
commitments, the fewest terms, the weakest possible enforcement mechanisms,
the least burdensome reporting obligations and oversight body, and in general, to
maintain the greatest possible sovereignty.
The values for vi (the value added to a treaty by state i’s ratification), and e (the
fraction of the treaty’s benefits that are public goods), are more difficult to model




be induced from the ratification behavior of sates; if states that are approximately




As discussed above, e denotes the percentage of the utility that constitutes positive
externalities (i.e., public goods) the treaty provides.
Pilot data coding has revealed one of ideal-point estimation’s potential
vulnerabilities: that the estimated ideal points can be highly dependent on a
researcher’s choices in identifying contentious issues. By analogy, methods for
estimating ideal points for legislators usually count all bills considered. Some
of those bills (e.g., tax, spending, civil rights, and environmental protection), are
related to one or more principal ideological dimensions, while others (e.g., naming
a bridge) are not. The IRT model essentially attributes to error those bills that do
not divide legislators along typical lines. But if a legislative session were dominated
by such minor or procedural issues, the recovered dimensions would reflect those
issues, not the substantive, politically salient ones, even though they are not central
to a legislator’s world view and do not factor into the electorate’s voting decisions.
Conversely, if a single vote were held on a single omnibus bill that contained dozens
of important issues, the model would under-weigh those issues.
Likewise, with treaty travaux, issues that are complex but relatively
unimportant to states can sometimes dominate negotiations. Such issues include
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debates over minor legal terminology and procedures for running the would-be
institution. Because these issues are complex, they can be divided into numerous
questions which may be discussed multiple times over the course of the
negotiations. (This is less likely to occur in other lawmaking contexts such as
legislatures, where the same issues are less often revisited over a legislative session.)
If each of these were counted independently, they might dominate the recovered
dimensions. It is therefore important to delineate the contentious issues in a way
that roughly reflects their relevance to the negotiations. To do so, a researcher might
consider grouping closely related issues together. That is, a coder might first identify
all instances in which the negotiators discuss some discrete issues, even if those
discussions were separated in time. The coder would then treat those discussions
as one discussion by aggregating all the state positions. Doing so would have the
additional advantage of grouping more actors votes together, likely improving the




This chapter applies the theoretical and empirical models in Chapters 3 and 4 to
real-world drafting efforts: (1) the International Covenant on the Elimination on All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); (2) the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court; and (3) the Convention on the Status of Refugees. I choose these
three treaties for several reasons.1 They represent high-profile drafting efforts with
detailed historical records. They are also relatively straightforward to analyze:
CERD and the Rome Statute have relatively small externalities, so it is likely that the
positions we observe in the records represent their positions assuming their intent
to ratify.2
1 APPLYING THEORY TO OBSERVATION
One of the insights from the theory developed in Chapter 3 is that treaties with
large externalities induce states to pursue negotiating positions consistent with their
optimal treaty that they do not intend to ratify. Therefore, a prior question to guide
1 I hope that the book project that evolves from this dissertation will contain up to a dozen
treaties, including some with large externalities. To that end, I have obtained over two-dozen
negotiating records with documentation sufficient for coding. The other issue areas include: trade
and investment, international humanitarian law/the laws of war, migration and refugee, human
rights, diplomatic, security, and others, such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
2 This means that we likely observe x and not x0.
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this empirical analysis is whether the treaty’s primary effects can be limited to state
parties, or whether the treaty produces significant externalities, either positive or
negative.
In Chapter 3, I distinguished between two kinds of states’ ideal points, one
with the intent to ratify the treaty (x) and one with the intent not to ratify (x0). The
empirical analysis cannot capture both for any given state; of course, states express
either x or x0 at any given time. Therefore, only one of them can be observed,
and which of the two they express is private information to that state; the other
ideal point remains latent, hidden to other states. Yet for any given treaty, we
can hypothesize whether states’ positions reflect x or x0 based on the nature of the
treaty and subsequent ratification patterns. Specifically, when a treaty produces
large externalities, we expect that at least some states express x0. In these cases, the
stated positions should also do a poor job at explaining subsequent ratification. For
treaties with few or no externalities, we must assume that we observe x, as a state is
largely or entirely indifferent among all possible X 0, that is, all versions of the treaty




vi   (t  x0i)2
⇤
= 0 when e = 0, the salience of ideological distance
between the treaty and x0 (t x) likewise becomes nil as the treaty’s externalities are
reduced.
For the sake of simplicity, the empirical analysis assumes that e is insignificant
for the three treaties that follow. This assumption is not arbitrary; it is grounded
in the nature of the three selected treaties. I believe that both CERD and the
Rome Statute are primarily club or private-goods treaties with relatively small
externalities. CERD’s externalities are relatively small because its main purpose is to
prompt state-parties to comply with certain legal standards on racial discrimination,
but these standards do not apply to non-state-parties. This observation does not
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imply that it has no externalities at all. A set of agreed-on norms against which states
can judge other states’ behavior is a form of externality: a positive one for states who
agree and practice those norms, and a negative one for states with weak records
or poor prognoses for racial equality. But these externalities are more difficult to
gauge than those for agreements like environmental or trade treaties, which solve
collaboration or cooperation problems. More importantly, they are small compared
with the treaty’s effects on the parties themselves.
Gauging the ICC’s externalities is more complex. The creation of a court with
the power to deter crime has clear benefits for many states, but most ICC crimes
are intra-state. Although the Statute recognizes that crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide can take place across national borders as in interstate war,
the ICC was inspired by and modeled after the internal conflict and persecution
in Nazi Germany, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. It appears that the Rome Statute
drafting states envisioned that the Court would target internal crimes, which, until
then, were outside of any court’s jurisdiction. (In contrast, violations of the laws
of war and other interstate crimes might fall under the jurisdiction of national
courts or the International Court of Justice.) And indeed, the offenses that the
Court has investigated since its inception have occurred almost entirely in the
defendant-national’s own territory.3 So it seems that the Court’s deterrence and
criminal-justice procedural benefits would fall almost entirely on member states,
meaning little external effect.
Granted, one key feature of the Rome Statute is that it extends the ICC’s
jurisdiction to nationals of non-parties, provided the offense occurred in the territory
of a party. This provision obviously impacts non-parties. In fact, it was the United
3 See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “ICC Situations and Cases,” at http://www.
coalitionfortheicc.org/explore/icc-situations-and-cases.
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States’s primary objection to the treaty and reportedly its main reason for not
ratifying. Yet in practice, this rule has little or no effect on the vast majority of states:
the risk of prosecution for extra-territorial conduct falls most heavily on states who
routinely have large numbers of troops abroad. The ICC’s costs and benefits are
therefore designed to fall primarily on state-parties, and externalities were probably
not a significant consideration for most negotiating states.
The nature of the Refugee Convention’s goods-production is also not
straightforward. The treaty certainly produces externalities, as binding oneself to
accept refugees under certain conditions partly relieves other states of that burden.
Like with many human rights treaties, however, it is unclear if that logic actually
motivates states to accept that burden for themselves by ratifying the treaty.
For each of these treaties, I therefore believe it is theoretically defensible
to focus on x and omit consideration of x0, as with the hypothetical, four-state
treaty negotiation depicted in Figure 3.4 in Chapter 3. While one of the model’s
insights involves the relationship between externalities and negotiating positions,
it is useful to test the model’s core predictions (that is, that negotiating positions
explain ratification, reservations, and implementation) before introducing treaties
with substantial externalities, which complicate these predictions. I hope that, as
I expand this project into a book manuscript and functional tool (as described in
the final chapter), I will be able to identify and code the travaux for treaties with
substantial externalities, such as trade, defense, and environmental treaties.
Since my empirical analysis relies on the treaties’ travaux, it is useful to briefly
discuss the nature of these records and reflect on what they capture. I do so first for
the Race Convention.
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2 THE RACE CONVENTION
A. Background and Empirical Expectations
The development of legally binding racial-discrimination covenant can be
seen against the backdrop of the mid-1960s Cold War struggle for influence with
the newly independent colonies. For the new African states, condemning racial
inequality was a particularly important and unifying topic, and they used their
influence in the General Assembly to push for a convention. Racial equality was
also a sensitive topic for the United States; parts of it operated under an effective
apartheid regime, which hurt its standing among the African states in particular.
It was clear to U.S. officials in the early 1960s that if the United States was to
compete successfully with the Soviet Union for the moral high ground on racial
policy, the United States would need to support the African initiative to enact
a convention condemning racial discrimination (Lovelace 2014). In essence, the
convention represented a virtue-signaling competition between the United States
and Soviet Union.
The competition for influence between the Soviet Union and the United States
was apparent in the initial battle over whether the convention should focus on just
race, or also on religion. When a group of African states tabled an official proposal
to commence the drafting of a racial discrimination convention during the 1962
regular session of the General Assembly, Liberia (at the request of Israel) pushed
to include religious discrimination in the mandate. This presented an important
opportunity for the United States: while it was particularly weak on racial equality,
it had a strong record on religious freedom. In contrast, religion was the Soviet
Union’s Achilles heel: at the time, it was under pressure for repressing religion and
for its anti-Semitism in particular. A convention that would deal with both race and
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religion would level the playing field for the United States. But the U.S. proposal
to include religion produced Soviet pushback, while simultaneously playing into
African states’ desire to focus on condemning racial discrimination and Arab states’
animosity for Israel, which was pushing to formally condemn anti-Semitism. The
Soviet lobbying efforts paid off: the General Assembly ultimately resolved that the
UN Commission on Human Rights should prepare two draft conventions, one on
race and one on religion. The latter Convention was never adopted.
The Convention was drafted and developed within several UN bodies. First,
the UN Commission on Human Rights4 began drafting the Convention in 1964. The
draft was debated and revised within the UN General Assembly, where it was first
discussed in its Third Committee in fall 1965,5 followed by a contentious revision
process in the plenary session on the General Assembly in December 1965. The
available travaux préparatoires captures both these stages. Notably, while the initial
discussions in the Human Rights Commission were limited to a smaller group of
states, major players like the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain were
all represented on this body, and, during the General Assembly stage, new states
entered the discussion. Thus, it is likely that all states that wanted to press their
views on the issue had an opportunity to do so, and that these views are captured
by the analysis that follows. It is also noteworthy that of the 53 states represented on
the Commission that were active participants, only 24 actively participated in this
initial stage.
Before 2013, the CERD travaux was not widely accessible; they, along with
other treaty travaux, were available only on physical microfiche files, and accessible
4 The UN Commission on Human Rights was a permanent UN body that had 53 members,
elected on a regional basis, which was replaced by the Human Rights Council in 2006 (Helfer and
Slaughter 1997).
5 The Third Committee is a standing committee dealing with human rights and humanitarian
issues.
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only from UN libraries in Geneva and New York. As part of a travaux-collection
initiative of the University of Virginia Law Library, I played a small supportive
role in the effort to bring these records together into one collection, digitize them,
and make them publicly available on the web.6 These records, which form the
basis for my ideal-point estimation, start with the 1964 deliberation in the UN
Commission on Human Rights, at which point religious discrimination had already
been relegated to a separate covenant.7 The historical records in this analysis also
span the subsequent discussions in the General Assembly’s Third Committee and
a plenary session on the General Assembly in December 1965, where the Race
Convention was unanimously adopted. In total, the travaux forming the basis for
the data comprises 94 documents of approximately 5 pages each, totaling just under
500 pages.
B. States’ CERD Ideal Points
To convert the travaux records into quantitative data for ideal-point estimation,
two trained coders each reviewed all of the available CERD travaux. Using the
methods discussed in Chapter 4 and in the codebook I developed (see Appendix),
they identified every contentious issue and every potential state and NGO position
on that issue. I myself also read the travaux multiple times and reconciled all
differences between the coders. The reconciled dataset is a 220 ⇥ 494 matrix
(comprising 220 states and 494 contentious issues).
To determine interrater agreement, Cohen’s Kappa or Krippendorff’s Alpha is
appropriate here because the compared data are categorical. This coding involves
6 See ‘UN Human Rights Treaties Travaux Preparatoires,’ at https://hr-travaux.law.virginia.
edu/.
7 The issue would occasionally reappear in proposals to include anti-Semitism as a form of racial
discrimination.
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identifying issues, and then states by country ID, rather than assigning a level or
quantity value to a predetermined unit. It would therefore be inappropriate to use
statistics designed for ordinal or interval data. (While many coding approaches
suffer from the “prevalence problem,” meaning that the distribution of ratings in
one or more categories occur at significantly higher rates, that problem does not
occur here, so neither the Brennan and Prediger coefficient24 or Gwet’s Adjusted
Coefficient are necessary here (Hallgren 2012; Hickel Jr 2019).) Cohen’s Kappa =
0.514 (p<0.001), meaning moderate strength of agreement. Krippendorff’s Alpha
= 0.827 (where ↵   0.800 is considered reliable and ↵   0.667 is considered
acceptable). So although this coding involves many difficult, subjective decisions,
the coders agreed at reasonable levels.
A matrix of that size accommodates over 100,000 votes, but most of its cells
are in fact empty or “missing.” As discussed in Chapter 4, most states in treaty
negotiations do not record a position on any given issue, either because they are not
present for the discussion, or because they simply opt not to openly express their
position. Because we cannot know the reason for a state’s failure to take a position in
any particular instance, I treat all non-positions as abstentions, neither in favor of the
proposition nor against it. As a result, the dataset comprises 1,956 positions: 1,491
in favor of a proposition and 465 against one. Because states that speak infrequently
produce highly imprecise estimates, I drop states with fewer than 10 expressed
positions (1 standard deviation below the mean). I also drop all issues in which
there was unanimous agreement, which are uninformative in any IRT model. This
process leaves 44 states, 123 contentious issues, and 1,013 positions: 598 positions in
favor of a proposition and 415 positions against one. See Table 5.1. As mentioned,
this “voting pattern” differs markedly from that in a typical legislature or court, in
that the vast majority of ‘votes’ are abstentions. As shown below, despite the large
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Table 5.1: State Positions in CERD Negotiations
Position Count Percent
0 (nay) 415 7.7%
1 (yea) 598 11.0%
99 (missing) 4, 399 81.3%
Total 5,412 100.0%
volume of missing data, there are a sufficient number of contentious issues such that
most states’ ideal points can be estimated with reasonable precision.
With this matrix of position data, I estimate x for each state i, as well as
s and t using the methods described in Chapter 4.8 Because standard errors
are difficult to depict in multiple dimensions with many actors, I first estimate
and display the ideal points in one dimension. Figure 5.1 below provides the
one-dimensional ideal points with 95% confidence intervals. From what we know
of the negotiations, however, it is likely that the data can be better represented in
two or more dimensions. To determine the dimensionality of the data, I plot a
scree plot and observe the Eigenvalues, that is, the relative amount of variation in
the data for each dimension.9 An “elbow test” applied to the scree plot suggests
that that CERD is best characterized as two-dimensional. See Figure A.1 in the
Appendix. I therefore estimate the ideal points in two dimensions.10 Table A.1
in the Appendix provides the estimated two-dimensional ideal points. The Figure
5.2 scatterplot below depicts the ideal points spatially, along with the treaty t and
status quo s. Here, the status quo roughly approximates the status of international
8 The IDEAL model parameters I used are: maxiter (the “number of MCMC iterations”) = 200,000,
thin (the “thinning interval used for recording MCMC iterations”) = 5, and burnin (the “number of
MCMC iterations to run before recording”) = 100,000.
9 In a scree plot, the dimensions’ Eigenvalues are plotted in descending order, and a researcher
typically determines the last value before a significant drop-off (otherwise known as the “elbow
test”).
10 The IDEAL model parameters I used are: maxiter (the “number of MCMC iterations”) = 200,000,
thin (the “thinning interval used for recording MCMC iterations”) = 5, and burnin (the “number of
MCMC iterations to run before recording”) = 100,000.
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Figure 5.1: CERD Negotiating Positions in a Single Dimension, with 95% Confidence
Intervals
racial-discrimination laws and norms in 1965 in the absence of a new treaty.
How states divide along the two dimensions provides insight into what these
dimensions represent. Because the treaty preferences captured by the dimensions
are latent, their identity must be inferred from the kinds of issues that divide the
states. Doing so involves a non-trivial interpretative exercise. As with scholars of the
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Figure 5.2: CERD Negotiating Positions in Two Dimensions
(and who has voted for lower taxes and abortion restrictions) is conservative, I must
glean the nature of the issues in a treaty negotiation. Since the divisive issues in any
treaty-making process are usually less familiar than those for the U.S. Congress or
other domestic legislatures, this interpretative task is not so straightforward.
The empirical model produces data to aid in this exercise. For each recorded
vote, the model produces a discrimination parameter, so called because it indicates
how well the vote separates the states on any given dimension. See Tables A.6
and A.7 in the Appendix. By way of comparison, studies of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions find that the body is mostly divided along one dimension: liberal to
conservative (Martin and Quinn 2002). Some types of cases – like civil rights,
criminal sentencing, and immigration cases – usually reveal the justices’ positions
on that spectrum better than other types – like jurisdictional and procedural
cases. That former set of cases, which discriminates better between liberal
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and conservative justices, would have higher discrimination parameters on the
liberal-conservative dimension. We might look closely at those cases in particular
for evidence of where any given justice lies on the left-right dimension. Likewise,
I can observe the set of issues with the largest discrimination parameters in each
dimension of interest.
Another tool for inferring the nature of the dimensions is to identify the most
extreme states in each dimension based on their ideal points and to inspect the
positions they took that caused their ideological isolation. For example, on what
types of issues do Italy, Turkey, and/or Australia, on one hand, take opposite
positions from the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Poland, on the other hand? Those
issues likely represent the divisions underlying the first dimension.
Applying these diagnostic tools, it appears that the first dimension represents
an ideology divide over the scope of regulated conduct. A cursory inspection of this
plot reveals that the first dimension seems to track Cold War divides. On the
right end lie states like Ukraine, the Soviet Union, Nigeria, Chile, and Poland;
on the left end lie states including Italy, Turkey, France, Australia, Denmark,
Costa Rica, the Netherlands, the United States, and Great Britain. In general,
Western states preferred more libertarian approaches and generally eschewed
coercive measures to reduce racism. In contrast, the Soviet Union and its allies
were more comfortable mandating such measures. For example, one of the issues
with the highest discrimination parameters involved whether state parties would
be required to prohibit not only acts leading to discrimination, but also to ban
entire organizations that had committed these infractions. To illustrate, in spring
1964, article IV of the Convention’s working draft stated in part, “States Parties
... undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all
incitement to such discrimination, and to this end, ... (b) Shall declare illegal and
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prohibit organizations, and also organized propaganda activities, which promote and
incite racial discrimination ....”11 This would have been politically and/or legally
impossible for many Western liberal democracies.
Schisms and alliances forming the second dimension are more difficult to
characterize: at the top lie states including Uganda, the Soviet Union, Venezuela,
Tanzania, Yugoslavia, El Salvador, and Poland; at the bottom lie states including
Liberia, Benin, Great Britain, India, Mauritania, and Ukraine. Notably, this
dimension divides the independent African states who were instrumental in placing
an international instrument on racial discrimination on the UN’s agenda (Friesel
2014). The United States and most (though not all) Western states fall somewhere in
the middle.
Looking to the divisive issues on the second dimension, it includes a set of
disagreements over: whether to permit what later became known as affirmative
action; what groups would be entitled to such affirmative action; and how to refer
to those groups in the treaty. In one of the most divisive issues, all states generally
agreed that parties could take remedial measures favoring certain groups, at least
temporarily. But foreshadowing the debate that would take place in the United
States and elsewhere in the following decades,12 the states disagreed over their
permissible means and what kind of groups could benefit. For example, draft
Article II, ¶2, stated, “States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take,
in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures
to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or
individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and
11 E/CN.4/SR.790 (emphasis added).
12 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (upholding the use of racial
preferences generally in college admissions, while holding that race-based numerical quotas violate
the Equal Protection clause).
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equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures
shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate
rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which they were taken have
been achieved.” Mr. Hakim of Lebanon argued that the purpose of affirmative
action was not to ensure that the groups would receive “full” enjoyment of the
rights, but rather their “equal” enjoyment. Otherwise, he feared, “a situation might
arise in the newly independent countries, with their very limited resources, where
under-developed racial groups would be assured a greater enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms than the rest of the community.”13
Thus, the data appear to tell a similar story about the main contentious issues
as that told by qualitative and historical accounts. That fact partly validate the
model’s approach. Identifying dimensions is not, however, the method’s primary
contribution. One of my theoretical model’s main functions is to infer and predict
states’ subsequent international legal behavior. To that end, I next use the ideal
points to predict which states value the treaty enough to formally act on it.
C. Predicting Ratification
To explain how observed ideal points can predict ratification, I briefly recall
the logic of the theoretical model from Chapter 3. When a state considers a treaty
that does not primarily produce externalities, it decides what positions to take and
whether to ratify by comparing its ideal point, x, with the treaty and with the status
quo. The one that generates the greater expected utility is the one closest to its ideal
point. During the negotiation stage, states will push for amendments that move
the treaty closer to its ideal point, x. This is true regardless of whether it finds
itself closer to the treaty, t, or the status quo, s: at this point, before preferences
13 E/CN.4/SR.786, at 6.
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are well-formed and before most of the treaty content is developed, there may be
ample opportunity to shape the treaty’s terms. This is especially true if the marginal
difference between the two proximities is small: that is, the state is “on the fence”
about whether to ratify. States in those cases may enjoy a relatively large amount
of leverage over the treaty terms by credibly threatening not to ratify if the state
does not get the concessions it requests (Morrow and Cope 2018). Of course, all
things equal, it is much more likely to receive those concessions if its participation
would add more value than other states’ participation. (In the model’s terms: its vi
is relatively large.) Once the drafting stage is over, a state will base its ratification
decision on where it finds itself relative to the treaty, t and the status quo, s. If it is
closer to the treaty, it will ratify; if it is closer to the status quo, it will not, unless
it can modify its position by entering reservations, declarations, or understandings
(RUDs).
This same logic can be used to predict ratification empirically. The model can
predict ratification simply by comparing the relative proximities of the state’s ideal
point to the treaty and the state’s ideal point to the status quo. If the former is closer,
it predicts that the state will ratify (or has ratified); if the latter is closer, it predicts
that the state will not ratify (or did not ratify). Thus, I can calculate each state’s
relative distance from the treaty and the status quo to make predictions about each’s
relative expected utility from ratifying. To depict visually where states are relative to
the treaty, a “cut line” is added to each plot. As with Figure 3.4 in Chapter 3, this cut
line represents the set of points that are equidistant between the status quo and the
treaty point, that is, where e
⇥P
irat






assuming both v and e = 0. Any state on that line should therefore be indifferent
between ratifying and not. States lying closer to the treaty should prefer to ratify,
and states lying closer to the status quo should prefer not to ratify. Note that the
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line is not “fitted” to the states’ ideal points; it is determined ex ante to any state
position-taking and depends entirely on the treaty and status quo.
The CERD treaty point lies at (1.46, 1.71), and the status quo is normalized to
the origin. The cut line, again representing where e
⇥P
irat






vi   (t   xi)2 (assuming both v and e = 0), runs perpendicular to the
line connecting those two points and is equidistant from them. The fact that it runs
diagonally, as opposed to horizontally or vertically, means that the treaty and status
quo are meaningfully different in both dimensions. This in turn suggests that both
dimensions were salient to states in determining whether to ratify.
This analysis predicts near-universal ratification of the CERD. Figure 5.3 depicts
the same two-dimensional plot as above, but with the cut line added, and with
the states that ratified (here, all of them) displayed in blue/purple. It reveals that
nearly every state lies above and to the right of the cut line – and thus closer to the
treaty than to the status quo. The point estimates place only four states – France,
Denmark, United Kingdom, and Italy – below and to the left of the line. Those ideal
points suggest that those four would not ratify (although they are close enough
that their confidence intervals include the line and points on the other side). In
reality, every state that participated in the negotiating later ratified the treaty.14 The
model therefore made four “errors” in this case, all “false-negatives” – predicting no
ratification for ratifying states – although, again, each within the model’s margin of
error. As I will show below, three of those four entered reservations and declarations
that would bring their ideal point closer to the treaty.
14 The treaty was popular not just among those who negotiated it: as of 2019, only 14 UN-member
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Figure 5.3: CERD Negotiating Positions in Two Dimensions with Cut Line: Ratifiers With
RUDs in Purple, Ratifiers Without RUDs in Blue
D. Predicting RUDs
Another feature of this model is that it can be used to explain reservations and
declarations. After all, where states are on the fence about a treaty (that is, they are
near the cut line), they might effectively be able to move the treaty, t, closer to their
ideal point by entering a reservation (or declaration or understanding) that modifies
the treaty so that it effectively becomes more palatable to them. Indeed, one of the
main arguments for allowing RUDs is that it will increase the number of ratifiers.15
Unlike some treaties such as the Rome Statute, CERD does allow reservations.
Note that Figure 5.3 above depicts reserving states in purple. A quick inspection of
15 Advisory Opinion Concerning Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 28 May 1951. (“The object
and purpose of the Convention imply that it was the intention General Assembly and of the States
which adopted it, that many States as possible should participate. This purpose would be defeated
if an objection to a minor reservation should produce complete exclusion from the Convention”).
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the plot reveals that reserving states tend to be those farther away from the treaty, as
expected. Interestingly, three of the four countries that the model predicted would
not ratify, but nonetheless did, entered RUDs. Take the example of Great Britain
and Belgium, whose ideal points are roughly equidistant between the status quo
and the treaty. As mentioned, during the drafting of CERD, delegates stood divided
over whether the treaty should “declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also
organized propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination.”
This language was proposed by the Soviet Union. A coalition of Western states
including Great Britain and Belgium feared that it would undermine free speech
and freedom of association. While the language ultimately made it into Article 4
of the final treaty, Great Britain and Belgium issued an interpretative declaration
stating that they interpret Article 4 as “requiring a party to the Convention to adopt
further legislative measures . . . only in so far as it may consider with due regard
to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
rights expressly set forth in article 5 of the Convention (in particular the right to
freedom of opinion and expression and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and association).”16 With this interpretation, these states effectively moved the
treaty closer to their ideal point, and they ratified it.
This relationship can be explored with a logit model. Regressing the RUDs on
the states’ ideal points’ proximity to the treaty allows me to estimate the likelihood
of a state’s entering either of those, given its ideal point. I use absolute proximity to
the treaty instead of relative proximity between the treaty and status quo because
preference for the status quo is not necessarily the only driver of states’ decisions
16 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Declarations and Reservations-United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland, signed with
reservation and interpretative statements Oct. 11, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S 195, 302-03, https://treaties.un.
org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&clang=_en..
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to enter declarations or reservations. In Figure 5.4 below, states that have entered
RUDs are represented by the black dots at the top; states that have not are at the
bottom. From these data points, the logit model infers the likelihood that a state
with a given ideal point will enter either a reservation or declaration. As with the
Figure 5.3 scatterplot above, the states that ratified without RUDs are in blue and
the states that ratified with RUDs are in purple. This scatterplot, analyzed together
with the logit graph in Figure 5.4, reveals a relationship between RUDs and distance
from the treaty that is both substantively meaningful and statistically significant
(p < 0.05). Notably, it is not just states that preferred a treaty closer to the status quo
that were more likely to enter RUDs; states that preferred either more or less state
obligations and/or more or less oversight were more likely to enter RUDs. States
that favor versions of the treaty even more different from the status quo (that is,
even more robust requirements or oversight than the treaty provided) were more
likely to enter reservations – or particularly declarations – to clarify that they view
a provision as imposing strong requirements, thereby effectively moving the treaty
in their more extreme direction, at least for them.
The logit model is only bivariate, regressing RUD decisions on the ideal point
estimates alone. If the goal were to maximize predictive accuracy, I would add
other elements to the model that are not strongly correlated with ideal point but
which bear on states’ tendency to enter RUDs. These might include variables such as
structure of the domestic ratification apparatus, including veto players, and states’
tendency to enter RUDs to similar past (or even future) treaties.
In essence, as applied to CERD, the model does a reasonably good job at: (1)
identifying state positions on multiple dimensions and the resulting alliances; (2)
revealing the identity of salient contentious issues; and (3) predicting state legal












































Figure 5.4: Predicted Entry of Reservation or Declaration as a Function of Distance From
the Treaty
At least as to the CERD, it appears that states’ expressed negotiating positions
represent a fairly sincere expression of the utility they expect to receive from the
treaty.
To further explore this phenomenon, I next apply the model to a somewhat
different and more controversial type of treaty: the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
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3 THE ROME STATUTE
A. Background and Empirical Expectations
The ICC’s authority flows from the Rome Statute of 1998, which confers
permanent jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and
(as of July 2018), the crime of state-to-state aggression. Before the Rome Statute’s
entry-into-force, there was no permanent international mechanism for prosecuting
and trying criminal acts. Serious talk of an international criminal court started
after World War I, when states discussed it at the 1918 Paris Peace Conference.
When the Genocide Convention was being drafted after World War II, the UN
General Assembly asked the International Law Commission (ILC), the United
Nations’ legal think tank, to consider the prospects of establishing an international
court with jurisdiction over genocide, among other possible crimes. The Genocide
Convention was concluded and took effect, but Cold War factions prevented states
from reaching consensus for an international court to enforce its terms.
Since then, terrorism, human trafficking trade, drug trade, human rights
abuses, and other spillover threats to state security reinvigorated discussion of a
permanent international criminal court. In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago formally
requested the UN to reconsider a permanent international court to deal with
transnational drug-trade-related crimes, and the General Assembly asked the ILC
to draft a statute. While the drafting was underway, wars in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda spurred the UN General Assembly to create temporary war crimes
tribunals for the purpose prosecuting offenders from those conflicts. Although those
bodies had jurisdiction only over specific conflicts (Kim 2003), they partially paved
the way for a permanent court by showing that international criminal tribunals
could work.
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The ILC concluded its draft in 1994 (Kim 2003). The draft envisioned a system
in which perpetrators of human rights abuses would preferably answer not to an
international tribunal, but to their own domestic courts. But the drafters knew
that crimes occurring during civil war or under the auspices of a corrupt regime
rarely come before domestic courts in practice, so they also sought to establish an
independent international court that would complement this regime by wielding
the threat of independent prosecution. The General Assembly created a preparatory
committee to reconcile the ILC draft text with proposals from states and NGOs. The
preparatory committee met several times at the UN headquarters between 1996 and
1998.
Finally, a five-week diplomatic conference took place in Rome in June and
July 1998 (Bassiouni 1999). It included not only state delegates, but hundreds
of NGO representatives who participated directly through the Coalition for the
International Criminal Court.17 Some of the most contentious issues involved the
scope of court’s compulsory authority and the scope of crimes over which the court
would have jurisdiction. With two weeks left of the Conference, the delegates had
reached an impasse. Short on time, the Conference’s chair did something rare for
large treaty negotiations: he called a meeting with selected delegates in order to
craft a consensus “package,” which he hoped the whole Conference would then
vote to accept wholesale (Benedetti et al. 2013). This meeting included 28 of the
Conference’s 150 delegates. It was not held at the regular conference venue, but
at the Canadian Embassy. Some states criticized it as an improper “ambush by the
chairman” (Benedetti et al. 2013, 123).
17 One difference between the Rome Statute and CERD is that the former allowed NGOs to
participate. Since NGO statements are included in the negotiating record, they are also included
in my analysis. Two of those, Amnesty International and the Red Cross, made enough proposals to
be included in the analysis.
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Although the United States participated in crafting this package deal, the U.S.
delegation objected to the package that emerged, mainly because it would subject
nationals of non-state-parties to the Court’s jurisdiction.18 The U.S. delegation had
already lost some credibility with other delegations. It had received conflicting
directives from the Defense and State Departments, and the lead delegate struggled
to receive clear instructions from President Clinton, who was embroiled in the
Monica Lewinsky scandal (and who was being prosecuted by independent counsel
Kenneth Starr under a statute that some senior U.S. officials likened to the ICC’s
draft prosecutor provision) (Benedetti et al. 2013; Scheffer 2013, 125). Some other
delegations were skeptical that the United States would ever join the treaty, even
if it received the several major concessions it had requested. Two weeks later,
the proposed U.S. amendments were defeated at the eleventh hour. Most of the
other delegates spontaneously hugged, cheered, and wept in the “biggest emotional
demonstration” of the Conference.19
On July 17, 1998, the Conference concluded the Rome Statute and opened it
to signature from all states. The majority got something close to their preferred
treaty in a strong international court, but at a price. President Clinton signed
the Statute but did not pursue ratification, and the Bush administration worked
to actively undermine the Court. The United States enacted legislation in 2002
levying economic sanctions on certain parties to the Statute and giving the president
authority to use “all means necessary and appropriate” to free U.S. service members
being detained by the Court (giving rise to the nickname, “the Hague Invasion
18 The United States was willing to accept this jurisdiction for the crime of genocide, but not for
war crimes or crimes against humanity (Benedetti et al. 2013, 127). For a detailed analysis of the U.S.
objections, see Scheffer (1999).
19 A total of 113 states voted in favor of the “no-action” motion on the proposed American
amendments, 17 opposed, and 25 abstained (Benedetti et al. 2013).
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Act”).20 The U.S. government also concluded a series of bilateral immunity treaties
(“Article 98” agreements),21 which sought to shield American troops from the ICC.22
In September 2018, the Trump administration went further, threatening the Court’s
judges and prosecutors with criminal prosecution, and vowing financial retaliation
against states aiding Court investigations of American service members.23
The Rome Statute entered into force in July 2002, upon receiving 60 ratifications
from parties to the Statute. As of 2019, of the 139 states that signed the Rome Statute,
123 have ratified it. States including China and India are non-party, non-signatories
to the treaty. In addition to the United States, Israel and Sudan have purported to
“unsign” the Statute, signaling that they no longer intend to become a party and
have no legal obligations arising from their original signatory status.
B. States’ Rome Statute Ideal Points
The analysis here is based on the records of this final conference; there are
no detailed records of the earlier two stages. Two coders reviewed the Rome
Conference travaux, identifying each contentious issue and every state and NGO
position on that issue. I read the travaux and reconciled all differences between the
20 American Service-Members’ Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA), 22 U.S.C. § 7421 et seq. (2002).
21 The treaties are inspired by the Rome Statute’s Article 98, which provides, “The Court may not
proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently
with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State
is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.” (Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 148 (entered into force July 1, 2002)).
The United States had lobbied for this provision in earlier stages of the negotiations. (Scheffer 1999,
2001).
22 These developments have received significant scholarly attention (see, e.g., Eubany 2003; Kelley
2007; Orentilicher 2003; Sadat 2003; Tallman 2004; Wedgwood 2001).
23 Mark Landler, Trump Administration Threatens International Criminal Court and the P.L.O.,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2018, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/10/us/politics/
trump-plo-bolton-international-criminal-court.html (“‘The United States will use any means
necessary to protect our citizens and those of our allies from unjust prosecution by this illegitimate
court’. . . .” (quoting U.S. National Security Adviser, John Bolton)).
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coders. The reconciled dataset comprises 142 state advocates and 229 contentious
issues. The dataset comprises 6,699 positions: 4,896 in favor of a proposition and
1,803 against one. As with the CERD, I drop states with fewer than 5 expressed
positions. I also drop all issues in which there was unanimous agreement. This
process left 142 states (none dropped), 149 contentious issues, and 5,215 positions:
3,419 positions in favor of a proposition and 1,796 positions against one. See Table
5.2.
Table 5.2: State Positions in Rome Statute Negotiations
Position Count Percent
0 (nay) 1, 796 8.5%
1 (yea) 3, 419 16.2%
99 (missing) 15, 943 75.4%
Total 39,388 100%
With this matrix of position data, I estimate x for each state i, as well as s and
t, as I did with the CERD. Figure 5.5 below provides the ideal points for the Rome
Statute in a single dimension with 95% confidence intervals.
As with CERD, Eigenvalue analysis suggests that the data is better represented
in two dimensions. The scree plot (see Figure A.2 in the Appendix) suggests that
that ICC is also two-dimensional.24 Figure 5.6 depicts state ideal points, x, in two
dimensions, along with the treaty, t, and the status quo, s. Key states are labeled;
see Tables A.2, A.3, and A.4 in the Appendix for a list of all the ideal points. Here,
the status quo attempts to model a world without an international criminal court
(and assuming no new ad hoc tribunals in the mode of the ICTY or ICTR). There
are plausible alternatives for conceiving the status quo. For instance, I might have
24 The IDEAL model parameters I used are: maxiter (the “number of MCMC iterations”) = 100,000,
thin (the “thinning interval used for recording MCMC iterations”) = 5, and burnin (the “number of
MCMC iterations to run before recording”) = 50,000.
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Figure 5.5: Rome Statute Negotiating Positions in a Single Dimension, with 95%
Confidence Intervals
87
assumed that, in the absence of the ICC, the UN Security Council would have
created a series of ad hoc tribunals – similar to those for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia – in response to future conflicts. But there is little reason to believe that
the Security Council would have consistently done so. And more to the point, there
is no evidence that the negotiating states expected that it would.
The plot reveals that the first (horizontal) dimension appears to capture an
anti-Israel alliance. It separates the Arab states and others (on the left side of the
plot) from Israel, the United States, France, Great Britain, and others (on the right
side). The second (vertical) dimension separates states like the United States, China,


























































































































































































Figure 5.6: Rome Statute Negotiating Positions in Two Dimensions
I again use the discrimination parameters and the positions of the extreme states
to better understand the nature of the divides (see Tables A.8, A.9, and A.10 in
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the Appendix.) This analysis reveals that the first dimension captures a range of
issues related to procedure, as well as a number of issues relating to the state of
Israel in particular. The highest discrimination-parameter issues on this dimension
include logistical procedures for establishing the court seat, the independence of
judges, representation in the assembly, double jeopardy,25 and voting rules. But
it also reflects questions of more substance. Examining the extreme state ideal
points reveals important disagreements over the scope of certain crimes that seem
to implicate Israel, most notably, the inclusion of a provision defining war crimes
to include “The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts
of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or
transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside
this territory.”26 Only the United States and Israel opposed this provision as written.
In particular, both opposed the term, “directly or indirectly.” This term implicated
Israel, of course, because the international community generally considered its
occupation of the Palestinian Territories illegal, and Israel had permitted (and would
continue to permit) Israeli settlers to relocate into those territories. To the extent
the state of Israel only “permitted” it but did not facilitate or execute the transfers
itself, its conduct may not be covered, unless “indirect” transfers were expressly
prohibited. Every state that took a position on the issue except Israel and the
United States supported the broader language: several Arab, Western European,
sub-Saharan African, and Asian states. This alignment helps to explain Israel’s
position on the right side of the Figure 5.6 plot, and the Arab, Latin American,
and African states’ position on the left side. Another divisive issue on the first
dimension separated the Middle Eastern states from the rest of the world: the
25 The Rome Statute uses the more universal Latin term, ne bis in idem, “not twice in the same
[thing].”
26 Rome Statute art.8 (2)(b)(viii).
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question of whether incidents that occurred exclusively within the country’s borders
could constitute crimes against humanity.
The second dimension represents a set of related issues dividing states that
wanted a strong and independent court (led by Western European states) from those
that wanted a weaker court (such as the United States and Pakistan). Analysis of
the discrimination parameters shows that the majority of contentious issues on this
dimension considered jurisdictional issues and centralization of authority in the
Court versus decentralization of power: how much authority states would retain
over prosecutions of their own nationals.
C. Predicting Ratification
As with CERD, I can use the insights from the Chapter 3 theoretical model,
together with the empirically estimated ideal points, treaty point, and status quo
point, to make predictions about the states’ post-negotiation foreign relations
behaviors. Figure 5.7 again depicts the same two dimensional plot as before, but
adds a cut line, where e
⇥P
irat
vi   (t  x0i)2
⇤
  (1  e)(s  xi)2i =
P
irat.
vi   (t  xi)2,
assuming both v and e = 0. It further displays states that ultimately ratified in blue;
and those that did not in red.
The treaty point lies at (0.063, 0.001), and the status quo lies at (0.076, -.403).
The cut line is mostly horizontal (and bisects the plot at around the -.2 mark on the
y-axis). The model expects states above that line to ratify and states below it not to.
The fact that the cut line is horizontal in itself yields information: it means that it is
mainly the second dimension (which captures disagreement over the strength of the
court) that predicts ratification. Given the complexity, the model does a reasonably
good job of separating ratifiers from non-ratifers. It correctly predicts the ratification
actions of 107 of the 136 states in the data set, incorrectly predicts that 27 states
90
would ratify (but which, thus far, have not), and incorrectly predicts that 2 states

























































































































































































Figure 5.7: Rome Statute Negotiating Positions in Two Dimensions with Cut Line: Ratifiers
in Blue, Non-ratifiers in Red
There are several possible explanations for why several states behaved
differently than the model expected. First, the executive branch, which directed
the drafting efforts, may have encountered veto-players with divergent preferences
when going through the domestic ratification process (Cope 2015). Second, there
may be time-inconsistency issues, i.e., changes in preferences after negotiations but
before ratification, particularly where the ratification process takes many years. In
theory, this is most likely to result from government transition or regime change
after the negotiations. For example, Nigeria was one of the two false-negative
ratification predictions. Indeed, the military-led Nigerian government was among
the most hostile to the treaty during the 1998 final negotiations; the model estimates
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based on its statements and the ratification actions of others that Nigeria was very
unlikely to ratify. (Per the logit graph in Figure 5.8 below, the likelihood was only
about 16%.) But one year after the treaty was concluded, Nigeria ended over 30
years of military rule and implemented sweeping democratic reforms. Two years
later, Nigeria ratified the treaty. It is impossible for an IRT model to capture such
country-specific forces, which were mostly unforeseen at the time of negotiation.
The recent “African backlash” against the Court can also be seen in this light: most
African states were strongly supportive of the ICC at the time of drafting and
turned against the Court only afterwards, especially when a pattern emerged of
the prosecutor’s investigating African states exclusively.27
Of course, prediction errors can also result from some degree of insincere
position-taking during the negotiations, or there might be some misspecification
in the empirical strategy.28 Regardless of the source, we can learn a great deal from
these predictive errors, and I envision doing so in future work.
The relationship between the relative proximity of ideal points and ratification
can further be explored through logit regression. The logit model here allows me
to test the model’s assumptions by comparing its several predicted post-negotiation
state legal behaviors with their actual behaviors: first, whether or not a state ratifies.
A set of predicted values gives the ex-post probability of each state’s ratifying. If the
probability of the behavior in question changes significantly as the proximity to the
treaty changes, that means that the content of the negotiation statements is strongly
27 The prosecutor has more recently launched investigations into Georgia, Palestine, and
Bangladesh/Myanmar and began preliminary examinations into several other non-African states.
28 Notably, the Rome Statute explicitly bans reservations (Article 120); it is a classic example of
a “package-deal” treaty that cannot be tailored to state preferences. (The same is true for, e.g., the
Convention on the Law of the Sea.) A visual inspection of the Rome Statute plot reveals that this rule
might have suppressed ratification. It shows that the states close to the cut line, and thus not too far
away from the treaty, mostly did not ratify, even though with minor modifications they might have
been able to “pull” the treaty sufficiently close to their ideal point.
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related to that behavior: states for whom the actual treaty was very close to their
ideal are more likely to legally embrace the treaty’s provisions as-is by ratifying it.






































Figure 5.8: Predicted Ratification as a Function of Treaty vs. Status Quo Relative Proximity
The results of the logit regression are displayed in Figure 5.8 below. The
probability of each state’s ratifying the Rome Statute given its relative distance from
the treaty and status quo is depicted on the y-axis with the plus signs. States that
have in fact ratified are depicted as black dots at the top; states that have not ratified
are the black dots at the bottom. From these data points, the logit model infers the
likelihood that a state with a given ideal point will ratify.
The curve reveals a significant and substantively large relationship between
the location of states’ ideal points and Rome Statute ratification. The ideal points’
relative proximity to the treaty versus the status quo are strongly correlated with
ratification (p < 0.001). The curve is rather S-shaped, such that states with the lowest
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ideal points are very unlikely to ratify – approaching about 5% likelihood – and
those with the highest are very likely – approaching 100% likelihood. The curve rises
steeply between. The non-ratifying states tend to cluster below the 0.5 probability
level; the ratifying states tend to cluster above that probability level. Thus, the curve
shows that the ideal points are reasonably strong predictors of actual Rome Statute
ratification. This analysis confirms that there is a close relationship between states’
ideal points as obtained from the negotiating record, and subsequent ratification.29
D. Predicting Implementation
Finally, the empirical model allows me to explore whether state ideal points
are related to other future legal behaviors such as implementation. Of course,
the relationship between treaty drafting and subsequent implementation is more
attenuated, and it depends more on factors that cannot be observed at the time of
drafting, such as future changes in government, domestic veto players, and so on.
Nonetheless, it is worth exploring whether the model has some predictive value
here.
The Rome Statute is a good treaty to test the model’s validity for
implementation, as it requires domestic implementation in two areas (Sandholtz
n.d.). First, pursuant to the principle of complementarity, states must outlaw the
conduct that the Rome Statute prohibits (“complementarity legislation”). Second,
it must have an apparatus in place to facilitate cooperation with the Court, such
as extraditing suspects and providing evidence (“cooperation legislation”).30 These
implementation efforts have previously been quantified by Wayne Sandholtz, who
29 Repeating this analysis with signing instead of ratification produces similar findings.
30 Article 86 of the Rome Statute creates an “obligation to cooperate”; it provides, “States
Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in
its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court” (Sandholtz n.d.).
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coded for each state whether it had enacted both obligations into law (Sandholtz
n.d.), and I use those data here.
Analysis of the relationship between ideal points and subsequent
implementation reveals a possible relationship between ideal points for both the
complementary legislation and the cooperation legislation, albeit at different levels
of positive significance. To gauge these relationships I again use logit regressions.
The two logit curves in Figure 5.9 show the relationship between these two forms of
domestic implementation, respectively, and states’ ideal-points relative proximity to
the status quo and the treaty. They show whether the states that ratified the Statute
implemented legislation to facilitate cooperation with the Court (Panel A), and to
grant the Court jurisdiction under the Rome Statute’s complementarity principles
(Panel B). The relationship between ideal point and complementarity-implementing
legislation is just outside conventional levels of statistical significance (p = 0.106);
that between ideal point and cooperation-implementing legislation is well outside
conventional significance levels (p = 0.200). The effect is also substantively small:
the relatively small slope means that as the ideal points move from -0.4 to -0.6,
the change in likelihood of implementing legislation is much smaller, increasing
from about 35% to about 70% for cooperation legislation, and from about 30%
to about 85% for complementary legislation. Overall, however, this analysis
suggests a positive and possibly significant relationship between ideal points and
implementation.
The validity of the ideal-point estimation approach to the Rome Statute is
supported by qualitative evidence. After doing that analysis, I interviewed David
Scheffer, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, who led the U.S.
Rome Statute delegation and signed the Statute on behalf of the United States in
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Figure 5.9: Predicted Post-negotiation Phenomena as a Function of Treaty vs. Status Quo
Relative Proximity
2000.31 After reviewing the Figure 5.7 two-dimensional plot of state positions,
Ambassador Scheffer observed, “This is a very accurate depiction of what went
on. ... Your map is quite accurate to demonstrate that there were positions in
Rome that we ultimately overcome.” More interestingly, he mentioned that he sat
next to the Uruguayan representative throughout the Rome Conference (because
of alphabetical seating) and that they “were talking constantly.” Through the
conference, Ambassador Scheffer said, “we were pretty much aligned,” despite
the fact that most other Latin American states were generally more supportive of
a stronger court. It did not surprise him, then, to see that the ideal points for the
United States and Uruguay in Figure 5.7 are nearly overlapping.
31 Telephone interview with David Scheffer, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues
(November 9, 2018).
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4 THE REFUGEE CONVENTION
A. Background and Empirical Expectations
Refugees have been a subject of international concern for at least as long as
sovereign states have existed. Refugees pose a difficult foreign relations challenge:
they generally have no right under ordinary domestic law to enter the country in
which they arrive, but forcing them to return home to be persecuted would violate
international humanitarian norms.
The Convention on the Status of Refugees was not the first attempt at legalizing
international refugee policy; numerous ad hoc agreements arose in the decades
before World War II in response to several isolated refugee crises, usually spurred
by civil war or other conflict. The Holocaust and the resulting pan-Eurasian refugee
crisis was a tipping point for international cooperation; it prompted a truly global
effort to address the World War II refugee fallout and mitigate possible future crises.
In 1948, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution urging the
UN to consider developing a framework to address the “legal status of persons
who do not enjoy the protection of any government, in particular pending the
acquisition of nationality as regards their legal and social protection and their
documentation.” An Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems was
convened comprising major powers from Europe and several from North America,
Asia, and South America.32 The committee prepared a draft convention in Lake
Success, New York, in January and February 1950, and later reconvened to revise the
draft in August 1950 in Geneva. A later conference of plenipotentiaries, comprising
representatives from 26 states (and two observers), met in Geneva in July 1951 to
32 Thirteen states were part of the ad hoc committee: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark,
France, Israel, Poland, Turkey, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
Venezuela, though the Poland and Soviet representatives did not participate in the drafting.
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finish refining the draft convention. The convention was concluded on July 25 and
opened for signature (Robinson 1953). The travaux come from a compilation of
records from these various negotiations prepared by Paul Weis (Weis 1995).
According to the negotiation records, one key issue in each of the negotiation
stages involved to what extent refugees would enjoy equal, greater, or less
protection than other, similarly situated migrants. For instance, could they be
expelled in the event of a threat to public order or a national emergency? Did they
have to conform to all national laws and norms? To what extent would they be
exempt from exceptional measures? Another issue was the definition of “refugee.”33
B. States’ Refugee Convention Ideal Points
A trained coder reviewed the Refugee Convention travaux, identifying each
contentious issue and every state and NGO position on that issue. I myself also
read the travaux closely and reviewed all coding decisions. I drop states with fewer
than 3 expressed positions. I also drop all issues in which there was unanimous
agreement. This process produced a 25 ⇥ 103 matrix (25 states and the treaty and
status quo, and 103 contentious issues). The dataset comprises 455 positions: 253 in
favor of a proposition and 202 against one. See Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: State Positions in Refugee Convention Negotiations
Position Count Percent
0 (nay) 202 7.8%
1 (yea) 253 9.8%
99 (missing) 2, 020 82.3%
Total 2,475 100.0%
With this matrix of position data, I estimate x for each state i, as well as s
and t, as I did with the Race Convention and Rome Statute. Figure 5.10 below
33 Unfortunately for the purpose of this analysis, those negotiations occurred in a General
Assembly Committee and were not available.
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provides the ideal points for the Refugee Convention in a single dimension with 95%
confidence intervals. Note that the status quo occupies the most extreme position,
with non-ratifier Venezuela closest in proximity, followed by Egypt. Curiously, the
other non-ratifier, the United States (which, like Venezuela, later ratified the 1967
Protocol), lies near the other end of the continuum, close to the treaty point.
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Figure 5.10: Refugee Convention Negotiating Positions in a Single Dimension, with 95%
Confidence Intervals
The Eigenvalue analysis produces unclear results, with no clear break between
dimensions (see Figure A.3 in the Appendix). Nonetheless, I map the first two
dimensions in order to depict the two-dimensional formal model.34 Figure 5.11
34 The IDEAL model parameters applied are: maxiter (the “number of MCMC iterations”) =
99
depicts state ideal points, x, in two dimensions, along with the treaty, t, and the
status quo, s,
Using the techniques described above, the plot reveals that the first (horizontal)
dimension appears to relate to the tradeoff between national security and the
sovereign right to exclude undesirables, on one hand, and the rights of refugees,
on the other hand. On the left side, closer to the status quo, lie European states
including Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Austria. On the right side
closer to the treaty lie Yugoslavia, Israel, and Australia. Looking to the issues
underlying those positions, several deal with preserving state power to exclude
under certain circumstances. For instance, Australia proposed an amendment
to the working Article 5, which read, “Nothing in this Article should prevent a
Contracting State in time of war or national emergency or in the interest of national
security, from taking provisionally essential measures in the case of any person,
pending a determination that the particular person is in fact a refugee and that
such measures are still necessary in his case in the interest of national security.”
In other words, Australia wanted to ensure that states could detain would-be
refugees while ascertaining their legal status. States obviously have this right under
domestic and international law for regular (i.e., non-refugee) would-be migrants,
but the Convention might have been interpreted to prevent provisional detention
of would-be refugees as well. The proposal was supported only by the sponsor,
Australia, which lies on the right side of the ideological space. It was opposed
by several states, including Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, all of
which lie on the left half of the space. Curiously, the proposal ultimately became
Article 9 of the Convention.
200,000, thin (the “thinning interval used for recording MCMC iterations”) = 5, and burnin (the
“number of MCMC iterations to run before recording”) = 50,000.
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On the second dimension, no states are close to the status quo, which implies
that every state on this dimension preferred significant change from the state of
the world in 1951. Closest to the bottom lies Venezuela, followed closely by a
large group of states. On the top, closer to the treaty, lie Canada, Germany, the
United States, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The substantive
issues that divide states involve a collection of issues related to the degree to which
states were obligated to give refugees equal and/or additional rights beyond those
given to other regular long-term migrants. For instance, Sweden proposed an
amendment to Article 5, which stated, “With regard to exceptional measures which
may be taken against the person, property or interests of nationals of a foreign
State, the Contracting States shall not apply such measures to a refugee who is
formally a national of the said State, solely on account of such nationality, or shall
provide for appropriate exemptions in respect of such refugees.” This issue divided
Scandinavia from the rest of Europe, with Denmark and Norway supporting the
Swedish proposal, and Belgium and Great Britain opposing.
C. Predicting Ratification
The treaty point lies at (0.88, 1.60), and the status quo lies at (-0.88, -2.22).
The cut line runs perpendicular to the line connecting those two points and and
equidistant from them. As with the CERD, the fact that it runs diagonal means that
the treaty and status quo are meaningfully different in both dimensions and that
both dimensions were important to states’ determinations to ratify.
Participants in and observers of the negotiations noted the broader-deeper
tradeoff that occurred, especially with regard to the degree of refugee rights
protections and state obligations to refugees. As one observer noted, the Convention
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Figure 5.11: Refugee Convention Negotiating Positions in Two Dimensions
restrictive nature of these stipulations was due mainly to the desire of the framers
of the Convention to reach unanimity in the Conference and not to write a
document which may be ideal in its wording but would not be acceptable to many
governments” (Robinson 1953).
One curious trait of the estimated points is that the treaty occupies an extreme
position in the second dimension. In theory, the treaty should typically occupy
a position close to the median state. After all, in consensus or majority-rule
decision-making processes, the treaty should represent a modal compromise or the
preferences of the median state, respectively. In some cases, one or more states with
extreme views may be particularly influential. But even in that case, it makes little
sense that states would agree on a treaty policy more extreme than the most extreme
state in any given dimension. There are at least a couple explanations for why we
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observe this phenomenon for the Refugee Convention. First, it may be that the
treaty was modified after the negotiations reflected in the travaux, though I am not
aware of evidence that that happened here. Another possibility is that in coding,
proposals’ agreement with the treaty were held to an overly technical standard.
For instance, suppose a state proposed language for a particular treaty term and
most other states supported the proposal. The final treaty language incorporated the
sentiment of the proposal, but with minor changes in phrasing. A coder reviewing
the final treaty language might reasonably conclude that the treaty had rejected the
proposed change, creating ideological distance between the state consensus and the
treaty. Making this distinction requires understanding of the legal issues involved in
the treaty and the implications of differences in language. In coding and reviewing
others’ coding, I was aware of this possibility and made decisions accordingly, in
light of each provision’s purpose. But it is possible that small misjudgments on key
issues might have affected the treaty position nonetheless.
Whatever the reason, the model manages to correctly classify the ratification
decision of most states (62.5%). The Refugee Convention has now been ratified
by the vast majority of UN member states, including all but two of those that
participated in the 1951 negotiations.35 (The United States and Venezuela later
ratified the 1967 Protocol, thereby committing themselves to the 1951 Convention’s
terms.) As with the CERD, the model predicted that the majority of negotiating
states would ratify. The model performed somewhat worse compared with the
other two treaties. It incorrectly predicted 8 states to be non-ratifiers, which did
in fact ratify, and 1 state to be a ratifier, which did not ratify. On a positive note, the
model would give non-ratifier Venezuela the lowest likelihood of ratifying, as that
35 See “Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,” at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en.
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state’s ideal point appears closest to the status quo (and farthest from the treaty).
Given that only two states failed to ratify (and even they ratified the
Convention’s substance after 1967), it is not possible to gauge the predictive power
of the ideal points, as I did with Rome Statute. Nor is it feasible here to measure
the ideal points’ ability to predict reservations and declarations, as nearly all of
the ratifying states entered some form of RUD. Some were largely technical or
idiosyncratic (such as refusing to apply its terms to certain territories or colonies),
and others were highly substantive, and the large variation makes it difficult to code.
Instead, to validate the ideal points, I estimate a bivariate OLS model, regressing
states’ time-to-ratification on their ideal points. The underlying theory being that
states that are most satisfied with the result will ratify quickly, and those that
are dissatisfied will ratify later, perhaps only after a new government, change of
leadership, or changed external incentives. Figure 5.12 below plots ideal point on
days–to-ratification. The relationship is statistically insignificant (p > 0.87). The
estimated expected utility from the treaty is not significantly correlated with how
quickly states ratified the Refugee Convention.36
Thus, the model performed somewhat worse for the Refugee Convention than
for the other two treaties. In addition to the sources of possible predictive error
discussed for the Rome Statute and just above, I suspect that the main reason
is the relative sparsity of the negotiation records. Although many issues were
discussed, states took relatively few positions for each issue. Many votes were held
to resolve disagreements, but they are recorded anonymously. This observation
underscores the importance of identifying treaties and locating travaux for which
detailed, non-anonymous records exist.
36 As a robustness check, a Cox proportional hazards model also produced no significant results.
So did removing the time-to-ratify ‘censored’ states (i.e., the United States and Venezuela, which
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Figure 5.12: Refugee Convention Days to Ratification vs. Relative Ideal Point Distance
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Chapter 6
Implications for IR/IL Theory and Concluding Thoughts
1 CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
My findings have implications for several long-standing academic debates in
international law and politics, including those over reservations and ratification.
The topic of reservations, in particular, has interested both researchers and
international legal bodies (see, e.g., Pellet 2013)1. According to the Argentine jurist
J.M. Ruda, “[t]he question of reservations to multilateral treaties has been one of
the most controversial subjects in contemporary international law” (Ruda 1975).
This quote has been much repeated since. This widely held view has prompted
a vigorous debate among both scholars and practitioners over the relative costs
and benefits of reservations, including how they trade off more participation2 with
decreased strength of legal commitments (Helfer 2006; Swaine 2006),3 and whether
they present a net benefit or harm to the institution of treaties generally (Henkin
1 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 (52), General comment on issues relating to
reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto,
or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6
(1994)
2 Advisory Opinion Concerning Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 28 May 1951.
3 Swaine’s conjectures are supported by an empirical study by Neumayer Neumayer (2007), who
finds that liberal democracies are most likely to enter reservations.
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1995; Lijnzaad 1995). Goodman (2002) has also considered the legal status of the
most harmful reservations (those that undermine the treaty’s “object and purpose”).
More recent work has argued that reservations are under-appreciated because
they contain important informational value: they serve to reveal states’ otherwise
private information (albeit imperfectly), such as whether they expect to uphold the
treaty and their level of commitment to the provisions that they have not reserved
(Swaine 2006). My analysis does not contradict this insight, but it implies that such
information is not the only source of this information; it can also be inferred from the
negotiating record itself. If negotiation positions allow me to predict ratifications,
they might also reveal the kind of information that can be gleaned from reservations,
probably in greater detail.
My findings have other implications. For those who believe that reservations
are a net negative to multilateral treaties, my analysis reveals that they can be
prevented. That is, before a treaty enters into force, we can predict which states are
most likely to enter reservations, and this information could be used to persuade
those states to refrain from reserving. The analysis further confirms what many
international lawyers have long understood: banning reservations (as the Rome
Statute does) usually suppresses ratification.
The subject of ratification has stirred less controversy in international legal
scholarship, but it has not gone unnoticed. International legal scholars have
produced countless articles that advance normative arguments for why certain
states should (or, less often, should not) ratify particular treaties. Some others have
offered positive explanations for why states actually ratify. In an important and
recent line of work, Goodman and Jinks (2013) have argued that, at least in the
realm of human rights, states ratify multilateral human rights agreements primarily
to signal their conformance to global norms, not because they have internalized
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these norms in any meaningful way (a phenomenon that they call “acculturation”).
Under their account, states’ treaty behavior is primarily about paying lip-service to
international norms, not about states’ expected utility in ratifying.
My findings partly agree and partly disagree. Even if states are driven largely by
the benefits of value-signaling when considering human rights treaties, the question
remains of whose values they will be. As I observed in the CERD debates, there are
distributional consequences of selecting one or another set of international norms,
and states tend to take those consequences seriously, advocating vigorously for
the norms that comport with their own. Whether as an ideological proxy battle
in the Cold War, a ploy to reassure foreign investors, or a signal to domestic
audiences, these ideological divergences are often meaningful enough to trigger
RUDs, non-ratification, and other opposition that alters the treaty’s effect in
apparently welfare-enhancing ways.
Perhaps more importantly, neither my theory nor my empirical strategy are
limited to human rights agreements. The analysis of the Rome Statute revealed
substantial disagreements over the scope of the Court’s power, which deterred some
states from ratifying. The findings from these two treaties jointly provides evidence
that the positions states take during the negotiations are substantively meaningful.
That is, the positions make sense, given states’ particular traits and international
status, as well as the features and objectives of the treaty in question. Moreover,
the positions that states take and the alliances that they form with each other vary
substantially from treaty to treaty. These insights suggest that treaty-making in
international fora is not primarily cheap talk; it offers important insights into real
state preferences.
My findings also speak to the relevance of treaty implementation. As
international legal scholars and practitioners are aware, domestic implementation
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is challenging; international law lacks the kinds of centralized enforcement
mechanisms often present in domestic law (Goldsmith and Levinson 2008).
Indeed, the relative lack of centralized enforcement is one of the traits missing in
international law that have lead a few to argue that it should not be considered
law at all. (Compare Lewis (1997) with Hart et al. (2012).) In addition, legal
scholars have long documented the challenges of implementation for different areas
of international law (Farrier and Tucker 2000; Freestone and Hey 1996; Merry 2009).
More recently, an empirical literature has emerged that seeks to more systematically
document the causes of effective implementation (or “treaty effectiveness”) (Cope
and Creamer 2016).4
One of the key insights from this literature is that downstream domestic legal
and political constraints can matter to international law. Certain studies have
documented empirically that whether a state implements its international law
commitments depends on post-ratification domestic politics, as well as key features
of the domestic legal systems (Mitchell and Powell 2011). For example, some
have found that treaty commitments are more likely to be upheld in democracies
(Simmons 2009), in countries with strong courts (Lupu 2013b; Powell and Staton
2009), and in countries where courts can interpret domestic law in light of
international law (Lupu unpublished manuscript). My findings do not contradict
these insights, but they might surprise some of those who work on these issues,
because they suggest that post-ratification law and politics is not all that matters;
some implementation behavior is foreseeable based on the positions held and taken
during the negotiations.
Finally, these findings also provide some insights into the nature of the
4 But compare Chilton and Posner (2016), who conclude that institutional or environmental
factors, more than international law, explain historical improvements in human rights performance.
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travaux préparatoires. International lawyers routinely consult travaux in both
legal international legal research and practice. For example, Bederman’s survey
of treaty interpretation in U.S. courts reveals that they routinely rely on the
travaux (Bederman 1993; Ris 1991).5 But while the travaux are often used, there
is widespread skepticism on how much we can learn from them (Aust 2013; Sadat
and Jolly 2014). Aust (2013) cautions that “[t]ravaux must ... always be approached
with care,” as ”[t]heir investigation is time-consuming, their usefulness often being
marginal and very seldom decisive.” Indeed, the ICJ typically avoids the travaux
when the meaning of the treaty is sufficiently clear. This skepticism traces back to
the Lotus decision from the Permanent Court of International Justice, in which the
Court held that on “no occasion” they should be resorted to when the treaty itself is
clear, a principle that later would be enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.6 Some human rights courts deliberately reject the travaux as a canon of
interpretation, instead favoring interpretative canons that favor pro-human rights
interpretations, such as the “pro persona” principle in the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the “evolutive” interpretation principle in the European Court
of Human Rights (Dzehtsiarou 2011).
I find that, while individual statements recorded in the travaux are sometimes
hard to decipher, they reveal a lot of useful information on the whole. Each state
representative’s corpus of positions was sufficiently clear and coherent to trained
coders that they revealed state positions that predicted ensuing state legal action
with reasonable accuracy. This insight suggests that, at least for the treaties that
5 Bederman notes that “[r]ecently, the use of negotiating history by courts has become much more
sophisticated-and problematic” (Bederman 1993, 971).
6See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (observing that “only the
British delegate . . . stated the reasons for his opposition to the Turkish amendment; the reasons
for the French and Italian reservations and for the omission from the draft prepared by the Drafting
Committee of any definition of the scope of the criminal jurisdiction in respect of foreigners, are
unknown and might have been unconnected with the arguments now advanced by France”).
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I studied, the travaux are more coherent and useful than some international legal
scholars have suggested. And they appear not to represent mere cheap talk, as
some political realists might believe. While there might be good reasons for judicial
interpreters to eschew the travaux, the nature of the records themselves is not one
of them.
2 A TOOL FOR TREATY NEGOTIATIONS
My method may be able to aid in these kinds of cases by offering a systematic
overview of where different parties stand, where the coalitions may lie, and what
adjustments can be made to move the negotiations forward. In reading through
a case study or history of a negotiation, one might implicitly assume that the
negotiators had the same sort of insights in the midst of the talks that we now have
in retrospect. In reality, negotiators’ real-time perspectives are usually more limited.
A committee or state delegate may know some states’ positions on certain issues,
including their deal-breakers and reservation points for ratifying, and they are likely
aware of key state coalitions and schisms. But negotiators often lack the capacity to
learn every state’s position on every issue. Negotiators on the ground have neither
the benefit of hindsight nor of a bird’s eye view of the negotiation, especially in
fast-moving negotiations or those which involve many states. In the midst of
talks, delegates rarely have the ability to see how all the issues fit together or how
seemingly unconnected states might have positions in common. It is also difficult
for negotiators to see how minor changes in policy might increase or decrease states’
expected utility, pushing those states across the ratification threshold one way or
the other. On top of all this, state delegates often misrepresent their true reservation
points, if they announce them at all (Morrow and Cope 2018). It is difficult to know
111
when and how states are exaggerating or otherwise misrepresenting their positions
in order to gain a strategic advantage. All of these things challenge even the most
sophisticated and well-equipped delegations, but it is particularly difficult for the
many delegations with less funding, fewer diplomatic personnel, and generally
lower capacity.
My method for analyzing treaty negotiations may offer some solutions to these
challenges. A spatial model’s key advantage lies in data reduction. That is, it
reduces the hundreds or thousands of elements down to the truly relevant ones,
showing relationships between the existing international policy, the proposed treaty
policy, and the revealed state preferences on each key issue. This might be helpful
to negotiations in several ways.
First, a spatial model depicts the full set of state participants. While many states
may have relatively little economic, military, or other relevance to the cooperation,
they still hold the same single vote in the final approval vote, and their decision
to ratify counts the same toward the entry-into-force threshold. And large blocs
of these minor players can collectively be significant in that respect, or even in the
value they add to the cooperation endeavor itself. Though these blocs sometimes
recognize their common cause and ally together to maximize their leverage, they
may often lack the capacity to do so. A spatial model would allow them to do so
more easily and more readily.
Second, this analysis can also uncover coalitions based on seemingly unrelated
issues, thereby offering insight into the actors’ motivations. Specifically, it could
reveal that two substantively different issues actually fall on the same dimension,
meaning that states’ positions on one are closely correlated with the same states’
positions on the other. This might reveal that some value underlies the two that
might not have been obvious to negotiators or negotiation coordinators.
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Third, in lengthier negotiations, it might show how states’ positions have
changed over time relative to each other, suggesting how open they might be to
further movement. The chair or mediator could use this information to develop and
propose further changes. The chair often acts as a conciliator, and he or she might
point out to State B that State A has already comprised significantly from its original
position, perhaps making State B more flexible. This could be, and sometimes is,
done already. But where negotiations drag on for years, the delegations and chairs
often turn over and institutional memory is lost. Regardless, a new delegate or
chair may not have the time or resources upon taking her position to comb through
thousands of pages of past records. Even if she did, it would be easy even for an
astute observer to overlook certain patterns. By reducing data, the spatial model
provides a bird’s-eye picture that might assist them in doing so.
Finally, a spatial model can show how minor changes to certain treaty
provisions would affect the states’ alignment relative to the treaty and status quo,
increasing or decreasing expected ratifications. For drafting committees or IGOs
chairing a negotiation, a dynamic spatial model might reveal that a series of minor
changes to draft treaty policy might be sufficient for certain key states (or a large
number of secondary states) to support the treaty. The chair could then use that
information to propose the change to the parties and show how it would enhance
total welfare by expectedly bringing more parties into the regime.
By way of analogy, consider how a comprehensive visual map of the battlefield
showing allied and enemy troop locations, as well as geographic features, aids
military commanders in developing battle strategies and tactics. Using modern
computer software, these tools can make a series of competing assumptions about
different tactics and can run simulations showing the most likely result of those
moves. A spatial model of negotiation positions could serve a similar purpose.
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Of course, this analysis requires a team of trained lawyers, social scientists,
coders, and data analysts, to which most delegations would not have access. Of
the delegations that might desire and benefit from this analysis, a small fraction
would have the capacity to conduct it. Instead of individual delegations’ hiring
their own analysts, I imagine that a group of international lawyers and social
scientists might institute a third-party international consulting organization, which
would provide these analytical services to delegations that request it. In this
sense, the program would operate somewhat like a jury-selection consultant firm
in the U.S. legal system, but more effectively, I would hope (see, e.g. Diamond
1989).7 Unlike jury-selection consultants, this consulting organization might be
affiliated with an academic institution and/or a think-tank-affiliated institute. It
would presumably operate on a non-profit basis, recouping its expenses from the
requesting states, IGOs, NGOs, and/or private donors. Whatever the specific
organization or institutional model, the products from these techniques would
provide one additional tool to negotiators and IGO coordinators hoping to produce
the most effective and welfare-enhancing treaty, whether for them, or for the parties
involved generally.
3 CONCLUSION
I have developed a theoretical model of treaty-making and used it to guide
the analysis of the drafting of three existing treaties. Doing so has yielded
some important new insights, most notably, that states appear to treat their
negotiating positions as substantively meaningful and that we can use them to
predict ratification, reservations, and even implementation efforts. These findings
7 Diamond concludes that “[t]he effects of scientific jury selection are modest at best.”
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provide novel insights into long-standing debates in international law, and they can
also be used to aid future treaty drafting efforts.
I acknowledge that this method has limits, and that existing historic and
first-hand accounts provide some things that this method cannot. Historical
accounts, case studies, and reports based on personal experience and primary
sources can provide nuanced understanding of the particular actors, including
people and government bodies, that influence negotiations. Historical and narrative
accounts also offer unique insights into the process by revealing micro-level
negotiation dynamics – e.g., broad strategies, side-deals, interpersonal relationships
– that most shaped the course of the negotiations and final treaty product. For
this reason, to provide a “reality check” on my findings and richer insight into my
quantitative results, I supplemented this analysis with interviews with experienced
treaty negotiators. As mentioned, I spoke with David Scheffer, who served as
U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues and lead U.S. delegate to the UN
negotiations on the ICC, as well as John Norton Moore, who served as U.S. Deputy
Special Representative for the UN Law of the Sea Conference from 1973 to 1976.
One of the advantages of these approaches is the benefit of time and hindsight.
They can draw on several types of sources such as notes, personal interviews
with participants, complete records from the talks, as well as reactions by states,
public officials, and citizens to the final product. Putting all these together can
paint a picture of why certain delegations did what they did and the interests
and diplomatic strategies that led to the final treaty provisions. The findings
these studies make are critical to understanding why and under what conditions
international cooperation succeeds or fails.
The method I develop here cannot do these things nearly as well, but it
has the unique application described above: providing insight into positions of
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numerous state delegations, the status of every provision of the draft treaty, how
each delegation was aligned with every other one, and how all this had changed
over the months and years of the negotiation. Knowing these things is also crucial to
understanding the story of a treaty’s creation. Future work will reveal the method’s
full potential in this regard.
One question that I leave unanswered is whether the difference between treaties
with and without externalities can be observed empirically. That is, my theoretical
model predicts that if we explore the negotiating records of treaties with large
externalities, we will find that states’ ideal points derived from the negotiating
records do not predict subsequent ratification, since states push for strong (or weak)
treaties that they do not intend to ratify. To illustrate, it predicts for a global
environmental agreement that some states will push for a strong treaty but not ratify
it, since they get to reap its benefits regardless of whether they join. My empirical
analysis thus far is limited to treaties without strong externalities, but in the larger
book project, I hope to gain empirical leverage on this question by adding treaties
with significant externalities.
Whatever their level of externalities, those treaties will span different areas of
international law, including trade, security, intellectual property, the environment,
and refugee law. They will differ in their distributional effects, methods
for generating cooperative benefits and enforcing compliance, and ways of
discriminating against non-parties. I expect that these additional treaties will extend
the findings in this dissertation with deeper and more generalizable insights about
the origins of treaties. I therefore hope that those insights will bring about better
understanding of treaties’ role in a host of questions that interest international
lawyers, social scientists, and legal scholars. With these methods, I can also explore
other questions, such as: (1) whether and how state positions change over the course
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of treaty negotiations; (2) which states are most successful during the negotiation,
and what explains this success: the power of persuasion (states acting as norm
entrepreneurs) or more traditional proxies of power such as military and economic
strength; and (3) the growing role of the various non-state actors that participate in
treaty-drafting and work to move states in their preferred policy direction.
Finally, my methods allow me to contribute to the ongoing debate on treaty
effectiveness, a debate that has engaged both international legal scholars and
international relations scholars and produced numerous articles (e.g., Goodman and
Jinks 2003; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002; Lupu 2013b; Simmons
2009). The primary obstacle for these studies to measuring a causal effect is the
inherent “endogeneity problem.” More specifically, many traits that make states
more likely to engage in treaty-complying behavior also make them more likely to
ratify the treaty in the first place, so when researchers observe that ratifiers have
better records than non-ratifiers, it is difficult to determine how much of the effect
was caused by the treaty ratification itself, versus the latent trait that also made the
state more likely to ratify. In a number of high-profile articles, Yonatan Lupu has
attempted to address this problem by identifying state preferences for international
legal commitment based on their ratification of prior treaties, and then comparing
states that are ideologically similar, but which differ only in whether they ratified
a given treaty (Lupu 2013a). My ideal points could serve a similar function, but
unlike Lupu, I could tailor them to the specific international legal problems at
issue. Thus, instead of an ideal point that captures general willingness to commit to
international law, I could calculate ideal points that capture willingness to commit to
trade agreements, or human rights – and that can aid future efforts to better explore
the causal effect of specific treaties.
Much of international law and politics concerns one or both of two broad issues:
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why states interact with each other as they do, and how institutions promote global
objectives like justice, wealth, and peace. This dissertation has taken a small step
toward deeper insight into both of those questions. A better understanding of
how states decide whether to join treaties – and, specifically, how they determine
and pursue their foreign relations goals through treaty negotiations – will help

















Figure A.1: Race Convention Scree Plot
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Figure A.2: Rome Statute Scree Plot








Figure A.3: Refugee Convention Scree Plot
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State Ideal Points Tables











Costa Rica 0.245 1.996
D.R. Congo 1.407 1.779
Denmark 1.323 · 10 2 1.027
Ecuador 1.019 1.172



















Soviet Union 2.659 2.513







United Kingdom 0.356 1.012




Table A.2: Rome Statute State Ideal Points
D1 D2
TREATY 6.372 · 10 2  9.963 · 10 4
STATUS Quo 7.675 · 10 2  0.403
Afghanistan 2.665 · 10 2  0.194




Argentina 8.777 · 10 2 0.339
Armenia  0.348 0.250




Bangladesh  0.150  7.912 · 10 2
Belarus  1.702 · 10 2  7.189 · 10 2
Belgium 6.508 · 10 2 0.545
Benin 5.858 · 10 2 0.221
Bolivia  0.517 0.108
Bosnia and Herzegovina 8.383 · 10 2 0.243
Botswana  4.704 · 10 2 9.999 · 10 3
Brazil 0.170 4.762 · 10 3
Brunei Darussalam  0.144  9.894 · 10 4
Burkina Faso  0.148 0.199
Burundi  0.259 5.396 · 10 2
Cameroon 9.434 · 10 2 3.484 · 10 2
Canada 0.325 0.183
Chile 0.104  4.095 · 10 2
China 0.155  0.455
Colombia  6.258 · 10 2  4.149 · 10 2
Comoros  0.299  4.526 · 10 2
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)  2.82 · 10 2  3.374 · 10 2
Costa Rica  0.256 0.513




Czech Republic 0.239 0.374
Denmark  0.119 0.240
Djibouti 6.189 · 10 2 0.366
Dominican Republic 0.324 1.071 · 10 2
Ecuador 9.89 · 10 2 0.497
Egypt  7.421 · 10 2  0.251
Estonia  8.598 · 10 2 0.386
Ethiopia 4.64 · 10 2  0.192
Finland 8.787 · 10 2 0.209
France 0.492 6.244 · 10 3
Gabon  8.675 · 10 2  0.105
Georgia 0.104 0.201
Germany 6.573 · 10 2 0.187
Ghana  9.363 · 10 2 6.918 · 10 2
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Table A.3: Rome Statute State Ideal Points (cont.)
D1 D2
Greece 6 · 10 2 9 · 10 2
Guatemala 0.190 0.160
Guinea 0.220 0.390
Guinea-Bissau 0.210  1 · 10 2




Indonesia  8 · 10 2  0.270







Jordan  3 · 10 2 0.180
Kazakhstan  0.100  0.120
Kenya 0.180  9 · 10 2
Korea (Republic of) 0.300 0.110
Kuwait 0.000  5 · 10 2
Latvia 9 · 10 2 0.540
Lebanon  0.260  0.310
Lesotho  0.210  4 · 10 2
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  0.290  0.190
Liechtenstein 0.300 0.230
Lithuania 5 · 10 2 0.250
Luxembourg 1 · 10 2 0.540
Macedonia 0.110 0.260
Madagascar  0.220 0.280
Malawi 2 · 10 2  4 · 10 2
Mali 0.160 0.330
Malta 0.220 0.310







New Zealand 4 · 10 2 0.310
Nicaragua  7 · 10 2 0.170
Niger 0.260 0.230










Russian Federation 0.150  0.320
Rwanda  6 · 10 2  0.200
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Table A.4: Rome Statute State Ideal Points (cont.)
D1 D2
Samoa 2.453 · 10 2 0.448
San marino  0.348 0.161
Saudi Arabia  0.501  0.375
Senegal  3.665 · 10 2 2.655 · 10 2
Sierra Leone 7.901 · 10 2 0.105
Singapore 8.998 · 10 2  0.101
Slovakia 0.144 0.307
Slovenia 0.210 0.134
Solomon Islands 0.120 0.382
South Africa 0.242 0.749
Spain 0.134 9.43 · 10 2




Switzerland 4.983 · 10 2 0.356
Syrian Arab Republic  0.187  0.279
Tajikistan 3.37 · 10 2 0.159
Tanzania  3.718 · 10 2  2.058 · 10 3
Thailand 0.105  0.174
Togo 0.105 9.523 · 10 2
Trinidad and Tobago  5.584 · 10 2 0.238
Tunisia  0.366  6.367 · 10 2
Turkey 7.237 · 10 2  0.259
Uganda 2.164 · 10 3 0.159
UK and Northern Ireland 0.359 1.694 · 10 2
Ukraine  0.275 0.187
United Arab Emirates  0.118  0.348
United States of America 0.281  0.334
Uruguay 0.354  0.304
Venezuela  5.427 · 10 2 9.869 · 10 2
Viet Nam 9.061 · 10 2  0.214
Yemen  9.107 · 10 2  0.128
Zambia 0.119 0.354
Zimbabwe  0.197 0.165
Red Cross 0.300  0.172
Amnesty International  7.155 · 10 2 0.399
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Table A.5: Refugee Convention State Ideal Points
"D1" "D2"
"TREATY’" 1.893  0.173






"China" 0.295 8.96 · 10 2
"Colombia" 1.070 0.170
"Denmark"  0.298  1.153 · 10 2
"Egypt"  0.521  0.350
"France"  0.367  0.500








"UK and Northen Ireland"  0.356 0.956
"United States of America" 1.166 0.176
"Venezuela"  1.116 0.113
"Yugoslavia" 4.278 · 10 2  1.757
"UN Commisssion of Refugees" 0.821 3.467 · 10 2
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Treaty Discrimination and Difficulty Parameter Tables
126
Table A.6: Race Convention Discrimination and Difficulty Parameters, by Issue
Discrimination D1 Discrimination D2 Difficulty
X004 1.900 4.000  2.700
X005 1.900 4.000  2.800
X132  3.000 4.100 1.500
X133  4.300 4.800  0.900
X134  4.000 4.800  0.900
X135  4.100  0.200  4.000
X136  5.300 2.100 1.400
X137  4.200  2.200 1.600
X138  5.900  1.400 0.000
X139 0.500 1.600  1.100
X140 5.200  0.600 1.600
X141 5.300 1.400 0.100
X143 6.100 1.200  0.200
X144 5.600 1.700 1.300
X146  5.200 2.200 0.400
X153 2.800  0.500  5.800
X157  0.200 3.700  3.600
X158  4.300 3.900 2.400
X159  4.300 2.900  3.600
X161 1.900 0.000  1.200
X163 5.700  0.600  3.500
X164  6.400  2.200 0.900
X166 1.900  4.200  3.600
X167 3.400 0.200 3.100
X169 2.700 4.000 0.200
X170 4.300 3.400 0.700
X173 4.100 0.600  5.000
X174  4.800 1.100  2.600
X175  1.400  5.800  2.100
X189  3.300  1.300  5.800
X190  3.400  1.400  5.900
X191 4.400 0.600  4.200
X211 6.100  0.700  3.600
X214  4.400  3.400 0.600
X215  6.400  1.600  0.100
X216  5.400 3.000 1.400
X218  5.900 1.200 2.500
X255 4.100  2.600 4.400
X258 4.000 2.200  2.900
X260  0.200  5.800 1.800
X262 1.200 4.300  2.700
X263 0.100  5.600  1.500
X268 0.500 0.400  0.600
X269 4.900 3.200 1.500
X270 3.400  1.200  4.500
X271 0.400 1.300  0.800
X272 3.900 0.500 3.900
X278  1.300 6.100  0.200
X280  4.000 2.700  1.300
X282 1.100 5.100  2.900
X283 1.300 5.200  2.900
X284 0.200 3.900  4.100
X285  1.200 6.000  0.200
X286 4.300  2.600 1.700
X290 0.200  2.700 2.400
X295  0.700 0.500  2.500
X297  2.500  2.900 1.100
X299  0.700 0.200  1.000
X300  4.000 2.400  1.700
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Table A.7: Race Convention Discrimination and Difficulty Parameters, by Issue (cont.)
Discrimination D1 Discrimination D2 Difficulty
X304 2.500  5.100 0.900
X306  4.600 0.800  3.200
X307  4.500 1.700  4.300
X314 3.700  1.800  0.200
X318 0.000 5.700  2.700
X328  4.000  2.500  0.600
X332  0.300 4.300 3.500
X334  0.100 3.900  4.000
X336  3.000  1.300  2.000
X338  3.100  1.800 4.000
X342  1.900 3.800 3.500
X345 2.400 3.100  3.700
X346  3.200  2.500  1.700
X347 1.900  0.500  1.000
X353 2.800 2.100 1.600
X355 1.900  3.000 1.100
X357 1.800  3.400  3.200
X360 1.100 4.300  2.200
X362 5.600  1.200  1.200
X365  3.900  1.900  2.300
X367  5.500  0.400 1.000
X369  5.100 0.000  1.700
X376  3.500  3.300  2.000
X377  0.100 4.200 0.300
X378 1.300 2.000 0.100
X385  2.500 3.300 3.700
X391 2.400  3.000  5.200
X392 1.200  3.300  4.400
X402  0.100 0.500  0.700
X403  1.100  4.300 1.700
X411  4.800 1.100 0.300
X412  4.500  1.200  1.800
X415  1.900  1.000  1.500
X416  0.300  2.900  4.100
X417  4.300 1.700 0.200
X418  4.400 1.500 0.400
X426  0.900  1.500  4.100
X428  1.000 2.300 3.700
X430  0.500  0.500  0.200
X433  0.800  0.800  5.800
X436  2.600 2.400 0.200
X440  3.700 1.700  4.100
X445  1.400 3.200  0.500
X456  1.600  3.500  2.500
X457  1.100  4.300 2.400
X458  1.700  3.500  2.500
X459  1.100  4.300 2.400
X463  1.800  0.700  6.400
X464  5.500 0.500 1.200
X465 3.100  2.400  5.000
X467  0.100 5.700  2.100
X469  1.500 2.900 4.100
X470 5.300 0.500 1.600
X471  4.100  0.300  3.200
X472  1.800  3.900 3.300
X473 4.000  1.300 2.000
X474 5.600  0.300 0.300
X478.1  1.100 2.500  7.000
X479 2.400 3.200  1.900
X481 4.400  3.000 4.200
X488  2.100  4.000 1.200
X490 2.700  2.500  2.600
X491  1.000 1.700  4.400
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Table A.8: Rome Statute Discrimination and Difficulty Parameters, by Issue
Discrimination 1 Discrimination 2 Difficulty
X7.3.FO 3.090  0.240  3.030
X3.3 3.030  5 · 10 2 0.450
X3.2  2.690 2 · 10 2  2.690
X7.3  2.550  5 · 10 2 1.890
X41 2.510 0.590  0.720
X7.FO 2.300 2.810  2.380
X4  2.220 1.040  4.670
X10.2 2.210 0.380  0.760
X99  2.210  0.150  1.140
X102.1.  2.200 0.890 1.960
X1  2.170  1.120  3.630
X15.2 2.070 1.100  2.990
X18.2 2.030  1.230 3.550
X5c.Bf  2.000 0.940  6.640
X5d 2.000 2.000  4.770
X53.1 1.990  1.000 1.450
X45 1.930  1.120  4.100
X25 1.910 2.360  2.830
X11.3.FO 1.870  2.020 3.860
X43.2  1.740  6 · 10 2  1.130
X42.3 1.720  0.440  1.230
X26  1.690  0.330  4.080
X6.1a.. 1.660 0.770  2.610
X107  1.650  2.570  1.450
X102.2e 1.650  2.280  0.560
X10.1.FO 1.620 0.310  0.840
X5c.Bp  1.600 0.860  6.780
X43.  1.600 0.490  6.800
X7.1.FO 1.570 2.070  2.090
X10.4.1 1.570 0.330  1.310
X109 1.540 1.240  0.340
X5c.D 1.520 2.630  3.750
X6b 1.500 2.620  1.910
X8 1.460  4 · 10 2  4.720
X17.6 1.460 2.520  0.480
X27Proposal2  1.460 1.780  4.470
X5c.C.1 1.450 1.920  3.100
X11.3 1.320  0.480 2.140
X7.2 1.300  1.650 4.260
X5b.1  1.250 2.650  4.390
X37.5  1.210  2.320  3.590
X5c.C 1.190 2.970  2.720
X17 1.180  1.000  5.190
X5c.D.1 1.150 2.430  2.470
treaty.crimes  1.150 0.480  1.730
X106  1.130 1.070  2.560
X7ter..12.3 1.110 0.930  3.020
X6.7.9  1.100 4.150 2.620
xx.1  1.100 2.030  5.120
X9.FO.  1.090 3.370 2.140
X2  1.040 2.130 1.530
X4.1 0.990 0.230  0.780
X10.5 0.990 0.800  1.330
X10.3 0.980 0.470  0.150
X38.2 0.970 2.580  3.170
X43.1.1  0.940  1.620 0.950
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Table A.9: Rome Statute Discrimination and Difficulty Parameters, by Issue (cont.)
Discrimination 1 Discrimination 2 Difficulty
X5d.1  0.940 2.270  1.900
X10.7 0.940 0.340  0.140
X7.2.1  0.880  0.830 4.400
X6c.1 0.810 3.510  0.980
X10.1 0.800 0.390  1.060
B.o. 0.770 0.460 1.080
X5c.B.o. 0.770 0.150  0.440
X10.4 0.750 0.360  9 · 10 2
X5.ter 0.750 2.260  1.660
X5c.Bp.bis. 0.730 1.720  4.410
X91 0.730  0.540  0.500
X44.4 0.730 1.410  3.360
X6.1c 0.720 2.380  1.570
X87.3b  0.700  3.060  0.910
X5d.1j 0.690 0.860  0.840
X112  0.690  2 · 10 2 0.110
X40 0.690 0.880  1.810
X16.2 0.650  0.620  1.010
X20.1c 0.640 0.790  1.060
X..5e  0.630 7 · 10 2  1.900
X18 0.610 0.470  1.100
X10.2.FO 0.610 0.490  0.530
X10 0.600 0.600  2.420
X6a  0.590 0.570  1.730
X75e 0.590 0.750  0.580
X110.6 0.590  0.990 0.230
X7.2.FO 0.590  0.150  0.920
X7.1 0.580 0.790 0.130
X15.1  0.570 1.930  3.430
X6c 0.560 1.780  1.180
X6.7.9.a 0.550 2.280  0.860
X16.1 0.550  1.030  0.300
X8.1 0.540 0.540  2.250
X6.7.9.b 0.540 2.300  3.240
X115...  0.530 0.890  1.080
X108 0.520 0.420  1.060
X45.4 0.510 0.350 0.570
X9.  0.510  1.040 1.010
X12  0.490 2.900  3.520
X5c.Bo 0.460 0.000 0.450
X5d.1i 0.460 1.150  1.190
X5e  0.450 5 · 10 2 0.330
X104  0.440  9 · 10 2 0.320
X52.1 0.430 0.290  1.250
X12.1  0.410 3.110  3.080
X16 0.400  0.880  0.520
xx..4...2. 0.390  0.490 1.220
X6b.1 0.390 2.960  3.210
X114 0.390  1.080 0.450
X39.3a. 0.360  0.100 0.460
X7.ter  0.340  2.020  4.050
X17.2b..  0.340 0.100  0.770
X7.bis  0.340  3.410 0.380
X5d.1h. 0.330 1.650  3.950
X49.2...  0.320  0.790 1.020
X37.3..  0.300 0.700 1.790
X37.8d.e 0.300 0.220  0.830
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Table A.10: Rome Statute Discrimination and Difficulty Parameters, by Issue (cont.)
Discrimination 1 Discrimination 2 Difficulty
X5c.Ba.bis.  0.290  0.240  1.470
X43.2.  0.280  2.490  5.050
X6.1b  0.270  0.140 0.620
X43.9 0.260 0.540  1.990
X5d.option.1  0.260 3 · 10 2  1.840
X111 0.230 0.290  5 · 10 2
X7bis  0.220  1.750 0.680
X5c.. 0.210 1.640  3.870
X19 0.210 0.630 0.480
X10.6  0.200 1.010  0.920
X5.Quarter  0.190 0.640  1.020
X5c.Bb 0.170 0.300 0.310
X5d.2 0.160  0.130 0.610
X5 0.150 0.220 1.250
X12.2 0.130 2.840  1.290
X39.4  0.130 0.100  0.720
X5c.Bt 0.120 1.650  4.050
X14 0.110  3 · 10 2  1.430
X23.5.6  0.100  0.100 1.950
X6.2 9 · 10 2  8 · 10 2  0.240
X7.bis.1  9 · 10 2 1.080  1.140
AggOptions 8 · 10 2 0.790  0.560
X15  8 · 10 2  0.210 0.760
X7.1.1  8 · 10 2 1.600  2.570
X102.5 8 · 10 2 0.100  1.890
X5c.1.thresh. 8 · 10 2 0.130 1 · 10 2
X20.1b  7 · 10 2 0.410 8 · 10 2
X36  6 · 10 2 1.380  4.420
X105  6 · 10 2 0.170  0.690
X37.4. 5 · 10 2  0.110  1.070
X47.2c.  4 · 10 2 0.000 0.780
X5d.1d 3 · 10 2 1.180  2.240
X110.3  2 · 10 2  0.100  0.830
X5c.Bb.bis. 2 · 10 2  0.220  4 · 10 2
xx 1 · 10 2  0.460 0.720
X113  1 · 10 2 0.340  0.260
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Table A.11: Refugee Convention Discrimination and Difficulty Parameters, by Issue
Discrimination D1 Discrimination D2 Difficulty
Vote 1 0.690  1.850  4.373
Vote 2  2.446 3.310  1.985
Vote 3  2.656  1.479  4.935
Vote 4 8.926 · 10 2  2.345 4.018
Vote 6  2.460  1.021  1.224
Vote 7  3.564 1.838 2.817
Vote 8 3.260 0.121  2.312
Vote 9  3.436 1.828 · 10 2  1.093
Vote 13  2.850  1.102  1.491
Vote 15 0.668  2.391 6.785
Vote 16 1.697 1.382  6.893
Vote 20  1.775 2.664 2.176
Vote 22  1.767 2.632  4.520
Vote 23 3.193  0.181  3.535
Vote 24  3.096 8.202 · 10 2  0.728
Vote 25 3.403  1.314 1.821
Vote 26 3.755 0.336  0.830
Vote 27 1.460 1.537 6.356
Vote 28 1.607  2.383  0.533
Vote 29 2.389 1.366  5.786
Vote 37  0.565  3.410  4.497
Vote 39  2.896  1.428  0.731
Vote 41  3.262 0.726 4.447
Vote 42  2.060  2.596  2.100
Vote 44  3.389 8.036 · 10 2  1.277
Vote 47 1.561 · 10 2 4.288  1.307
Vote 48  1.501  3.091  1.333
Vote 50 0.587  3.267  3.185
Vote 52 3.032  0.638 0.119
Vote 53  2.668  1.448  0.680
Vote 56 0.161  2.732  3.314
Vote 58  0.674 2.454 3.049
Vote 61  0.568 1.816 5.000
Vote 64  3.238 1.983 1.706 · 10 2
Vote 69 2.787 1.625 1.735
Vote 71 2.475 1.606  2.109 · 10 2
Vote 72  1.770  2.308  1.611
Vote 73  1.517  2.768 3.763
Vote 74  1.728 1.163  1.185
Vote 77  3.544  0.621 1.512
Vote 78  2.892  0.889  1.580
Vote 79  0.402  4.053 1.051
Vote 80 3.091 0.261 2.716
Vote 81 1.487 3.149  1.548
Vote 82  2.311 2.442  1.739
Vote 83  1.218 0.984  5.445
Vote 84 2.911  1.294 1.190
Vote 86  3.538  1.385  4.000
Vote 88 3.613  0.170 2.741
Vote 92  0.334  2.786 0.653
Vote 93 2.575 3.242 0.512
Vote 94 2.427 0.842 3.482
Vote 95 2.820 0.873  1.363
Vote 97  2.304  2.620  2.195
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Table A.12: Refugee Convention Discrimination and Difficulty Parameters, by Issue (cont.)
Discrimination D1 Discrimination D2 Difficulty
Vote 98  1.322  2.556  1.030
Vote 99  3.209  0.114  0.914
Vote 101  0.714  3.754  1.203
Vote 102 2.973  2.389 1.451
Vote 106 1.575  2.625  5.288
Vote 107  3.359  1.653  1.691
Vote 108 2.554 0.836  5.507
Vote 109 2.453 1.580 3.165
Vote 110  1.903 1.867 1.115
Vote 113 1.446 3.673 2.287
Vote 114 3.681 1.056 0.700
Vote 115 1.619  3.086 3.855
Vote 117 1.590 4.119 0.866
Vote 119  1.375  2.564  3.108 · 10 2
Vote 120 1.714  1.573 5.148
Vote 121 1.828 1.691  6.163
Vote 122 3.299 0.132  1.074
Vote 124 3.139 1.486 4.188
Vote 125 1.524 3.756 1.337
Vote 128 3.537  1.344  0.313
Vote 130 2.101 1.645  5.533
Vote 132  2.502  2.660 2.161
Vote 133 3.220 0.531  4.577
Vote 134 3.306  2.545  0.558
Vote 135 3.409  2.621  0.429
Vote 136 3.361 1.536 3.122
Vote 137 1.759 1.977  3.309
Vote 140 2.730 1.138  4.967
Vote 141 3.147 0.942  0.893
Vote 142 3.797 0.167 1.987
Vote 143  3.237 1.023 1.691
Vote 144 2.858  0.103  3.903
Vote 145  1.809  1.762  2.297
Vote 146 3.072  1.627 1.489
Vote 147 0.371  2.700  2.402
Vote 148 0.927 4.081  2.086
Vote 149 1.785 3.911  0.838
Vote 153  0.800 3.719  1.499
Vote 154 2.804  0.743  2.565
Vote 155 2.449 1.626  5.480
Vote 158 3.284  2.160  0.373
Vote 160 2.496 1.941 2.570
Vote 167 3.074 0.456  4.250
Vote 168 2.843  0.167  3.421
Vote 170 2.871 1.344  0.770
Vote 171  0.254  2.748  4.276
Vote 174 3.914  0.727 0.184
Vote 176  2.675  1.234  1.349
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1   DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 
1.1   Document Collection  
The UN core human rights treaties include the following nine instruments: 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination1; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights2; International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights3; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women4; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment5; Convention on the Rights of the Child6; Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities; International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. 
As part of the treaty-drafting records for these conventions, the working groups 
regularly issued detailed meeting reports and other documents that identify the content and 
sponsors of substantive proposals.7  Unfortunately, the travaux for most of the nine core 
UN human rights instruments has been mostly inaccessible to the public. There is no 
electronic central depository for most treaties, and many of the older records still exist only 
in microfiche or other physical formats where the treaties were concluded, such as New 
York and Geneva. But over the past two years, the PI has worked with University of 
Virginia Law School Law librarians and other researchers to build and organize a database 
                                               
1 Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
2 Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
3 Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
4 Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
5 Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
6 Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
7 For example, a report from a drafting meeting for the Migrant Workers’ Convention notes, “The 
representative of Morocco, supported by the representatives of Jamaica, Algeria, India and the Philippines, 
suggested starting the article with a chapeau, recognizing, on the one hand, the right of migrant workers to 
dispose of their earnings and savings and, on the other hand, that States should facilitate the transfer of their 
earnings and savings” A/C.3/38/1, ¶ 22. 
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of travaux documents for these treaty-drafting negotiations.8  We have determined that the 
universe of documents for the nine treaties comprises approximately 2200 documents 
totally roughly 44,000 pages.  The researchers have finished locating, assembling, and 
sorting the records, and they are nearly finished converting the documents to text-
searchable format.  They are now located in a UVA Law Library secured electronic 
database. 
These efforts have enabled this project, which involves quantifying the information 
in the meeting reports and other pertinent documents, and identifying and classifying all 
proposals relating to the substantive content of the treaty.9  
1.2   Coding Methodology 
The current stage of the project, then, involves coding the information contained in 
the travaux documents. This project is primarily interested in parties’ proposals for the 
treaty instrument.  In coding the travaux, we are interested in proposals for substantive 
provisions and procedural reforms, and how those proposals were treated by the drafting 
committee, including to what extent the substantive provisions appeared in the final treaty.   
To quantify the proposal data, two coders will read each relevant document and 
identify all proposals relating to the treaty being drafted. In doing so, we will take account 
of which states or other organizations made which sort of proposals, capturing and coding 
numerous attributes of each.  We will find the progression of each proposal by comparing 
the proposal to the final version of the treaty. 10  Various intercoder reliability statistics will 
be calculated, and any discrepancies in the two coders’ findings will be reconciled by the 
principal investigator.   
                                               
8 Mila Versteeg, Alec Knight, and I were the faculty and staff members who collaborated with the team 
of law librarians. Notably, Alec Knight traveled to the UN repository in New York and worked with UN 
employees in Geneva to locate and retrieve copies of the documents.   
9 I thank Alec Knight for identifying most of the travaux proposal examples below, which are drawn 
from the Migrant Workers’ Convention. 
10 available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx 
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1.2.1   Project Website and Shared Folder 
The project website is located at www.kevinlcope.com/travaux.  It is password-
protected; the password is “[redacted].”  The website is the project headquarters, and it 
contains links to various materials you will need to prepare for and complete the coding.  
The materials will be updated constantly throughout the project, so rather than 
downloading the materials and saving them in Dropbox or on your hard drive, access them 
online each time you need them.  Some materials that you’ll be editing, like the travaux 
documents and the coding spreadsheet, are not available on the website; they will be placed 
in your Dropbox shared folder.   
Online forum – There is a link to an online forum on the website.  Its password is 
also “Travaux.” We will use this forum in lieu of email to ask questions and share thoughts 
about the coding process.  The forum has the benefit that all team members, including ones 
that join later, will be able to review it and benefit from our shared experiences.  Open 
communication is crucial to this project.  All of us our doing this for the first time (because 
it’s never been done before!), so we’re all be learning together.  Use the forum and ask 
questions liberally.  When in doubt, ask; there are no foolish questions!  In fact, we hope 
that everyone will post at least a few questions each week.  It’s far worse to code something 
incorrectly–especially if you repeat the error–than to ask a question that you’re concerned 
(probably, unjustifiably) will be obvious to someone else.   
When someone posts on the forum, everyone will get a notice email.  When 
someone else posts and you get the email, go to the forum as soon as possible, and read the 
question.  If it’s a question that concerns something you’ve dealt with, feel free to weigh 
in; don’t worry if you’re not 100% certain; the PI will review all answers and respond 
definitively.  When an answer is posted, check back and review it; it may be important to 
what you’re then working on.   
The one limitation of the forum is that because we are double coding all or some of 
the treaties, we need coders to make judgments about specific coding questions without 
knowing exactly how a past coder has resolved it.  Therefore, do not ask (or answer) 
questions about precisely how to code a specific issue.  Rather, ask about the rule governing 
that type of issue generally.  That said, err on the side of asking too many questions; if a 
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question is too precise, it’s not a problem; the PI will simply contact you via email to 
answer it.   
Reporting – When you’re coding, if you come across anything that you think is 
particularly interesting given the project objectives described, above, email the PI.  
Likewise, if you see a problem with the documents, such as one that seems to be missing, 
email the PI; we may be able to locate it. 
1.2.2   The Coding Process 
Each set of treaty travaux comprises many documents.  The number of documents 
ranges by treaty, from 86 to several hundred.  The individual documents also vary 
dramatically in their length. For instance, for CEDAW, the mean length is about 11 pages, 
the median length is two pages, the shortest documents are less than one page, and the 
longest is more than 100 pages (though much of the longer documents are irrelevant to the 
coding).  The documents will be in your Dropbox folder under the name of the pertinent 
treaty.   
Before staring your review, first make sure you’re viewing the documents in 
chronological order.  The document file names are prefixed with a date in YY-MM-DD 
format, so sorting them in Windows/Finder, ascending by document title, will produce a 
chronological ordering (usually one that spans many years).  Because you’re reading the 
documents in chronological order, you’ll also be following the evolution of the treaty, 
including the development of the various proposals, in chronological order.  In essence, 
you’ll be reading the “story of the treaty” from a primary source, the perspective of the 
drafters.   
The travaux documents fall into several categories, some of which contain very 
many proposals, and some which contain just one or none. These categories include, e.g., 
(1) meeting reports, which recount and summarize proposals, including, the body’s 
reaction(s); (2) memos by states and other entities making written proposals; (3) committee 
reports summarizing existing proposals; (4) other reports about related international legal 
developments.  The first three types are likely or guaranteed by definition to contain 
proposals.  
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The drafting committees typically convened for meetings over the course of several 
weeks, once or more per year.  The committee generated many reports, submissions, and 
other documents when in session, and relatively few documents other times.  As a result, 
the documents will generally appear in groups closely clustered in time.   
Proposals can take several forms, including written and oral form.  Some 
documents consist entirely of a proposal or series of proposals, usually when a 
representative submits its amendments (or whole or partial treaty draft) as a memo to the 
drafting committee.  Other proposals are mentioned in meeting reports; a common form is 
for the report to note that a state or organization proposed something, and then, in some 
cases, note the reaction.   
To begin reviewing, open the Coding Excel spreadsheet located in your Dropbox 
folder.  Before editing the spreadsheet, save a copy of the spreadsheet for the relevant treaty 
in the treaty data folder. Rename the spreadsheet with the name of the treaty and the initials 
of the coder (e.g., “CEDAW Coding AB v.1”). Then open each document in Adobe Reader, 
Preview, or some similar PDF viewer.  Determine the document’s author, procedural 
context, and purpose. Also pay attention to the document date, noting how it relates to the 
dates of any documents you’ve recently reviewed. 
In reviewing a document, keep track of who’s “at the table” (states, IGOs, NGOs) 
for any given session/meeting.  Read every page closely to determine whether the 
document contains any proposals.  Note: some documents are reports of a body not 
specifically dedicated to drafting the treaty (especially early in the process), so some of the 
material may have nothing to do with the treaty; if you’ve determined with certainty that a 
part of the document addresses an unrelated subject (e.g., part of one document in the 
CEDAW file was a tribute to Pope John Paul on his birthday), you should skip over that 
portion. When you identify a proposal, note it.  Review the entire document to ensure that 
you’ve covered all references to that proposal in the document.  Note: sometimes a body 
entertains views, even formal proposals, from states and organizations who are not formal 
members of the group.  Those can constitute proposals, provided they meet the standard 
criteria below. 
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It is very common for a proposal to propose a change to a working treaty draft 
without stating explicitly how the proposal changes the status quo.  For example, a party 
might propose that “Article 12 be amended to state [X],” but not specify what Article 12 
currently states. You need to know what change the proposal accomplishes in order to code 
it.  For that reason, it is imperative that you maintain a running version of the treaty in a 
separate Word document.  When you come across a proposal, copy and paste it onto the 
current working treaty version (or run a comparison using Word’s Compare Documents 
feature).  This will allow you to compare proposals, viewing how they modify the existing 
draft or previous proposals, which is essential to answering many of the coding questions.  
Note that a proposal styled as a written memo presenting one or more articles will often 
change only some aspects of those articles in previous drafts; only those changes constitute 
the proposals. 
When reviewing a proposal, consider whether the proposal might be referring to 
some previously recorded proposal.  For example, sometimes a party submits a proposal in 
written form, and a report later references that proposal; often the later reference will 
expressly name the earlier written submission by name and/or document number, but it 
may not always do so. Other times, the report will reference a proposal previously made 
orally in another group session. You may need to go through several documents, 
synthesizing proposals and reactions, to fully complete the questions on any given proposal. 
Where the discussion does not expressly note that the proposal was made in some other 
form, you’ll have to detect this by comparing the proposal’s sponsor(s) and substance.  
Either way, if the proposal is indeed referencing an earlier-made proposal, do not code it 
as a separate proposal; rather, use the information in the document to update the coding 
you already entered for that proposal.   
Once you’ve studied the proposal and determined how it modifies the working 
version, proceed to answer all of the coding questions in the data map.  Note: One of those 
questions asks you to cut and paste the entire proposal text into the spreadsheet.  Since 
some proposals are long and spreadsheet space is limited, format the spreadsheet cell so 
that it doesn’t expand the cell to accommodate the entire proposal. (It’s not important that 
one can see the full proposal when glancing at the spreadsheet.)  
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There are 141 questions that apply to all treaties, and several treaty-specific 
questions that apply to the treaty you’re reviewing.  (Needless to say, do not answer the 
treaty-specific questions for other treaties; enter a ‘99’ for them.)  To answer each question, 
closely consult the notes in the Datamap (Section 2 below), which contains instructions on 
how to interpret and respond to each of the questions.   
Q140 asks how the proposal is reflected in the final treaty.  To determine this, 
access the final version of the treaty (available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx) and compare 
the proposal to the final version of the treaty. Make use of the Control/Command-F 
function to search for key proposal language in the treaty, wherever it appears.   
Do not move on to the next document until you’ve finished with the previous one.  
However, you will often need to come back to an already-completed document to review 
the history of a proposal that resurfaced in a later document.   
Repeat this process for all the documents in the set.  We expect that a complete 
treaty will comprise hundreds, perhaps more than one thousand, total proposals.    
This process involves a steep learning curve.  You will move more slowly at first, 
but once you’ve done the process several times, your efficiency will improve as you 
become acquainted with the questions and possible responses. Importantly, you’ll quickly 
see that the vast majority of questions are not applicable to any given proposal, and will 
receive a “99” (see Datamap below). Once you’re acclimated, we anticipate that identifying 
and coding a single proposal will take 15-20 minutes on average, though some will take 
longer.   
While we would like to progress efficiently, the most important goal is accuracy.  
All coding will be reviewed using an intercoder reliability measure, and too much coder 
disagreement can call the data’s reliability into question.  So please be meticulous and 
check to make sure the codes you entered are what you intended.   
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1.2.3   Identifying Proposals 
Definition 
A proposal is a suggestion from a state or other participant that the treaty at issue 
add some term, change some term, and/or delete some term, or that the treaty-writing 
process adopt some new procedure.   
Not all expressed opinions or stated preferences constitute proposals for our coding 
purposes. To be considered proposals, statements must be concrete suggestions to shape 
the treaty content or negotiation procedure; vague preferences about the nature of the treaty 
are insufficient.11 Opinions about whether there should be one or multiple treaties, or broad 
ideas about the focus or scope of the treaty, should not be coded. Also, parties sometimes 
give explanations, opinions, and objections, or voice other views that don’t fall under the 
above definition of “proposal,” and therefore do not constitute proposals for the purpose of 
this study. Finally, parties often respond to others’ proposals, expressing support for or 
opposition to adopting that proposal; these are coded not as proposals, but as “positions on 
proposals” and are recorded in Q52-Q134.  These positions include instances where a role 
call vote is taken on a proposal, in which case votes in favor of [opposed to] the proposal 
should be coded as unqualified support for [unqualified opposition to] it. 
Distinguishing the statements that qualify as valid proposals from those that 
constitute something else requires you to make a subjective and important judgment. While 
there is no simple method for identifying proposals, there are a few general rules to follow.  
The sub-sections below provide some guidelines. 
Non-proposals and positions on proposals 
Explanations, opinions, and positions, which do not quality as proposals, often 
involve verbs like “expressed,” “felt,” “stated,” and “pointed out.”12  These verbs normally 
                                               
11 If a state representative makes a proposal to a version of the treaty in another language (e.g., the French 
or Spanish text), this should not be coded as a separate proposal; we are concerned only with the primary, 
English version. 
12  For example, “The representative of Jamaica and other delegations expressed their difficulty in 
accepting the word legal” A/C.3/37/7, ¶ 21.  Example: “The representative of Finland stated that his 
delegation had difficulty with the phrase ‘may be taken into account’, as in his view that term expressed an 
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do not indicate proposals, but they can sometimes do so, particularly when they are 
combined with auxiliary verbs indicating the desire for or commitment to a particular 
outcome (e.g., “should,” “ought,” “must”).13  When parties express support for, object to, 
or express reservations regarding another proposal without specifying a specific proposed 
change, these are considered positions on another proposal (Q52-Q134), not proposals 
themselves.14 
Revisions 
Often one party will revise an earlier proposal, modify it, and propose it as its own.  
Take care to code only those provisions in revisions that are truly different from the original 
formal proposal. To do otherwise would be to double-count these provisions. Note that so-
called revisions often include new provisions, which must also be coded.15  Also note that 
where a party amends or corrects its own previous proposal without input from the group, 
code only the amended/corrected version. 
                                               
idea of probability.” A/C.3/42/1, ¶ 67. Example: “The representatives of Morocco and Senegal stated that 
their delegations could not accept such a proposal as the idea behind it implicitly provided for expulsion or 
deportation….” A/C.3/41/3, ¶ 234 
13 For example, “The representative of the United States stated that, in his view, the paragraph should be 
limited to detention of migrant workers for being in an irregular situation.” A/C.3/42/1, ¶ 15.  Example: “The 
representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, while referring to article 13 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights stressed that the provisions of the present paragraph should be in harmony with 
the provision of article 13 of the Covenant….” A/C.3/42/1, ¶ 102 
14 Example: “The representative of Greece placed on record his reservations on the substance of the 
proposed article; he objected to any proposal aimed at restricting by the State of employment, the right of 
migrant workers and members of their families to freedom of expression, to vote and to be elected as well as 
to participate in the conduct of public affairs in the State of origin, on the grounds that such restrictions would 
be against the letter and the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of many other relevant 
international instruments.” (Emphasis added) A/C.3/37/7, ¶ 54. Example: “The delegations of Algeria, 
Morocco, Senegal, the Sudan, Iraq, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Syrian Arab 
Republic and Jordan placed on record their formal reservations as regards the inclusion in article 4 of the 
draft Convention of the [proposed] phrase ….” A/C.3/41/3, ¶ 51. 
15 Consider the original, “All migrant workers and members of their families shall enjoy quality of 
treatment with nationals of the receiving country in respect of social security, in so far as such protection 
arises out of employment,” U.N. Doc. A/C.3/36/WG.1/CRP.1, II.21(1), versus the revision, “Migrant 
workers and members of their families shall enjoy equality of treatment with nationals of the receiving 
country in respect of social security, provided that, as regards migrant workers and members of their family 
who are undocumented or in an irregular situation, States Parties may limit these rights to social security 
protection arising out of employment or to contributory benefits, that is, benefits the grant of which depends 
on direct financial participation by the migrant workers or their employer or on a qualifying period of 
economic activity.” See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/36/WG.1/CRP.1/Add.1, 27.II.21(1) The first part of the proposal 




There are two main classes of proposals: procedural and substantive.  The 
overwhelming majority–and the ones of most interest here–are substantive.   
Procedural proposals (Q12, Q29-Q33) typically refer to the procedures for 
adopting substantive proposals, such as how many votes are required for adoption, the 
order for proceeding, or who should be included in the discussions.  Minor suggestions for 
when to discuss specific substantive proposals, should not be included.  For example, “[O]n 
a proposal made by the representative of Greece, the Working Group agreed to reconsider 
at a later stage the formulation of the part of the text which deals with restrictions applicable 
to migrant workers . . .  in order to take fully into account some concerns expressed . . . .” 
A/C.3/36/10, ¶ 10.  This ad hoc procedural suggestion would not be coded as a proposal. 
On the other hand, substantive proposals (Q12) must recommend that the treaty add 
or alter one or more aspects of the treaty itself. Thus, proposals commonly involve verbs 
like “propose(s)/d,” “submit(s)/ted,” “suggest(s)/ed,” “urge(s)/d,” and “call(s)/ed for.” 
These verbs nearly always indicate proposals, but there are other, less common, verbs that 
may also indicate proposals. As an aid or double-check on your work, you may use the 
Control/Command-F function to locate the common proposal verbs, but you should not use 
it exclusively; you must read every part of every document to identify the proposals.  This 
is true for two main reasons: (1) parties sometimes use other language to make proposals; 
and (2) some documents are not text-searchable.  So relying on this function alone would 
miss a significant number of important proposals.   
Consider the following: “The representative of the United States orally proposed 
replacing the word ‘formalities’ by the words ‘legal requirements’. A/C.3/37/7, ¶ 21.  As 
another example: the representative of Finland “suggested either the complete deletion of 
paragraph 2 or the replacement of the word ‘may’ by the word ‘should’.” A/C.3/42/1, ¶ 67.  
These would both constitute substantive proposals.   
Distinguishing one proposal from multiple proposals 
Sometimes a party will propose a complex substantive treaty change that actually 
addresses multiple topics.  This is especially common when a party submits a written 
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proposal listing the proposed changes. These cases are considered not one, but multiple 
proposals, and should be coded as such.  It may sometimes be difficult to determine the 
difference between a complex, single proposal, on one hand, and multiple, closely related 
proposals, on the other.  Use your best judgment, and consult the PI whenever in doubt.   
2   DATAMAP 
Below is a comprehensive list of the travaux information being coded.  The 
questions, possible responses, and interpretive explanations for coders are provided for 
each variable.  The data are currently divided into six categories: (1) preliminary; (2) 
proposal logistics; (3) sponsorship identify; (4) generic content; (4) support and outcome; 
(5) CEDAW-specific content; (6) MWC-specific content. 
2.1   Preliminary 
Q1.   What are the coder’s initials?  
(Fill in)  
Ø   E.g., AB 
Q2.   On what date was the proposal coded?  
(Fill in) (YYYY-MM-DD) 
Ø   If the coding spans dates, use the date coding started.   
Q3.   At what time did coding for the proposal begin?   
(Fill in) (HH:MM, 24-hour format) 
Q4.   What is the name of the treaty being drafted?  
1.      International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
2.      International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
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3.      Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
4.      Convention Against Torture (CAT) 
5.      Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
6.    Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) 
7.      International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families (MWC) 
8.      Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
9.      International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (ICCPED) 
10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
11.    Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
12. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
Q5.   What is the name of the first document that refers to the proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   Use the document’s self-identified title, usually located at the top of the first page. 
Ø   If a representative describes his state’s proposal in one a document but does not 
provide the exact wording, it should be coded as being introduced in that document, 
although details of the proposal may come from elsewhere. 
Q6.   What is the UN document number of the first document that refers to the 
proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   Use the UN symbol nomenclature, e.g., A/C.3/38/5, provided in the file name and 
on the document.  For example, A/52/100 denotes a General Assembly document 
from the 52nd session; S/1997/100 denotes a Security Council document issued in 
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1997; and E/1993/100 denotes an Economic and Social Council document from 
1993.  For a complete overview of UN document symbols, click here. 
Q7.   On what page(s) of the above document does the proposal appear?   
(Fill in) 
Ø   Use the page as originally listed on the document itself (not the PDF page number).  
If the document is not numbered, determine for yourself the page number, treating 
the first page as “1” (meaning it will generally correspond with the PDF page 
number).   
Q8.   On what date was the proposal introduced?  
(Fill in) (YYYY-MM-DD) 
Ø   If the proposal is described in a meeting report and the exact date of the proposal 
itself is not given, use the document’s event date.  If the proposal is submitted in 
writing, use the date of the submission document. But if the proposal is coded as 
submitted both orally and in writing (Q17 below), use the earlier date. 
Q9.   What is the full text of the proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   Cut and paste the proposal from the document.  If the proposal includes an entire 
treaty draft, do not input the full text; simply note as much. If the document has not 
undergone optical character recognition, look for the corresponding Word or RTF 
document and cut and paste from it.  If no such document exists, ask for assistance 
from the PI or type the proposal in manually.  (This will obviously be more time 
consuming, so use it only as a last resort.)   
Q10.   What is the proposal’s objective in brief?  
(Fill in) 
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Ø   After reading the proposal and determining how it modifies the status quo, describe 
the proposal’s objective in approximately one to three sentences.   
2.2   Proposal Logistics  
Q11.   Which does the proposal concern: a substantive aspect of the treaty’s content 
or operation, or how the treaty drafting-process will proceed?  
1.      A substantive aspect of the treaty’s content or operation 
 
Ø   The great majority of proposals concern a substantive aspect of the treaty’s content 
or operation. 
 
2.      How the treaty drafting-process will proceed in general 
 
Ø   Proposals that refer to the general internal workings of the drafting body are coded 
as how the treaty drafting-process will proceed in general. These proposals often 
refer to the order in which articles should be discussed, but can also refer to voting 
or membership rules, among other procedural matters. Ad hoc proposals for how 
to deal with particular issues are not considered proposals for this purpose. For 
Example 1: “At the end of the discussion on the text of article 8, on a proposal made 
by the representative of Greece, the Working Group agreed to reconsider at a later 
stage the formulation of the part of the text which deals with restrictions applicable 
to migrant workers and members of their families in order to take fully into account 
some concerns expressed, during the debate, in particular by the representative of 
Morocco” See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/36/10, ¶ 10.  This suggestion is considered ad hoc 
and does not constitute a proposal.  
Q12.   What is the procedural context of the proposal?   
1.      Suggests a new change  
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Ø   The great majority of proposals are coded as suggests a new change. 
Ø   Where multiple drafts/proposals are submitted by different parties simultaneously 
(or very close in time), they should be treated as unrelated separate proposals, not 
as modifications of each other  
2.      Revises one or more suggestions previously made  
Ø   Attempts to create a compromise text based on an earlier proposal, which tend to 
be submitted by the chairman and/or a group of states, are coded as revises one or 
more suggestions previously made. They must be based directly on an earlier 
proposal.16  
3.      Proposes to settle upon then-disputed language 
Ø   A proposal is coded as proposes to settle upon then-disputed language if the 
proposal selects one word/phrase/sentence from among at least two options in the 
draft convention. Often, while reading a draft convention, bodies leave words in 
brackets to indicate that there is no agreement on the language. The text in brackets 
may be anything from a single word to a paragraph. In the readings of the draft 
convention that follow, states attempt to reach an agreement, either by deleting the 
bracketed language or accepting one bracketed option from among multiple choices.  
For example, “Regarding the word “property” in brackets in the text, the 
representative of Finland, supported by Australia, suggested removing the brackets 
around it as it was used in article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.” A/C.3/40/1, ¶ 124.17 
                                               
16 For example, at its 6th meeting on 22 October, the Chairman and the original co-sponsors submitted 
a second revision for a text for article 38, reading as follows…” A/C.3/37/7, ¶ 33.  As another example, 
“After the discussion and informal consultations with delegations, the Chairman proposed to consolidate the 
Indian proposals in one single article which would be article 68 of part V of the draft Convention, reading as 
follows…” A/C.3/38/5, ¶ 35. 
17  As another example: “At its 4th meeting on 4 June, the Working Group considered preambular 
paragraph (1) on the basis of preambular paragraph (1) of the text agreed upon during the first reading 
(A/C.3/39/WG.1/WP.1) reading as follows: “(1) [Reaffirming] [Taking into account] the [permanent 
validity] [importance] of the principles [, standards] [and norms] embodied in the basic instruments of the 
United Nations….The representative of France, supported by the representatives of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the United States, expressed a preference for the words “Taking into account” because in their 
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4. Creates disputed language 
Ø   A proposal is coded as creates disputed language if it proposes alternative language 
to another existing proposal that has not been incorporated.  
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
Q13.   Is the proposal part of a first/original treaty draft or does it seek to amend an 
existing working draft?  
1.      First/original draft  
Ø   Proposals are coded as a first/original draft if they constitute a complete version of 
a proposed treaty rather than a modification to an existing draft.  If such a draft is 
submitted contemporaneously or shortly after another party submits its own 
competing draft, and the later draft does not acknowledge that it is a modification 
of the earlier draft, it is coded as a first/original draft.  
2.      Amends an existing working draft 
Ø   The great majority of proposals, especially after the early phases of the drafting 
process, are coded as amends an existing working draft. 
99. Not applicable 
Q14.   Does the proposal concern a subject that the working draft (if any) previously 
addressed, or does it concern a new subject?  
1.      Concerns a previously addressed subject 
                                               
view the word “Reaffirming” would tie the present Convention to previous conventions to which several 
States were not parties.”  A/C.3/40/1, ¶ 68 
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Ø   Proposals are coded as concerns a previously addressed subject if some body has 
previously considered the specific topic at any point during the drafting process.   
2.      Concerns a new subject   
Ø   Proposals are coded as concerns a new subject if the proposal introduces a new 
topic.  Note that introducing a new provision is not necessarily the same thing as 
introducing a new topic.  A new provision could revive a previously discussed topic.  
Conversely, a modification to an existing paragraph could address a new topic.  For 
example, Country X proposes that the provision stating that “States parties resolve 
not to discriminate on the basis of gender in government hiring” be amended to add 
the clause, “but nothing in this provision shall be construed to prevent governments 
from implementing short-term measures to remedy gender disparities resulting 
from past discriminatory practices against women.”  This proposal would be coded 
as concerns a new subject (i.e., whether affirmative action is permitted).   
Q15.   How much of the treaty text does the proposal seek to change?  
1. Introduces or deletes one or more words within a clause or phrase; reformulates, 
reorders, or otherwise changes a clause or phrase  
2. Introduces or deletes one or more clauses or phrases within a sentence; reformulates, 
reorders, or otherwise changes one or more sentences 
3. Introduces or deletes one or more sentences; reformulates, reorders, or otherwise 
changes one or more subparagraphs 
4. Introduces or deletes one or more subparagraphs within a paragraph; reformulates, 
reorders, otherwise changes a paragraph 
5. Introduces or deletes one or more paragraphs; reformulates, reorders, or otherwise 
changes multiple paragraphs within an article 
6. Introduces or deletes an article; reformulates, reorders, or otherwise changes 
multiple articles 
7. General proposal (concrete substantive proposal without specific language 
suggestion) 
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Ø   If a proposal falls into more than one category (e.g., it introduces a new, one-
sentence (3) subparagraph (4)), use the code of the more substantial change. 
Ø   A proposal is coded as general proposal if it calls for the inclusion of some new 
provision or change to existing provisions, but does not suggest any specific textual 
change.18  (Recall that vague statements about what the treaty should accomplish 
or include are not coded as proposals at all.)    
77. Other 
88. Multiple above 
99. Not applicable/none (procedural proposal)  
Q16.   To what body is the proposal made?  
1.      A working group/committee session (orally or in writing) 
2.      The General Assembly (orally or in writing) 
77.    Other 
Ø   Note that many documents reference the General Assembly in the header, even 
where the document is prepared by a drafting committee. The relevant body is that 
to which the proposal is directly addressed. So if the proposal is made in a meeting 
of the “3rd Committee of the General Assembly,” it should be coded as a committee 
session. 
                                               
18 Example 1: “In that connection the representative of Mexico, referring to the obstacles encountered 
by some states to ratify some ILO conventions, stated that the chapeau of the article should mainly address 
the "prevention of clandestine labour.” A/C.3/38/5, ¶ 24. Example 2: [The representative of Algeria] “stressed 
that, with a view to ensuring their durable reintegration in the country of origin, the return of the migrant 
worker should be final and freely decided upon by the migrant worker.” A/C.3/38/5, ¶ 18. Example 3: “The 
representative of Argentina stated that there should be a general safeguard clause whereby States would 
provide legislation or regulation to this end” A/C.3/38/1, ¶ 18. Example 4: [The representative of the 
Netherlands] “suggested that part 2 of the proposed article 68 should be restricted to an obligation for the 
States concerned to remove legal obstacles to the repatriation of a body.” A/C.3/38/5, ¶ 36. Example 5: “The 
representative of Morocco, supported by the representatives of Jamaica, Algeria, India and the Philippines, 
suggested starting the article with a chapeau, recognizing, on tne one hand, the right of migrant workers to 
dispose of their earnings and savings and, on the other hand, that States should facilitate the transfer of their 
earnings and savings” A/C.3/38/1, ¶ 22 
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Q17.   In what form is the proposal?  
1.      Oral 
Ø   Code as an oral proposal if the party makes the proposal to a body exclusively in 
oral form.   
2.  In writing 
Ø   Code as in writing if the party submits a written version of the proposal. (Also code 
as in writing (not both) if the party submits a written version, and later, the proposal 
is orally debated, discussed, or otherwise mentioned before a body (but not formally 
re-proposed).) 
3.      Both 
Ø   If the party both submits a written proposal and formally makes the proposal before 
the body (not just discusses it), in whichever order, code as both.   
77.    Other 
2.3   Sponsorship Identity 
Q18.   What is the name of the first state making/sponsoring the proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   If there is no COW code for a country per se, use the code that corresponds most 
closely. If in doubt, use this ICOW Historical State Names data set: 
http://www.paulhensel.org/icownames.html. 
Ø   Where multiple parties are listed along with the introduction of a proposal, code the 
party as a proposal maker/sponsor (as opposed to as merely expressing support in 
the questions below) only if the party is named as a “sponsor,” “author” of a 
submission, as the party that “proposed,” or the like.  If a report notes that Country 
X proposed a change, “with the support of Country Y,” do not code Country Y as 
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a sponsor.  But if a report notes that “Country X along with Country Y” proposed 
a change, code Country Y as a sponsor. 
Ø   Where there are multiple proposal sponsors, in determining the order, use the order 
listed in the document.   
99.    Not applicable 
Q19.   What is the name of the second state making/sponsoring the proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See notes on Q18. 
99.   Not applicable 
Q20.   What is the name of the third state making/sponsoring the proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See notes on Q18. 
99.   Not applicable 
Q21.   What is the name of the fourth state making/sponsoring the proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See notes on Q18. 
99.   Not applicable 
Q22.   What is the name of the fifth state making/sponsoring the proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See notes on Q18. 
99.   Not applicable 
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Q23.   What is the name of the sixth state making/sponsoring the proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See notes on Q18. 
99.   Not applicable 
Q24.   What is the name of the seventh state making/sponsoring the proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See notes on Q18. 
99.   Not applicable 
Q25.   How many additional states (beyond the first seven) make/sponsor the 
proposal and what are the states’ identities?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   If the number of state sponsors exceeds seven, fill in the number and write down 
its/their identity.  So if there were eight sponsors, fill in “1” and give the COW 
abbreviation of the eighth state. 
Q26.   What is the name of the first IGO/NGO making/sponsoring the proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   See notes on Q18. 
99.   Not applicable 
Q27.   What is the name of the second IGO/NGO making/sponsoring the proposal?  
(Fill in) 
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Ø   See notes on Q18. 
99.   Not applicable 
Q28.   How many additional IGOs/NGOs (beyond the first two) make/sponsor the 
proposal and what are the IGOs’/NGOs’ identities? 
(Fill in) 
Ø   If the number of IGO/NGO sponsors exceeds two, fill in the excess number and 
write down its/their identity.  
2.4   General Content 
Q29.   How does the proposal address how the treaty-drafting process will generally 
proceed?  
1.      Increases threshold for adopting changes  
2.      Decreases threshold for adopting changes 
3.      Allows additional states/organizations to participate 
4.     Allows fewer states/organizations to participate 
5.      Changes order in which elements of the treaty will be considered 
77. Other 
88. Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (addresses a substantive aspect) 
Ø   Per Q11, ad hoc proposals for how to deal with particular issues are not considered 
proposals for this purpose.  
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Q30.   What substantive aspect of the treaty does the proposal seek to modify?  
1. Modifies treaty definitions19 
2. Delegates authority to a treaty/third-party organization20  
3. Modifies the scope of the treaty’s jurisdiction21  
4. Modifies the rules of signature/ratification/accession, EIF, RUDs, amendments, 
and denunciation22 
                                               
19 Example 1: “As regards article 2 (1) and in particular to the expression “on his own account,” [the 
representative of Sweden] stated that in his Government’s view it would be unjustified to deprive a migrant 
worker of the protection accorded to him under the Convention as long as he is employed, for the reason that 
he decides to set up a small enterprise. Such a change of wstatus would have immediate repercussions also 
on the rights enjoyed by members of his family if the self-employed worker were to be excluded from the 
application of the Convention. He thus suggested that the term ‘self-employed migrant worker’ should be 
defined in a new subparagraph (g) to be added to article 2 (2) and that provisions applicable to this particular 
category should be added to part IV” A/C.3/40/1, ¶ 15.  Example 2: The representative of the United States 
felt that there was a slight ambiguity in the phrase “any other status” as those words in themselves might 
constitute a status. He therefore suggested rewording the phrase after the words “economic position” to read 
“property, marital status, birth or other status.” ICRMW: A/C.3/40/1, ¶ 132.  Example 3: With reference to 
the expression “except as otherwise provided hereafter and without distinction,” the representative of Italy 
suggested deleting the word “and” between “hereafter “ and “without” and restructure the beginning of the 
article to read: “The present Convention is applicable, except as otherwise provided hereafter, to all migrant 
workers and members of their families without distinction ….” ICRMW: A/C.3/40/1, ¶ 133 
20 For example, regarding paragraph 4, the Chairman suggested that the possibility of inviting other 
agencies and organizations besides ILO to participate, in an advisory capacity in the work of the should be 
extended as well to intergovernmental organizations outside the united Nations system which dealt with 
matters covered by the Convention on a regional basis. ICRMW: A/C.3/39/1, ¶ 91 
21 Example 1: The representative of Morocco suggested that the formulation of the article should be 
based on the wording of article 28 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or 
on article 50 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which referred to the application of 
the Covenant without any limitations or exceptions. ICRMW: A/C.3/39/1, ¶ 24. Example 2: CAT: “The 
representative of Brazil proposed, in a spirit of compromise, a modified system under which the principle of 
universal jurisdiction would apply under certain conditions and on a subsidiary basis, only if the States of 
territorial or national jurisdiction did not request extradition within a set period or if a request were denied.” 
Example 3: The representative of the United States explained her difficulty in accepting proposed paragraph 
1 [“This Convention … shall be applicable, in all its terms, all territories under the jurisdiction of States 
which become parties thereto”] and suggested that it should be reformulated to reflect the concern of States 
with a federal system. ICRMW: A/C.3/39/1, ¶ 24 
22 Example 1: During the discussion of article 81, the representative of the USSR, supported by the 
delegations of India and Chile, stressed that the Convention as an international instrument should be opened 
to all States as set out in the proposal reproduced in column A of document A/.C.3/36/WG.1/WP.1. ICRMW: 
A/C.3/39/1, ¶ 16. Example 2: The representative of Italy pointed out some problems in connection with any 
optional clauses. He expressed his preference for working on the basis of reciprocity clauses. He therefore 
proposed a new formulation for article 85 reading: “At the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, any State may indicate the parts or articles which it will apply only to the nationals of 
other States.” ICRMW: A/C.3/39/4, ¶ 74.  Example 3: At its 5th meeting on 27 September, the Working 
Group had before it a text for article 81 bis to be included in the final provisions submitted by the 
representative of Denmark. The article read as follows: “… (1) Any State Party which ratifies this Convention 
may, by a declaration appended to its ratification, exclude from application of the Convention, parts or articles 
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5. Edits treaty title, subsection title, or preambular language23  
6. Modifies the substantive rights of the protected group24 
7. Modifies the enforcement/supervision provisions of the treaty25 
8.    Modifies the requirements for how state governments enact domestic legislation or 
otherwise implement the treaty 
77. Other 
88. Multiple above 
99. Not applicable 
Q31.   How does the proposal address the treaty’s member requirements or its 
operation?  
1. Requires some behavior of states 
Ø   Proposals that prescribe something are coded as requires some behavior of states 
                                               
and/or one or more particular categories of migrant workers.”… ICRMW: A/C.3/39/4, ¶ 78. Example 4: The 
representative of Morocco suggested that it would be sufficient to state in that article that the convention 
would enter into force on the ninetieth day after the deposit of the required number of ratifications or 
accessions. ICRMW: A/C.3/39/1, ¶ 20. 
23 Example 1: “The representative of Sweden proposed the following text for preambular paragraph (6): 
‘Recognizing that one of the principal objectives of the International Labour Organisation, as stated in its 
Constitution, is the protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own.” 
ICRMW: A/C.3/40/1, ¶ 81.  Example 2: “The representatives of Sweden, Finland, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Norway, Denmark and the United States felt that preambular paragraph (9) was superfluous and 
therefore they supported the deletion of the paragraph.” ICRMW: A/C.3/40/1, ¶ 89 
24 Example 1: “Turning to the issue of the free assistance. of an interpreter, [the representative of the 
United States] stated that free interpretation should be provided only for the indigent and not for persons who 
could themselves pay for an interpreter.”ICRMW: A/C.3/41/3, ¶ 199.  Example 2: “The representative of 
France suggested adding a paragraph between paragraphs (2) and (3) as follows: ‘Migrant workers and 
members of their families temporarily deprived of their liberty while awaiting the application of a decision 
concerning their departure from the territory of the State of employment shall be separated from sentenced 
and convicted persons.’” ICRMW: A/C.3/41/3, ¶ 231. 
25 Example 1: The representative of France, supported by the representative of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, stated that some priority should be accorded to States directly concerned with question of migration, 
in particular, with respect to the supervision of the convention, so as to avoid the supervisory machinery of 
the Convention being controlled by experts nominated by States which did not have migrant workers. 
ICRMW: A/C.3/39/4, ¶ 16. Example 2: The representative of the Untied States, supported in principle by the 
delegation of Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany, proposed a new text for old paragraph 8 (new 
9) reading as follows: “The States Parties shall be responsible for all expenses incurred in connection with 
the administration of the present Convention pursuant to part VI and shall reimburse the United Nations for 
all costs of meetings, staff, facilities and emoluments.” 
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2. Prohibits some behavior by states 
Ø   Proposals that proscribe something are coded as prohibits some behavior by states 
3. Authorizes some behavior by states 
Ø   The difference between requiring and authorizing some behavior is that requiring 
makes the action mandatory, and authorizing bestows authority to engage in the 
behavior but makes it optional. 
4.      Recommends/suggests some behavior by states 
Ø   The difference between authorizing and recommending/suggesting some behavior 
is that authorizing bestows authority (i.e., without the provision, there may have 
been no authority), and recommending/suggesting attempts to persuade states to 
take some action which for which it already has authority. 
5. Requires some behavior of a treaty body or other central authority 
Ø   See note for response 1. 
6. Prohibits some behavior by a treaty body or other central authority 
Ø   See note for response 2. 
7. Authorizes some behavior by a treaty body or other central authority 
Ø   See note for response 3. 
 
8.      Recommends/suggests some behavior by a treaty body or other central authority 
Ø   See note for response 4. 
9. Does not address substantive obligations: concerns preambular language 
Ø   Some proposals address only preambular language, which typically does not 
directly affect substantive obligations. 
10. Does not address substantive obligations: involves treaty logistics/procedure 
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Ø   Proposals that involve treaty logistics/procedure include topics like amendment, 
withdrawal, dispute resolution, entry into force, treaty bodies, duration, etc. 
77. Other 
88. Multiple above 
99. Not applicable 
Q32.   How does the proposal address the precision of the treaty language?  
1. Makes it more precise  
Ø   More precision roughly equates with less specificity, vagueness, ambiguity, or 
generality. 
2. Makes it less precise  
Ø   More precision roughly equates with more specificity, vagueness, ambiguity, or 
generality. 
99. Not applicable (does not address the treaty language’s precision) 
Q33.   Which aspect(s) of the treaty does the proposal address? 
1. The treaty’s membership rules (skip to Q34) 
2. The treaty’s derogation provisions (skip to Q35) 
3. The treaty’s reporting provisions (skip to Q36) 
4. The treaty’s monitoring provisions (skip to Q37) 
5. The treaty’s complaint procedures (skip to Q38) 
6. The treaty’s dispute-resolution mechanism (skip to Q39) 
7. The treaty’s procedures for incentivizing compliance (skip to Q40) 
8. How the treaty creates new bodies (skip to Q41) 
9. Whether and how the treaty delegates to other existing (i.e., separate from the 
treaty) bodies (skip to Q42) 
10. The treaty’s duration (skip to Q43) 
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11. The treaty’s amendment procedures (skip to Q44) 
12. The creation of/deletion of/change to an escape clause (skip to Q45) 
13. The creation of/deletion of/change to a withdraw clause (skip to Q46) 
14. How the treaty allows reservations (skip to Q47) 
15. The substantive rights of the protected group (skip to Q48) 
16. The scope of the treaty’s jurisdiction (skip to Q49) 
17. The flexibility that states have to implement the proposal domestically (skip to 0) 
77. Other 
88. Multiple above 
99. None/Not applicable 
Ø   If the proposal addresses only one of the issues in responses 1-17, use that code 
here, and skip to the question noted.  Code ‘99’ (Not applicable) for all the 
questions Q32–0 other than the one chosen.   
Ø   If the proposal addresses multiple issues, use code ‘88’ (multiple above) here and 
address the corresponding questions Q32–0.  Note: given how the coding scheme 
defines “proposal,” proposals will rarely address more than one issue; if it seems 
that one does so, consider whether it might more properly be coded as multiple 
proposals.   
Q34.   How does the proposal address the treaty’s membership or entry-into-force 
rules?  
1.      Increases minimum number of members needed for entry into force 
2.      Decreases minimum number of members needed for entry into force 
3.      Requires that certain states ratify before it enters into force 
4.      Removes the requirement that certain states ratify before it enters into force 
5.      Allows non-states to become members 
6.      Prevents non-states from becoming members 
77.    Other 
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88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address the treaty’s membership rules) 
 
Q35.   How does the proposal address the treaty’s derogation provisions?  
1.      Makes one or more provisions derogable 
Ø   Derogation provisions allow, under certain extraordinary circumstances (like a 
national emergency), states parties to fail to comply with one or more treaty 
provisions without violating their obligations. 
2.      Makes one or more provisions non-derogable 
3.      Heightens the requirements for derogation from one or more provisions 
4.      Lowers the requirements for derogation from one or more provisions 
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address the treaty’s derogation provisions) 
Q36.   How does the proposal address the treaty’s reporting provisions?  
1.      Gives members more responsibility/authority to report (self-reporting) 
2.      Gives members less responsibility/authority to report (self-reporting) 
3.      Gives an internal treaty body more responsibility/authority to report 
4.      Gives an internal treaty body less responsibility/authority to report 
5.      Gives an existing IGO more responsibility/authority to report 
6.      Gives an existing IGO less responsibility/authority to report 
7.      Gives an NGO more responsibility/authority to report 
8.      Gives an NGO less responsibility/authority to report 
9.      Increases the frequency of required reporting 
10.    Decreases the frequency of required reporting 
 171 
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address the treaty’s reporting provisions) 
Q37.   How does the proposal address the treaty’s monitoring provisions?  
1.      Gives a treaty body more monitoring responsibility 
2.      Gives a treaty body less monitoring responsibility 
3.      Gives states more monitoring responsibility 
4.      Gives states less monitoring responsibility 
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address the treaty’s monitoring provisions) 
Q38.   How does the proposal address the treaty’s complaint procedures?  
1.      Allows NGOs to file complaints 
2.      Disallows NGOs from filing complaints 
3.      Allows individuals to file complaints 
4.      Disallows individuals from filing complaints 
5.      Allows states to file complaints 
6.      Disallows states from filing complaints 
7.      Changes the entity with whom complaints are filed 
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address the treaty’s complaint procedures) 
Q39.   How does the proposal address the treaty’s dispute-resolution mechanism?  
1.      Creates a process for rendering binding judgments (arbitration or adjudication) 
2.      Eliminates a process for rendering binding judgments (arbitration or adjudication) 
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3.      Creates a process for rendering non-binding judgments (mediation or other 
informal process) 
4.     Eliminates a process for rendering non-binding judgments (mediation or other informal 
process) 
5.      Delegates dispute resolution responsibility to an existing body 
6.      Removes dispute resolution responsibility from an existing body 
7.      Delegates dispute resolution responsibility to a newly created body 
8.      Removes dispute resolution responsibility from a newly created body 
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address the treaty’s dispute-resolution procedures) 
Q40.   How does the proposal address the treaty’s procedures for incentivizing 
compliance?  
1.      Creates monetary or other rewards for compliance 
2.      Removes monetary or other rewards for compliance 
3.      Creates monetary punishments for non-compliance 
4.      Removes monetary punishments for non-compliance 
5.      Creates membership-related punishments for non-compliance 
6.      Removes membership-related punishments for non-compliance 
7.      Creates reputational punishments for non-compliance 
8.      Removes reputational punishments for non-compliance 
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address the treaty’s procedures for incentivizing 
compliance) 
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Q41.   How does the proposal address how the treaty creates new bodies?  
1.      Creates additional bodies 
2.      Creates fewer bodies 
3.      Gives a previously proposed body more authority 
4.      Gives a previously proposed body less authority 
5.      Changes the membership rules of a previously proposed body  
6.      Changes the voting rules of a previously proposed body 
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address how the treaty creates new bodies) 
Q42.   How does the proposal address whether and how the treaty delegates to other 
existing (i.e., separate from the treaty) bodies? 
1.      Delegates to additional existing bodies 
2.      Delegates to fewer existing bodies 
3.      Delegates more authority to existing bodies 
4.      Delegates less authority to existing bodies 
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address how the treaty delegates to other existing bodies) 
Q43.   How does the proposal address the treaty’s duration?  
1.      Makes duration infinite (where previously silent) 
2.      Makes duration finite (where previously silent) 
3.      Reduces existing duration to fixed period 
4.      Increases existing duration to fixed period 
77.    Other 
99.    Not applicable (does not address the treaty’s duration) 
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Q44.   How does the proposal address the treaty’s amendment procedures?  
1.      Increases number/fraction of states required to approve amendment 
2.      Decreases number/fraction of states required to approve amendment 
3.      Sets a minimum waiting period before amendment 
4.      Increases the minimum waiting period before amendment 
5.      Decreases the minimum waiting period before amendment 
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address the treaty’s amendment procedures) 
Q45.   How does the proposal address the creation of/deletion of/change to an escape 
clause?  
1.      Creates an escape clause 
2.      Eliminates an escape clause 
3.      Increases the burden of invoking an escape clause by requiring extraordinary 
circumstances 
4.      Increases the burden of invoking an escape clause by requiring approval of other 
members (or increasing number of members required) 
5.      Decreases the burden of invoking an escape clause by not requiring extraordinary 
circumstances 
6.      Decreases the burden of invoking an escape clause by not approval of other 
members (or decreasing number of members required) 
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address an escape clause) 
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Q46.   How does the proposal address the creation of/deletion of/change to a 
withdrawal clause?  
1.      Creates a withdrawal clause 
2.      Eliminates a withdrawal clause 
3.      Increases the burden of invoking a withdrawal clause by requiring extraordinary 
circumstances 
4.      Increases the burden of invoking a withdrawal clause by requiring approval of other 
members (or increasing number of members required) 
5.      Decreases the burden of invoking a withdrawal clause by not requiring 
extraordinary circumstances 
6.      Decreases the burden of invoking a withdrawal clause by not requiring approval of 
other members (or decreasing number of members required) 
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address a withdraw clause) 
Q47.   How does the proposal address how the treaty allows reservations?  
1.      Prohibits reservations altogether 
2.      Prohibits reservations that undermine treaty’s object and purpose 
3.      Prohibits reservations on some specific substantive issue or group of issues 
4.      Prohibits reservations on some specific procedural issue or group of issues (e.g., 
dispute resolution) 
5.      Allows reservations generally (silent on what type are allowed) 
6.      Allows reservations that do not undermine treaty’s object and purpose 
7.      Allows reservations on some specific substantive issue or group of issues 
8.      Allows reservations on some specific procedural issue or group of issues (e.g., 
dispute resolution) 
77.    Other 
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88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable (does not address reservations) 
Q48.   How does the proposal address the substantive rights of the protected group? 
1. Adds a right or protection afforded to the protected group 
2.  Removes a right or protection afforded to the protected group 
3.       Expands a right or protection already afforded to the protected group 
4.       Narrows a right already or protection afforded to the protected group 
5.       Provides an initial definition of the protected group 
6.       Expands the definition of the protected group 
7.       Narrows the definition of the protected group 
8.  Provides an initial definition of the rights or protections afforded to the protected 
group 
77.     Other 
88.     Multiple above 
99.     Not applicable 
Q49.   How does the proposal address the scope of the treaty’s jurisdiction? 
1. Broadens the jurisdiction by increasing the circumstances under which it will apply  
2. Narrows the jurisdiction by creating circumstances under which it will not apply  
Ø   Some treaties have force only where other international instruments or domestic 
processes are absent or ineffective26 
3. Broadens the jurisdiction by regulating the conduct of additional parties 
                                               
26 Example 1: CAT: “The representative of Brazil proposed, in a spirit of compromise, a modified system 
under which the principle of universal jurisdiction would apply under certain conditions and on a subsidiary 
basis, only if the States of territorial or national jurisdiction did not request extradition within a set period or 
if a request were denied.” Example 2: The representative of the United States explained her difficulty in 
accepting proposed paragraph 1 [“This Convention … shall be applicable, in all its terms, all territories under 
the jurisdiction of States which become parties thereto”] and suggested that it should be reformulated to 
reflect the concern of States with a federal system. ICRMW: A/C.3/39/1, ¶ 24 
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Ø   Some treaties purport to regulate behavior by non-states parties.  For instance, the 
Rome Statute of the ICC regulates behavior by private individuals. 
4. Narrows the jurisdiction by regulating the conduct of fewer parties 
77.    Other 
88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable 
 
Q50.   How does the proposal address how states implement the proposal 
domestically? 
1.      Imposes fewer, less stringent, or more flexible requirements for implementing 
legislation or other domestic obligations 
2.  Imposes more, more stringent, or less flexible requirements for implementing 
legislation or other domestic obligations 
99.    Not applicable 
Q51.   On its face, how does the proposal affect the burden of state compliance 
generally? 
1.      Adds to, or increases the burden of, all states parties’ responsibilities 
Ø   Proposals coded as adds to, or increases the burden of, state-parties’ 
responsibilities increase the responsibilities of states parties to the convention 
generally. They include, inter alia, proposals to increase the rights afforded to the 
protected group, expand the protected group, relinquish authority to third-party 
organizations, strengthen the enforcement of the convention, widen the jurisdiction 
of the treaty, and to diminish the ability of states parties to make RUDs.27  
                                               
27 Example 1: The representative of Pakistan suggested replacing the sentence “Migrant workers and 
members of their families shall have the right to be fully informed of the length of time during which they 
may be absent from the State of employment” with the sentence “Migrant workers and member of their 
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2.      Reduces, or reduces the burden of, all states parties’ responsibilities 
Ø   Proposals coded as reduces, or reduces the burden of, states parties’ 
responsibilities lessen the responsibilities of states parties to the convention 
generally. They include, inter alia, proposals to reduce the rights afforded to the 
protected group, shrink the size of the protected group, carve out exceptions on the 
basis of domestic law and/or existing international law, weaken the enforcement of 
the convention, curtail the jurisdiction of the treaty, and augment states parties’ 
abilities to make RUDs28 
3.      Adds to, or increases the burden of, some but not all states parties’ responsibilities 
Ø   Similar to 1, except the increase in responsibilities facially falls on only some 
parties 
4.      Reduces, or reduces the burden of, some but not all states parties’ responsibilities 
Ø   Similar to 2, except the decrease in responsibilities facially falls on only some 
parties 
5.      No discernable facial change to states parties’ responsibilities 
                                               
families shall have the right to be temporarily absent from the State of employment under conditions 
established by that State.” A/C.3/37/7, ¶ 29.  Example 2: With regard to paragraph (1), the delegation of 
Yugoslavia orally proposed to add the word "occupational,’’ after the word "social,” to put a comma at the 
end of the paragraph after the word "interests,” and to add the sentence "including the preservation of their 
national and cultural identity and links with the State of origin.” A/C.3/37/7, ¶ 41 
28 Example 1: Netherlands proposed replacing the words “subject to no limitations other than those 
provided for in this convention” with “subject to such limitations as imposed on it by this convention or other 
rules of international law.” A/C.3/37/7, ¶ 17.  Example 2: United States proposed changing the language from 
“Each State Party to the present Convention shall be free to determine the criteria for authorizing the 
admission, stay, employment or other economic activity of migrant workers and members of their families, 
and to decide in each case whether to grant any such authorization, subject to no limitations other than those 
provided for in this convention. Any conditions subject to which the admission, stay, employment or other 
economic activity of migrant workers and members of their families is authorized shall not be such as to 
impair, nor be applied so as to impair, the rights and guarantees provided for in this Convention.” to “Nothing 
in the present convention shall affect the right of each State Party to establish in its national legislation the 
legal criteria governing the admission, duration of stay, type of employment or other economic activity, and 
all other matters relating to the immigration and employment status of migrant workers and members of their 
families.” A/C.37/7, ¶ 18. Example 3: The representative of the United States suggested that the "freedom to 




Ø   If the effect on state-parties’ responsibilities is unclear, code as no discernable 
change to states parties’ responsibilities.  No Discernable Change to State-Parties’ 
Responsibilities category includes, inter alia, proposals to alter the perambulatory 
clauses and edit titles/headings in the treaty. Many proposals that fall under other 
categories in the Substantive Aspects Addressed typology also fall under this 
category. For example, proposals that target provisions relating to substantive rights 
often merely clarify, refine, or rearrange those provisions without any effect on the 
responsibilities of the states parties.29  
77.    Other 
99.    Not applicable 
2.5   Reception and Outcome 
Q52.   What is the name of the first state that expressed a position on the proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   If a role call vote is taken on a proposal, votes in favor of [opposed to] the proposal 
should be coded as unqualified support for [unqualified opposition to] it. 
Ø   Where states express positions collectively and simultaneously, in determining the 
order, use the order listed in the document.   
99.    Not applicable (no first state position) 
Q53.   What is the nature of that first state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
                                               
29 Example 1: “The representative of the Byelorussian SSR, suggested that the whole article should be 
restructured by starting it with a phrase stating ‘with the exception of cases referred to in paragraph 3 of 
Article 2 of the present Convention, the term ‘migrant worker’ refers to….” ICRMW: A/C.3/40/1, ¶ 151. 
Example 2: [Proposed article 81 (2) by the representative of Denmark]: “Such declaration does not affect the 
rights established for migrant workers and members of their families in the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.” ICRMW: A/C.3/39/4, ¶ 78. Example 3: [Proposed article by the representatives of Sri Lanka and 
India] “States Parties to the present Convention shall remain free to conclude bilateral or multilateral 
agreements, subject to no limitations other than those provided for in this Convention…” ICRMW: 
A/C.3/38/5, ¶ 69 
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2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   Code as mixed/ambivalence only if the party’s comments do not reveal its position 
(i.e., for or against) on the proposal, or where the comments are perfectly balanced 
between support and opposition.   
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no first state position) 
Q54.   What is the name of the second state that expressed a position on the proposal?
  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.    Not applicable (no second state position)  
Q55.   What is the nature of that second state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no second state position) 
Q56.   What is the name of the third state that expressed a position on the proposal? 
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
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Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no third state position) 
Q57.   What is the nature of that third state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no third state position) 
Q58.   What is the name of the fourth state that expressed a position on the proposal?
  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.    Not applicable (no fourth state position) 
Q59.   What is the nature of that fourth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fourth state position) 
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Q60.   What is the name of the fifth state that expressed a position on the proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q61.   What is the nature of that fifth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q62.   What is the name of the sixth state that expressed a position on the proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q63.   What is the nature of that sixth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
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5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q64.   What is the name of the seventh state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q65.   What is the nature of that seventh state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q66.   What is the name of the eighth state that expressed a position on the proposal?
  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q67.   What is the nature of that eighth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
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2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q68.   What is the name of the ninth state that expressed a position on the proposal?
  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q69.   What is the nature of that ninth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q70.   What is the name of the tenth state that expressed a position on the proposal?
  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
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Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q71.   What is the nature of that tenth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q72.   What is the name of the eleventh state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q73.   What is the nature of that eleventh state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
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Q74.   What is the name of the twelfth state that expressed a position on the proposal?
  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q75.   What is the nature of that twelfth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q76.   What is the name of the thirteenth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q77.   What is the nature of that thirteenth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
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Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q78.   What is the name of the fourteenth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q79.   What is the nature of that fourteenth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q80.   What is the name of the fifteenth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
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Q81.   What is the nature of that fifteenth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q82.   What is the name of the sixteenth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q83.   What is the nature of that sixteenth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
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Q84.   What is the name of the seventeenth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q85.   What is the nature of that seventeenth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q86.   What is the name of the eighteenth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q87.   What is the nature of that eighteenth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
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Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q88.   What is the name of the nineteenth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q89.   What is the nature of that nineteenth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q90.   What is the name of the twentieth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
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Q91.   What is the nature of that twentieth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q92.   What is the name of the twenty-first state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q93.   What is the nature of that twenty-first state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
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Q94.   What is the name of the twenty-second state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q95.   What is the nature of that twenty-second state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q96.   What is the name of the twenty-third state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q97.   What is the nature of that twenty-third state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
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Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q98.   What is the name of the twenty-fourth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q99.   What is the nature of that twenty-fourth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q100.  What is the name of the twenty-fifth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
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Q101.  What is the nature of that twenty-fifth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q102.  What is the name of the twenty-sixth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q103.  What is the nature of that twenty-sixth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
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Q104.  What is the name of the twenty-seventh state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q105.  What is the nature of that twenty-seventh state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q106.  What is the name of the twenty-eighth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q107.  What is the nature of that twenty-eighth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
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Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q108.  What is the name of the twenty-ninth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q109.  What is the nature of that twenty-ninth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q110.  What is the name of the thirtieth state that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Use COW state index abbreviation to code) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
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Q111.  What is the nature of that thirtieth state’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no fifth state position) 
Q112.  How many additional states (beyond the first thirty) express positions on the 
proposal, and what are the states’ identities? 
(Fill in)  
Ø   If the number of states expressing positions exceeds thirty, fill in the number and 
write down its/their identity.  So if eight states express positions, fill in “1” and give 
the COW abbreviation of the eighth state. 
 
Q113.  How many total states express positions on the proposal? 
(Fill in)  
 
Q114.  What is the name of the first IGO/NGO that expressed a position on the 
proposal? 
(Fill in) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.   Not applicable (no first IGO/NGO position) 
 198 
Q115.  What is the nature of that first IGO/NGO’s position?  
1.      Unqualified support 
2.      Qualified support 
3.      Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.      Concern/reservation 
5.      Unqualified opposition 
99.    Not applicable (no first IGO/NGO position) 
Q116.  What is the name of the second IGO/NGO that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.     Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q117.  What is the nature of that second IGO/NGO’s position?  
 
1.     Unqualified Support 
2.     Qualified Support 
3.     Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.     Concern/reservation 
5.     Unqualified Opposition 
99.   Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
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Q118.  What is the name of the third IGO/NGO that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.     Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q119.  What is the nature of that third IGO/NGO’s position?  
 
1.     Unqualified Support 
2.     Qualified Support 
3.     Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.     Concern/reservation 
5.     Unqualified Opposition 
99.   Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q120.  What is the name of the fourth IGO/NGO that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.     Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q121.  What is the nature of that fourth IGO/NGO’s position?  
 
1.     Unqualified Support 
2.     Qualified Support 
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3.     Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.     Concern/reservation 
5.     Unqualified Opposition 
99.   Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q122.  What is the name of the fifth IGO/NGO that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.     Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q123.  What is the nature of that fifth IGO/NGO’s position?  
 
1.     Unqualified Support 
2.     Qualified Support 
3.     Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.     Concern/reservation 
5.     Unqualified Opposition 
99.   Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q124.  What is the name of the sixth IGO/NGO that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
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99.     Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q125.  What is the nature of that sixth IGO/NGO’s position?  
 
1.     Unqualified Support 
2.     Qualified Support 
3.     Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.     Concern/reservation 
5.     Unqualified Opposition 
99.   Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q126.  What is the name of the seventh IGO/NGO that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.     Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q127.  What is the nature of that seventh IGO/NGO’s position?  
 
1.     Unqualified Support 
2.     Qualified Support 
3.     Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.     Concern/reservation 
5.     Unqualified Opposition 
99.   Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
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Q128.  What is the name of the eighth IGO/NGO that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.     Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q129.  What is the nature of that eighth IGO/NGO’s position?  
 
1.     Unqualified Support 
2.     Qualified Support 
3.     Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.     Concern/reservation 
5.     Unqualified Opposition 
99.   Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q130.  What is the name of the ninth IGO/NGO that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.     Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q131.  What is the nature of that ninth IGO/NGO’s position?  
 
1.     Unqualified Support 
2.     Qualified Support 
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3.     Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.     Concern/reservation 
5.     Unqualified Opposition 
99.   Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q132.  What is the name of the tenth IGO/NGO that expressed a position on the 
proposal?  
(Fill in) 
Ø   See note on Q52. 
99.     Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
Q133.  What is the nature of that tenth IGO/NGO’s position?  
 
1.     Unqualified Support 
2.     Qualified Support 
3.     Mixed/ambivalence 
Ø   See note on Q53. 
4.     Concern/reservation 
5.     Unqualified Opposition 
99.   Not applicable (no second IGO/NGO position) 
 
Q134.  How many additional IGOs/NGOs (beyond the first two) express positions on 
the proposal, and what are the IGOs’/NGOs’ identities? 
(Fill in) 
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Ø   If the number of IGOs/NGOs expressing positions exceeds two, fill in the excess 
number and write down its/their identity.   
 
Q135.  How many total IGOs/NGOs express positions on the proposal? 
(Fill in) 
Q136.  What was the body as-a-whole’s view on the proposal (original or as modified, 
whenever it was decided on)?  
1. Received consensus or unanimous support 
2. Received consensus or unanimous opposition 
3.      Received mixed reaction, with more support than opposition 
4.      Received mixed reaction, with more opposition than support 
5.      No discernable view expressed 
6. Unclear or unstated 
77.    Other 
 
Ø   If a proposal is passed with all in favor, none opposed but a few abstentions, it is 
not unanimous support, but it is  nonetheless a “consensus,” so it should be coded 
1. 
Ø   For the purpose of this question, where the proposal in question drew a response, 
do not consider any later decisions on later proposals that effectively 
nullified/altered the original proposal in question, unless the new decision explicitly 
mentioned the proposal in question.30  
                                               
30 For instance, suppose State X proposed that states parties would be required to submit a report every 
five years and that the proposal was then discussed, adopted, and incorporated into the treaty.  One year later, 
State Y proposed that states parties would be required to submit a report every four years, which was likewise 
adopted, replacing the five-year rule.  State Y’s proposal would not be considered in coding State X’s 
proposal.   
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Q137.  When was a conclusive decision reached on the proposal?  
1.      Immediately upon its introduction in the meeting 
2.      Later during the same meeting 
3.   At the next working body meeting immediately following its introduction 
4.    At some subsequent working group/committee/body meeting (but not the one 
immediately following its introduction) 
77.    Other 
99     Not applicable (available documents do not show a decision’s being reached) 
 
Ø   For the purpose of this question, where the proposal in question drew a response, 
do not consider any later decisions on later proposals that effectively 
nullified/altered the original proposal in question, unless the new decision explicitly 
mentioned the proposal in question.  See footnote 30. 
Q138.  How was the proposal acted on by the body?  
1.     Accepted immediately (without significant deliberation) as proposed 
Ø   Proposals that are accepted without any modifications, and without more than one 
page (or multiple reports) of deliberation.  
2.      Accepted as proposed after substantial deliberation 
Ø   Proposals that are accepted without any modifications, but with deliberation.  .  The 
deliberation must take up more than one page of a working group report, or else it 
must appear in multiple reports. 
3.      Accepted with modifications after significant deliberation 
Ø   Proposals that were accepted by the drafters, but with modifications. These 
proposals tend to include whole paragraphs of specific language, which is modified 
during the drafting process but retains its core substance.  The deliberation must 
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take up more than one page of a working group report, or else it must appear in 
multiple reports. 
4.      Rejected immediately without significant deliberation as proposed 
Ø   Proposals that were rejected by the drafters without significant debate. A proposal 
that is rejected out of hand may provoke some discussion, but the discussion does 
not take up more than one page of a working group report.  While these proposals 
appear in a working group report (otherwise they would be coded as ignored), they 
do not appear in more than one report. If they appear in multiple reports, they should 
be coded as rejected after deliberation.31 
5.      Rejected as proposed after significant deliberation 
Ø   Proposals that were rejected by the drafters, but after significant debate. Unlike 
proposals rejected out of hand, these proposals take up more than one page of 
discussion in a single working group report or else are the subject of discussion 
across multiple working group reports.32 
6.      Ignored 
                                               
31 Example 1: “With regard to preambular paragraph 17, the representative of Ecuador referred to the 
phrase ‘fundamental human rights’ included in the draft proposals both in column A and column C of 
document A/C.3/36/WG.1/WP.1 and requested that in this paragraph…it should be changed to read ‘the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’, in accordance with the already agreed-upon language used in the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenants 
on Human Rights” See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/36/10, ¶ 24. The final text of draft preambular paragraph 17 in the 
ICRMW: “Bearing in mind that the human problems involved in migration are even more serious in the case 
of irregular migration and convinced therefore that appropriate action should be encouraged in order to 
prevent and eliminate clandestine movements and trafficking in migrant workers, while at the same time 
assuring the protection of their fundamental human rights, After this brief statement in the 1981 report, the 
ICRMW Working Group gave Ecuador’s proposal to change the language no further consideration.   
32 Example 1: “The representative of the Ukrainian SSR proposed the following amendments to the text: 
in paragraphs (1) and (2), change the wording from ‘to have or to adopt a religion’ to ‘to have or not to have 
and to adopt or not to adopt a religion’;” See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/36/10, ¶ 39. The Ukrainian SSR made the 
above proposal in October 1981 and the Working Group placed the words “or not to have” and “or not to 
adopt” in brackets. In September 1985, many meetings later, the Working Group finally decided to eliminate 
the language: “After some discussion, the Working Group agreed to delete the words "[or not to have]’ and 
‘‘[or not to adopt]" in paragraphs (1) and (2) and to delete the brackets around the second sentence of 
paragraph (1).” See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/41/3, ¶ 128 
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Ø   Note that proposals that appear in the final treaty text are coded as ignored if thy 
are not explicitly addressed by the drafting body; in some cases, the final provision 
derives from another, similar proposal.33     
7.      Not formally accepted or rejected itself, but used in forming or developing later 
proposals 
77.    Other 
Ø   Where a decision was made on the proposal in question, for the purpose of this 
question, do not consider any later decisions on later proposals that effectively 
nullified/altered the decision about the original proposal in question, unless the new 
decision mentions the proposal in question. 
Q139.   In what document(s), other than the one in which it was first introduced 
(Questions 5 and 6 above), was the proposal discussed? 
(Fill in document number(s).) 
99.    Not applicable (discussed in only one document) 
Q140.  How is the proposal ultimately reflected in the final treaty?  
1.      Appears in treaty exactly as proposed 
2.      Appears in treaty with minor modifications34 
                                               
33  Example 1: In the G77’s first draft, they made a proposal: “Every migrant worker shall enjoy 
exemption from import duties in the State of destination in respect of the importation of his personal effects 
and work tools or equipment; the same exemption shall be granted in his State of origin on his return thereto. 
These exemptions shall also apply to the personal effects of his family.” See U.N. Doc. 
A/C.3/35/WG.1/CRP.7, art. 23. The Working Group never discussed the G77 proposal in any of its reports.  
See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/38/1. 
34 Example 1: “Considering the situation of vulnerability in which migrant workers find themselves in 
the receiving societies for objective reasons relating, among other tings, to their absence from their country 
of departure and to the difficulties of their insertion in the receiving society,” See U.N. Doc. 
A/C.3/35/WG.1/CRP.9, ¶ 7. The final text of preambular paragraph nine of the ICRMW: “Considering the 
situation of vulnerability in which migrant workers and members of their families frequently-find themselves 
owing, among other things, to their absence from their State of origin and to the difficulties they may 
encounter arising from their presence in the State of employment,”. Example 2:“Realizing the importance 
and extent of the migration phenomenon, which involves millions of people and affects a large number of 
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3.     Appears in treaty with substantial modifications 
4.      Does not appear in treaty, or a competing proposal appears in treaty 
5. Proposal is general and appears spirit of proposal appears in treaty35 
6. Uncertain/Unclear 
77.    Other 
99.  Not applicable 
Q141.   In what article(s) and paragraph(s) of the final treaty is the proposal codified?
  
(Fill in) (A.¶.#) (article.paragraph.subparagraph/sentence) 
99.    Not applicable (does not appear in treaty) 
                                               
countries in the international community” See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/35/WG.1/CRP.9, ¶ 10. The final text of 
preambular paragraph seven of the ICRMW: “Realizing the importance and extent of the migration 
phenomenon, which involves millions of people and affects a large number of States in the international 
community….” 
35 Example: “The representative of Norway suggested that mention should be made of the Commission 
for Social Development and of other United Nations agencies, such as the FAO, which had important 
programmes for the welfare of migrant workers and their families” See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/35/WG.1/CRP.16, 
¶ 23The final text of preambular paragraph five of the ICRMW: “Recognizing the importance of the work 
done in connection with migrant workers and members of their families in various organs of the United 
Nations, in particular in the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission for Social Development, 
and in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization, as well as in other international 
organizations…” Example: A proposal by the representative of Jamaica with the support of the 
representatives of Algeria, Egypt, Spain and Turkey and consisted of the formulation of a list of principles 
and basic rights which are applicable to all migrant workers and their families regardless of their status 
followed by the formulation, in separate sections of the Convention, of a list of rights applicable to 
documented migrant workers in a regular situation. The final convention contains a Part (III) on the Human 
Rights of All Migrant workers and Members of their Families followed by a Part (IV) on the Other Rights of 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families who are Documented or in a Regular Situation. 
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2.6   CEDAW-Specific Substance 
Q200.  How does the proposal seek to change the definition of discrimination against 
women? 
1. Expands it to all discrimination on the basis of sex 
2. Narrows it to only discrimination against women 
3. Expands it to include “preferences,” or the like 
4. Narrows it to exclude “preference,” or the like 
77.  Other 
88.  Multiple above 
99.  Not applicable 
Q201.     How does the proposal seek to modify the means by which states must pursue 
a policy of eliminating discrimination against women? 
1.  Expands them to include non-legislative practices 
2.  Narrows them to include legal practices only 
3.  Expands them to include discrimination “in all its forms,” or the like  
4.  Narrow them to exclude discrimination “in all its forms,” or the like 
5.  Expands them to require states to include the principle of equality in their national 
constitutions or legislation 
6.  Narrows them to allow states to decide whether or not to include the principle of 
equality in their national constitutions or legislation 
7.  Expands them to require states to ensure that private institutions refrain from 
engaging in discrimination against women 
8.  Narrows them to only require states to ensure that “public authorities” refrain from 
engaging in discrimination against women 
9.  Expands them to require states to modify or abolish “customs and practices” that 
constitute discrimination against women 
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10.  Narrows them to require states to only modify or abolish laws and regulations that 
constitute discrimination against women 
11.  Expands them to require states to repeal penal provisions that constitute 
discrimination against women 
12.  Narrows them to exclude the repeal of penal provisions that constitute 
discrimination against women 
77.  Other 
88.   Multiple above 





Q202.    How does the proposal seek to change state responsibility to implement 
temporary special measures (AKA positive action, affirmative action, or reverse 
discrimination)?   
1.  Expands it to make the imposition of such measures mandatory 
2.  Narrows it to make the imposition of such measures permissible  
3.  Excludes such measures from the treaty entirely 
4.  Expands it to allow for permanent measures 
5.  Narrows it to temporary measures, which must be discontinued when their 
objective have been achieved 
6.  Expands it to allow measures for men as well as women 
7.  Narrows it to only allow measures for women 
8.  Expands it to include special measures aimed at protecting maternity  
9.  Narrows it to exclude special measures aimed at protecting maternity  
77.  Other 
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88.    Multiple above 
99.    Not applicable 
Q203.    How does the proposal seek to modify state responsibility to eliminate 
prejudices? 
1.  Expands it to prohibit incitement to discrimination against women or the advocacy 
of the superiority of one sex over the other 
2.  Narrows it to exclude the prohibition of incitement to discrimination against women 
or the advocacy of the superiority of one sex over the other  
3.  Expands it to include “educating public opinion,” or the like 
4.  Narrows it to exclude “educating public opinion,” or the like 
5.  Expands it to include “protection of motherhood,” or the like 
6.  Narrows it to exclude “protection of motherhood,” or the like 
77.  Other 
99.  Not Applicable 
Q204.    How does the proposal seek to change state responsibility regarding sex 
trafficking and prostitution? 
1.  Expands it to include combating commercial advertisements contrary to the dignity 
of women or media exploitation 
2.  Narrows it to exclude combating commercial advertisements contrary to the dignity 
of women or media exploitation 
3.  Expands it to include the suppression of all prostitution 
4.  Narrows it to only include the suppression of exploitation of prostitution 
77.  Other 
99.  Not Applicable 
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Q205.  How does the proposal seek to modify state responsibility regarding violence 
against women? 
1.  Expands the Convention to explicitly address violence against women 
2.  Narrows the Convention to exclude explicit references to violence against women 
77.  Other 
99.  Not Applicable 
Q206.  How does the proposal seek to change state responsibility regarding 
discrimination against women in politics and public life? 
1.  Expands state responsibility regarding discrimination against women in politics and 
public life 
2.  Narrows state responsibility regarding discrimination against women in politics and 
public life 
77.  Other 
99.  Not Applicable 
Q207.  How does the proposal seek to modify the right of women to represent their 
governments at the international level? 
 
1.  Expands the right of women to represent their government at the international level 
2.  Narrows the right of women to represent their government at the international level 
77.  Other 
99.  Not Applicable 
Q208.  How does the proposal seek to change women’s rights with respect to 
nationality? 
1.  Expands women’s rights with respect to nationality 
2.  Narrows women’s rights with respect to nationality 
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77.  Other 
99.  Not Applicable 
 
 
Q209.  How does the proposal seek to modify women’s rights in education? 
1.  Expands women’s rights with respect to education 
2.  Narrows women’s rights with respect to education 
77.  Other 
99.  Not Applicable 
Q210.  How does the proposal seek to change women’s rights regarding employment? 
1.  Expands women’s rights regarding employment 
2.  Narrows women’s rights regarding employment 
77.   Other 
99.   Not Applicable 
Q211.  How does the proposal seek to modify state responsibility regarding 
discrimination against women on the basis of marriage and/or pregnancy? 
1.  Expands women’s rights with respect to discrimination on the basis of marriage 
and/or pregnancy 
2.  Narrows women’s rights with respect to discrimination on the basis of marriage 
and/or pregnancy 
77.  Other 
99.  Not Applicable 




1.  Expands women’s rights with respect to healthcare 
2.  Narrows women’s rights with respect to healthcare 
77.  Other 
 99.  Not Applicable 
Q213.    How does the proposal seek to change state responsibility regarding rural 
women?  
 
1.  Expands the rights of rural women 
2.  Narrows the rights of rural women 
3.  Introduces explicit reference to the rights of rural women 
4.  Removes explicit reference to the rights of rural women  
77.  Other 
99. Not Applicable 
 
 
Q214.    How does the proposal seek to modify state responsibility regarding the legal 
capacity of women?  
 
1.  Expands women’s rights with respect to legal capacity 
2.  Narrows women’s rights with respect to legal capacity 
77.   Other 
99.   Not Applicable 
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Q215.    How does the proposal seek to change women’s rights with respect to 
marriage and family relations? 
1.  Expands women’s rights with respect to marriage and family relations 
2.  Narrows women’s rights with respect to marriage and family relations 
3.  Prohibits child marriage  
77.  Other 
88.  Multiple above  
99.  Not Applicable 
Q216.    How does the proposal seek to change responsibility for enforcing/monitoring 
the treaty? 
 
1.  Grants the responsibility to the Commission on the Status of Women 
2.  Creates an ad-hoc committee of states parties and members of the Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Council to supervise the treaty 
3.  Creates an independent committee to supervise the treaty 
77.  Other 
99.  Not Applicable 
Q217.    How does the proposal seek to modify the structure of CEDAW’s treaty body 
(eventually named the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women)?  
 
1.  Expands the powers of the Committee 
2.  Narrows the powers of the Committee 
3.  Changes the term of Committee members 
4.  Requires that a certain number or percentage of members of the Committee must 
be women 
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5.  Eliminates any requirements regarding the number or percentage of women on the 
Committee 
6.  Changes other criteria regarding the selection/election of Committee members 
77.  Other 
99.  Not Applicable 
Q218.    How does the proposal seek to modify the periodic reporting process? 
1.  Increases the periodicity of reporting 
2.  Decreases the periodicity of reporting 
3.  Increases the comprehensiveness of periodic reports 
4.  Decreases the comprehensiveness of periodic reports 
77.  Other  
88.  Multiple above 
99.  Not Applicable 
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2.7   MWC-Specific Substance 
Q250.  How does the proposal seek to change the definition of migrant worker?   
1.      Adds groups/types of workers from the definition 
2.      Removes groups/types of workers from the definition 
77.    Other 
99. Not applicable 
Q251.  How does the proposal seek to modify the rights of migrant workers and 
members of their families?  
1.      Adds a right afforded to all migrant workers 
2.      Removes a right afforded to all migrant workers 
3.      Expands a right afforded to all migrant workers 
4.      Narrows a right afforded to all migrant workers 
77.    Other 
99. Not applicable 
Q252.  How does the proposal seek to modify the definition of members of their 
families? 
1.      Adds categories of family members from the definition 
2.      Removes categories of family members from the definition 
77.    Other 
99. Not applicable 
Q253.  How does the proposal seek to modify the definition of documented workers?  
1.      Expands the definition of documented workers 
2.      Narrows the definition of documented workers 
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77.    Other 
99. Not applicable 
Q254.  How does the proposal seek to modify the definition of undocumented 
workers? 
1.      Expands the definition of undocumented workers 
2.      Narrows the definition of undocumented workers 
77.    Other 
99. Not applicable 
Q255.  How does the proposal seek to modify the duties  of states vis-à-vis migrant 
workers and members of their families in an irregular situation?  
1.      Increases protections for migrant workers in an irregular situation 
2.      Decreases protections for migrant workers in an irregular situation  
3.     Increases responsibilities to curb employment of migrant workers in an irregular 
situation  
4.     Decreases responsibilities to curb employment of migrant workers in an irregular 
situation  
5.      Increases duties to curb illegal or clandestine movements of migrant workers  
6.      Decreases duties to curb illegal or clandestine movements of migrant workers   
77.    Other 
99. Not applicable 
Q256.  How does the proposal seek to modify the rights afforded only to migrant 
workers and members of their families in a regular situation?  
1.      Adds a right afforded to migrant workers in a regular situation 
2.      Removes a right afforded to migrant workers in a regular situation 
3.      Expands a right afforded to migrant workers in a regular situation 
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4.      Narrows a right afforded to migrant workers in a regular situation 
77.    Other 
99. Not applicable 
Q257.  How does the proposal seek to change the definition of states of origin, 
employment, or transit?  
1.      Expands the definition of state of origin 
2.      Narrows the definition of state of origin 
3.      Expands the definition of state of employment 
4.      Narrows the definition of state of employment 
5.      Expands the definition of state of transit 
6.      Narrows the definition of state of transit 
77.    Other 
99. Not applicable 
Q258.  How does the proposal seek to modify the International Labor Organization’s 
(ILO) responsibility to enforce/supervise/monitor the treaty?  
1.     Increases the ILO’s powers 
2.      Decreases the ILO’s powers 
77.    Other 
99. Not applicable 
Q259.  How does the proposal seek to modify the structure of the treaty monitoring 
body?  
1. Creates the committee 
2. Eliminates the committee 
3.      Increases the size of the committee 
4.      Decreases the size of the committee 
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5.      Changes the rules regarding the selection/election of committee members 
6.      Changes the term of committee members 
7.      Expands the powers of the committee 
8.      Narrows the powers of the committee 
77.    Other 
99. Not applicable 
Q260.  How does the proposal seek to modify the rights afforded to particular 
categories of migrant workers and members of their families (e.g. frontier 
workers)?  
1.      Adds a right afforded to migrant workers in a regular situation 
2.      Removes a right afforded to migrant workers in a regular situation 
3.      Expands a right afforded to migrant workers in a regular situation 
4.      Narrows a right afforded to migrant workers in a regular situation 
77.    Other 





2.8   CERD-Specific Substance 
[to come] 
Q300.  How does the proposal seek to treat national origin as a protected class? 
 
1.     Adds national origin as a protected class                    
2.     Eliminates national origin as a protected class 
3.     Narrows the definition of national origin  
4.     Broadens the definition of national origin 
77.   Other 
88.   Multiple above 
99.   Not applicable 









Q303.  How does the proposal seek to change states' responsibility regarding racist 




Q304.  How does the proposal seek to change states' responsibility regarding the 






Q305.  How does the proposal seek to modify the structure of ICERD’s treaty body 










Q307.  How does the proposal seek to change individuals' right to complain to the 
international treaty body? 
 
Q308.  How does the proposal seek to address financing of treaty bodies? 
 
 
Q309.  How does the proposal seek to modify the rights of people in non-independent 
territories? 
 








Ø   References to “Nazism” could fall within this question if the proposal has in mind 
combatting anti-Jewish views or actions; anti-semitism is often considered an 
important element of Nazism. 
 
 




Q313.  How does the proposal seek to change responsibility to enforce/monitor the 
treaty? 
 
Q314.  How does the proposal seek to address the acknowledgement of colonialism? 
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